Socio-economic impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games

Paper presented at the 2001 seminar of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB). The seminar offers a general reflection, from the time of the bid onwards, of the 2000 Games experience in Sydney and Australia.

Keys to interpret the Games: Sydney 2000 Olympics

Document published by the CEO-UAB, corresponding to the results of the research undertaken by the author during the celebration of the Sydney 2000 Games.

Olympic Villages after the Games

Article analysing the use of Olympic villages once the Games are finished. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Olympic Games as showcase

In the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, besides the country-versus-country typical showdown in the backdrop of Olympics, and the economic and political impulses for the host city, there was a third factor complicating the celebration: rivalry between the Catalan hosts and the Spanish state. By guiding the development of and eventual Olympic projection of national identity, Catalan and Spanish politicians hoped to create a resounding rallying point around which they could unite disparate individuals. The text is made up of: an introduction, five paragraphs on the different political perspective, conclusions, a commentary on the tallying of score and a note section with bibliographical references.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

The economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An analysis of first impacts and prospects

This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Inter-American Court, Crimes Against Humanity and Peacebuilding in South America

The present work contains a general overview of the sentences of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which have recognised that crimes against humanity are pre-existing in customary law, and do not prescribe, nor can they be subject to amnesty or pardon. Specific attention is paid to the consequent restrictions and opportunities offered by said verdicts to countries such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Peru, which find themselves in postconflict transition processes and where peace has been negotiated with certain groups and state structures that are responsible for carrying out crimes against humanity. In doing so, special attention is paid to the impact of the recognition of the nature of crimes against humanity on the notion of the principle of legality, stricto sensu; on the development and evolution of the doctrine and the practice of international human rights law in the inter-American context; and finally on the aforementioned processes of transitional justice.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.