161 resultados para Assignment problem
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The Whitehead minimization problem consists in finding a minimum size element in the automorphic orbit of a word, a cyclic word or a finitely generated subgroup in a finite rank free group. We give the first fully polynomial algorithm to solve this problem, that is, an algorithm that is polynomial both in the length of the input word and in the rank of the free group. Earlier algorithms had an exponential dependency in the rank of the free group. It follows that the primitivity problem – to decide whether a word is an element of some basis of the free group – and the free factor problem can also be solved in polynomial time.
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Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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Guba and Sapir asked, in their joint paper [8], if the simultaneous conjugacy problem was solvable in Diagram Groups or, at least, for Thompson's group F. We give an elementary proof for the solution of the latter question. This relies purely on the description of F as the group of piecewise linear orientation-preserving homeomorphisms of the unit. The techniques we develop allow us also to solve the ordinary conjugacy problem as well, and we can compute roots and centralizers. Moreover, these techniques can be generalized to solve the same questions in larger groups of piecewise-linear homeomorphisms.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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We prove existence theorems for the Dirichlet problem for hypersurfaces of constant special Lagrangian curvature in Hadamard manifolds. The first results are obtained using the continuity method and approximation and then refined using two iterations of the Perron method. The a-priori estimates used in the continuity method are valid in any ambient manifold.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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We establish existence and non-existence results to the Brezis-Nirenberg type problem involving the square root of the Laplacian in a bounded domain with zero Dirichlet boundary condition.
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A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.
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The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents' participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents' shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents' voluntary participation.
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A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
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We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
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We introduce and analyze two new semi-discrete numerical methods for the multi-dimensional Vlasov-Poisson system. The schemes are constructed by combing a discontinuous Galerkin approximation to the Vlasov equation together with a mixed finite element method for the Poisson problem. We show optimal error estimates in the case of smooth compactly supported initial data. We propose a scheme that preserves the total energy of the system.
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This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.