Well-posedness and invariant measures for HJM models with deterministic volatility and Lévy noise

We give sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness and ergodicity of invariant measures for Musiela's stochastic partial differential equation with deterministic volatility and a Hilbert space valued driving Lévy noise. Conditions for the absence of arbitrage and for the existence of mild solutions are also discussed.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

El largo ciclo electoral de Plataforma per Catalunya: del ámbito local a la implantación nacional (2003-2011)

El partido anti-inmigración Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) ha experimentado un progresivo crecimiento en la franja temporal que va desde su primera participación electoral en 2003 hasta las municipales de 2011. En dicho periodo temporal ha pasado de ser una formación presente exclusivamente en el ámbito local, y con un apoyo fuertemente concentrado en ciertos municipios de Cataluña, a recibir votos y tener secciones locales consolidadas en gran parte del territorio catalán. El texto trata de ofrecer claves interpretativas para entender tanto los éxitos como las debilidades de PxC a lo largo del ciclo electoral 2003-2011. Partiendo de la base de que actualmente existe en España una demanda electoral suficiente para el éxito de una formación como PxC, este trabajo se centra en el análisis de la estrategia política y electoral desarrollada por el partido para aprovechar dicha demanda, y en su interacción con el contexto social y político de la Cataluña de la primera década del siglo XXI.

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

Volatility smile extrapolation with an artificial neural network

I use a multi-layer feedforward perceptron, with backpropagation learning implemented via stochastic gradient descent, to extrapolate the volatility smile of Euribor derivatives over low-strikes by training the network on parametric prices.

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Associationism and electoral participation: A multilevel study of 2000 Spanish general election

This work presents an application of the multilevel analysis techniques tothe study of the abstention in the 2000 Spanish general election. Theinterest of the study is both, substantive and methodological. From thesubstantive point of view the article intends to explain the causes ofabstention and analyze the impact of associationism on it. From themethodological point of view it is intended to analyze the interaction betweenindividual and context with a modelisation that takes into account thehierarchical structure of data. The multilevel study of this paper validatesthe one level results obtained in previous analysis of the abstention andshows that only a fraction of the differences in abstention are explained bythe individual characteristics of the electors. Another important fraction ofthese differences is due to the political and social characteristics of thecontext. Relating to associationism, the data suggest that individualparticipation in associations decrease the probability of abstention. However,better indicators are needed in order to catch more properly the effect ofassociationism in electoral behaviour.

Calibration of stochastic volatility models via second order approximation: the Heston model case

Using a suitable Hull and White type formula we develop a methodology to obtain asecond order approximation to the implied volatility for very short maturities. Using thisapproximation we accurately calibrate the full set of parameters of the Heston model. Oneof the reasons that makes our calibration for short maturities so accurate is that we alsotake into account the term-structure for large maturities. We may say that calibration isnot "memoryless", in the sense that the option's behavior far away from maturity doesinfluence calibration when the option gets close to expiration. Our results provide a wayto perform a quick calibration of a closed-form approximation to vanilla options that canthen be used to price exotic derivatives. The methodology is simple, accurate, fast, andit requires a minimal computational cost.

Option pricing under stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rate in the Spanish case

Among the underlying assumptions of the Black-Scholes option pricingmodel, those of a fixed volatility of the underlying asset and of aconstantshort-term riskless interest rate, cause the largest empirical biases. Onlyrecently has attention been paid to the simultaneous effects of thestochasticnature of both variables on the pricing of options. This paper has tried toestimate the effects of a stochastic volatility and a stochastic interestrate inthe Spanish option market. A discrete approach was used. Symmetricand asymmetricGARCH models were tried. The presence of in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectswas allowed. The stochastic processes of the MIBOR90, a Spanishshort-terminterest rate, from March 19, 1990 to May 31, 1994 and of the volatilityofthe returns of the most important Spanish stock index (IBEX-35) fromOctober1, 1987 to January 20, 1994, were estimated. These estimators wereused onpricing Call options on the stock index, from November 30, 1993 to May30, 1994.Hull-White and Amin-Ng pricing formulas were used. These prices werecomparedwith actual prices and with those derived from the Black-Scholesformula,trying to detect the biases reported previously in the literature. Whereasthe conditional variance of the MIBOR90 interest rate seemed to be freeofARCH effects, an asymmetric GARCH with in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectsand some evidence of persistence in variance (IEGARCH(1,2)-M-S) wasfoundto be the model that best represent the behavior of the stochasticvolatilityof the IBEX-35 stock returns. All the biases reported previously in theliterature were found. All the formulas overpriced the options inNear-the-Moneycase and underpriced the options otherwise. Furthermore, in most optiontrading, Black-Scholes overpriced the options and, because of thetime-to-maturityeffect, implied volatility computed from the Black-Scholes formula,underestimatedthe actual volatility.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

Inflation, political instability and stockmarket volatility in interwar Germany

What determined the volatility of asset prices in Germany between thewars? This paper argues that the influence of political factors has beenoverstated. The majority of events increasing political uncertainty hadlittle or no effect on the value of German assets and the volatility ofreturns on them. Instead, it was inflation (and the fear of it) that islargely responsible for most of the variability in asset returns.

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.