The Lottery Blotto Game

In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game. JEL: C72, D74, H56. KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function.

Dialogic learning and interactive groups: an IMS LD template integrated in runtime systems

Dialogic learning and interactive groups have proved to be a useful methodological approach appliedin educational situations for lifelong adult learners. The principles of this approach stress theimportance of dialogue and equal participation also when designing the training activities. This paperadopts these principles as the basis for a configurable template that can be integrated in runtimesystems. The template is formulated as a meta-UoL which can be interpreted by IMS Learning Designplayers. This template serves as a guide to flexibly select and edit the activities at runtime (on the fly).The meta-UoL has been used successfully by a practitioner so as to create a real-life example, withpositive and encouraging results

Optable : The operation table serious game

Aquest treball consisteix en la realització d'un estudi al voltant dels anomenats serious games, jocs destinats a l'aprenentatge. Concretament, el projecte es centra en els serious games d'àmbit sanitari. A més d'un estudi de l'art, el treball consta del desenvolupament d'un serious game anomenat Optable per a la pràctica de la preparació del material quirúrgic d'una taula d'operacions. Aquesta aplicació ha estat desenvolupada sota llicència GNU GPL.

The customer valuations game as a basis for revenue management

I describe the customer valuations game, a simple intuitive game that can serve as a foundation for teaching revenue management. The game requires little or no preparation, props or software, takes around two hours (and hence can be finished in one session), and illustrates the formation of classical (airline and hotel) revenue management mechanisms such as advanced purchase discounts, booking limits and fixed multiple prices. I normally use the game as a base to introduce RM and to develop RM forecasting and optimization concepts off it. The game is particularly suited for non-technical audiences.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

We use a Colombian TV game show to test gender differences in competitivebehavior where there is no opportunity for discrimination and females face no genderspecificexternal constraints. Each game started with six contestants who had toanswer general knowledge questions in private. There were five rounds of questionsand, at the end of each, one participant was eliminated. Despite equality in startingnumbers, women earn less than men and exit the game at a faster rate. In particular,there are more voluntary withdrawals by women than men. We draw an analogybetween the game and the process by which employees rise through the levels of acorporation. As such, we note that glass ceilings may result, in part, from women sown behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave. At thesame time, our results illustrate that maintaining and promoting gender diversity at thelower/middle ranks of organizations is necessary to obtain gender diversity at the top.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Implementing interactive computing in an object-oriented environment

Statistical computing when input/output is driven by a Graphical User Interface is considered. A proposal is made for automatic control ofcomputational flow to ensure that only strictly required computationsare actually carried on. The computational flow is modeled by a directed graph for implementation in any object-oriented programming language with symbolic manipulation capabilities. A complete implementation example is presented to compute and display frequency based piecewise linear density estimators such as histograms or frequency polygons.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Interactive local bandwidth choice

A tool for user choice of the local bandwidth function for a kernel density estimate is developed using KDE, a graphical object-oriented package for interactive kernel density estimation written in LISP-STAT. The bandwidth function is a cubic spline, whose knots are manipulated by the user in one window, while the resulting estimate appears in another window. A real data illustration of this method raises concerns, because an extremely large family of estimates is available.