Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Aplicación de programas de gestión sanitaria en criaderos marinos

La primera necesidad de los peces es la higiene. La elaboración de Programas de Gestión Sanitaria (PGS) aplicables a la industria, dentro de un marco realista y eficiente, pueden contribuir positivamente a la mejora sistemática de la productividad, afectando no sólo a la cantidad y calidad del producto, sino directamente a la eficiencia económica de la empresa. Las principales normas deben quedar reflejadas dentro de un Plan de Control Sanitario (PCS) de la instalación, normas que deben ser de obligado cumplimiento, tanto para los trabajadores como para las visitas. El seguimiento del PCS se realiza mediante la aplicación de un Sistema de Análisis de Peligros y Puntos Críticos de Control (APPCC), sistema que forma parte, a su vez, del Sistema de Gestión de la Calidad (SGC). No será factible la aplicación de ninguno de estos programas, planes y sistemas sin un uso racional del autocontrol. Hygiene is the first need that fish have. The elaboration of the Sanitary Management Programs (SMP) which industrial application, inside a realistic and efficient framework, could contribute positively to the systematic improvement of the production, affecting not only to the quantity and quality of the product, but that affect directly to the economic efficiency of the company. The main norms will be reflected in a Sanitary Control Plan (SCP) of the facilities, these norms must be obligatory fulfilment for the workers and visits. The monitoring of the SCP will do meanly the application of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP), system that it is a part, also, of the Quality Management System (QMS). It is not possible, the application of any of this programs, plans and systems, without a rational use of the auto control processes.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Establiment de bases científiques per al desenvolupament d'una estratègia integrada per avaluar toxicitat en reproducció

Report for the scientific sojourn at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Netherlands, from 2006 to 2008. This project aimed at creating scientific elements that could help deriving an integrated testing strategy for reproductive toxicity. Part of the project focused on the use of alternative tests for regulatory purposes. An in vitro-in vivo extrapolation method for embryotoxicity was proposed and evaluated. In vitro and in vivo dose descriptors were correlated; however, the scatter in the correlation was too large to allow an accurate estimation of an in vivo dose from an in vitro dose. The in vitro-in vivo extrapolation method together with toxicokinetic data was also applied to a category of substances (phthalates). Although based on a limited number of substances, the results suggested that in vitro-in vivo extrapolation for embryotoxicity is possible within a category of compounds if adequate toxicokinetic data is available. Because of the limitations that still remain in the use of alternative tests for reproductive toxicicity, other approaches to reduce animal testing were explored. Thus, a database of reproductive toxicity studies was created to retrospectively evaluate the comparative value of some studies or elements in a particular study. When compared to the subchronic toxicity study, the rat two-generation reproductive toxicity study had a considerable impact on the identification of hazard for reproductive toxicity, but not on the overall NOAEL. Among the two-generation studies included in our database, the second generation affected neither the overall NOAEL nor the critical effect. The rat and the rabbit developmental toxicity studies were, on average, similarly sensitive. However, for certain substances the developmental study in either one of the two species appeared to be more sensitive than in the other species.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Efecto de los contenidos de C, Mn y Si en el comportamiento a fluencia en caliente de aceros de construcción al carbono y microaleados: aplicación a la obtención de grano ultrafino en productos largos laminados

Després d’aplicar alguns tractaments d’elaboració i conservació als aliments, queden bacteris lesionats. Aquests bacteris perden la capacitat de créixer en els medis de cultiu selectiu convencionals, de manera que se’n subestima el recompte. Malgrat això, poden recuperar-se als aliments i suposar un risc per la salut, ja que alguns encara poden mantenir activitat metabòlica i integritat estructural. En aquest projecte, es van optimitzar protocols de preparació de mostres per citometria de flux (CF) per avaluar l’estat fisiològic de patògens alimentaris (Escherichia coli O157:H7, Salmonella Enteritidis i Listeria monocytogenes) sotmesos a estrès. Es van estudiar principalment dos paràmetres fisiològics: la integritat de membrana, mitjançant iodur de propidi i fluorocroms de la família SYTO; i l’activitat respiratòria, per la reducció intracel•lular d’una sal de tetrazole, el CTC. En primer lloc, es van avaluar variables de protocol, com la concentració de colorant, la ràtio entre colorants, la solució de tinció i el temps d’incubació, en mostres control (cèl•lules sanes i mortes). A continuació, els protocols optimitzats es van aplicar a suspensions bacterianes en medi de cultiu que prèviament havien estat sotmeses a estressos físics i fisicoquímics. Durant l’etapa final del projecte, els coneixements adquirits sobre la preparació de mostres per CF es van aplicar a l’anàlisi de mostres de matriu complexa: amanides comercials inoculades amb E. coli O157:H7. Als assajos amb indicadors d’integritat de membrana en suspensions bacterianes sotmeses a estrès, es van poder quantificar cèl•lules amb la membrana parcialment danyada (presumptes cèl•lules lesionades). El recompte de cèl•lules que mantingueren l’activitat respiratòria després de ser sotmeses a estrès va ser superior al que es va obtenir mitjançant recompte en placa convencional, cosa que va evidenciar la presència de cèl•lules actives però no cultivables. La introducció d’estratègies per reduir les interferències provocades per les partícules alimentàries i l’ús d’un anticòs amb marcatge fluorescent va permetre detectar selectivament les cèl•lules d’E. coli O157:H7 i avaluar-ne la integritat de membrana simultàniament. L’anàlisi de cèl•lules bacterianes per CF requereix de la exhaustiva optimització dels protocols, que són específics per cada soca i matriu. Malgrat això, i a diferència del mètode convencional per recompte en placa, ofereix la possibilitat d’obtenir una gran quantitat d’informació sobre el sovint complex estat fisiològic d’una mostra.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Social perceptions of floods and flood management in a Mediterranean area (Costa Brava, Spain)

Taking as an example three study cases in the Costa Brava area, this paper examines the social perceptionof floods through surveys, interviews and Focus Group sessions. Perception is then related to vulnerability, flood management, and citizen’s preferences regarding alternatives to curb flood losses in the future. The study concludes that flood awareness and the willingness to take actions regarding this hazard are clearly related to the degree of social involvement with the affairs of the local community. Furthermore, participatory settings such as Focus Group sessions appear to enable a better environment for assessing and implementing flood management options that attempt to modify human activities rather than modify natural processes as has been frequently the case in the past