Taxes and labor supply: Portugal, Europe, and the United States

I relate hours worked with taxes on consumption and labor for Portugal, France, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. From 1986 to 2001, hours per worker in Portugal decreased from 35.1 to 32.6. With the parameters for Portugal, the model predicts hours worked in 2001 with an error of only 12 minutes from the actual hours. Across countries, most predictions differ from the data by one hour or less. The model is not sensible to special assumptions on the parameters. I calculate the long run effects of taxes on consumption, hours, capital and welfare for Portugal. I extend the model to discuss implications for Social Security. I discuss the steady state and the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system.

Patterns of Associational Life in Western Europe, 1800-2000

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Science of the European University Institute

Protein folding, metal ions and conformational states: the case of a di-cluster ferredoxin

Dissertation presented to obtain the PhD degree in Biochemistry at the Instituto de Tecnologia Química e Biológica, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Fast-to-fed shift in glucose homeostasis: clues to an earlier detection of human prediabetic states

FCM: UC Bioquímica I - PhD Thesis

Internationalization strategy of ABotoa/Skypro shoes to United States of America

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Taxes and labor supply: Portugal, Europe, and the United States (Conference version)

I relate hours worked with taxes on consumption and labor. I propose a model and compare its predictions for Portugal, France, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. Hours per worker in Portugal decreased from 35.1 in 1986 to 32.6 in 2001. With only the parameters and the taxes for Portugal, the model predicts the hours worked in 2001 with an error of only 12 minutes from the actual hours. Across countries, most predictions differ from the data by one hour or less. The model is able to explain the trend in hours with only the changes in taxes.

Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger

We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either pure long-run incremental cost ; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or Bill & Keep (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer surplus decreases strongly.

The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?

This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance.

Rebalancing frequency and the welfare cost of inflation

Cash-in-advance models usually require agents to reallocate money and bonds in fixed periods, every month or quarter, for example. I show that fixed periods underestimate the welfare cost of inflation. I use a model in which agents choose how often they exchange bonds for money. In the benchmark specification, the welfare cost of ten percent instead of zero inflation increases from 0.1 percent of income with fixed periods to one percent with optimal periods. The results are robust to different preferences, to different compositions of income in bonds or money, and to the introduction of capital and labor.

Rebalancing frequency and the welfare cost of inflation

Cash-in-advance models usually require agents to reallocate money and bonds in fixed periods. Every month or quarter, for example. I show that fixed periods underestimate the welfare cost of inflation. I use a model in which agents choose how often they exchange bonds for money. In the benchmark specification, the welfare cost of 10 percent instead of 0 inflation increases from 0.1 percent of income with fixed periods to 1 percent with optimal periods. The results are robust to different references, to different compositions of income in bonds or money, and to the introduction of capital and labor.

Evaluation of the welfare impact of regulating mobile termination rates in Portugal

Following the European Commission’s 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, the Portuguese regulatory authority (ANACOM) decided to reduce termination prices in mobile networks to their long-run incremental cost (LRIC). Nevertheless, no serious quantitative assessment of the potential effects of this decision was carried out. In this paper, we adapt and calibrate the Harbord and Hoernig (2014) model of the UK mobile telephony market to the Portuguese reality, and simulate the likely impact on consumer surplus, profits and welfare of four different regulatory approaches: pure LRIC, reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks, “bill & keep”, and asymmetric termination rates. Our results show that reducing MTRs does increase social welfare, profits and consumer surplus in the fixed market, but mobile subscribers are seriously harmed by this decision.

A (in)segurança privada em Portugal

Along with the food and the comfort, safety has always been one of the human priorities. In pursuit of this objective, man developed self-preservation mechanisms, went to live in society and created rules to control the community life. In the West and in the late eighteenth century, with the creation of states as we know them today, the monopoly of security, among other powers, has been preserved untouched until the last quarter of this century. With the bankruptcy of the welfare state and the rise of the regulatory state, many of the essential tasks for the community have also been carried out by private companies or institutions, including education, health care and security. Although not easy, education and health care have been more opened to be managed by the private sector. Instead, the privatization of the security sector has seen much more resistance. Still, especially in the West, the states have delegated some of the security competences to private companies. Portugal is no exception to the rule and, after a few years of unregulated activity, in 1982 was published the first law regulating the private security. After the initial stages of development (evolution and maturation), which lasted until the early years of the 2000‘s, the private security now seems to have reached maturity. Today, now with a new legal system, composed by Law no. 34/2013, of 16 may, its regulations and complementary legislation, now private security encompasses other activities and competences - becoming, an increasingly complement to public safety. It has also increased the pre-requisites and control mechanisms for private security companies, and strengthened the rules that limit their scope of activity.

Leverage instability and persistence: Evidence from the United States and Europe

We find that leverage behavior both in level and time-series variation is very similar between the United States and Europe throughout the 1990-2013 period. Leverage regimes are simultaneously unstable and persistent for both regions. We define instability as the extent to which firms largely deviate from their long-term leverage mean, while persistence as the extent to which today’s leverage influences its future levels. We then show that this simultaneous evidence imply a mean-reversion behavior of leverage and discuss some of its implications for future research on this field.

The relationship between liquidity and profitability in the food & beverage industry evidence from Europe and United States

This Work Project clarifies the relationship between liquidity and profitability based on a sample in the Food & Beverage (F&B) industry, and comparing the largest European and United States companies. The research concludes that liquidity, proxied by current ratio or quick ratio, correlates with return on assets taken as the measure of profitability, and so does the cash conversion cycle and its components. Moreover, company size correlates with liquidity, and indirectly affects ROA. This research contributes and addresses to managers in the F&B industry and recommends how they should act in order to improve profitability in the industry.