Novel techniques for the design and practical realization of switched-capacitor circuits in deep-submicron CMOS technologies

Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia

Depositions of rulers in the later middle ages: on the theory of th "useless ruler" and its practical utilization

pp. 157-168

A communication strategy for Continente: Practical, low priced and healthy eating solutions

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Bits, Atoms, and Information Sharing: new opportunities for participation

The particular characteristics and affordances of technologies play a significant role in human experience by defining the realm of possibilities available to individuals and societies. Some technological configurations, such as the Internet, facilitate peer-to-peer communication and participatory behaviors. Others, like television broadcasting, tend to encourage centralization of creative processes and unidirectional communication. In other instances still, the affordances of technologies can be further constrained by social practices. That is the case, for example, of radio which, although technically allowing peer-to-peer communication, has effectively been converted into a broadcast medium through the legislation of the airwaves. How technologies acquire particular properties, meanings and uses, and who is involved in those decisions are the broader questions explored here. Although a long line of thought maintains that technologies evolve according to the logic of scientific rationality, recent studies demonstrated that technologies are, in fact, primarily shaped by social forces in specific historical contexts. In this view, adopted here, there is no one best way to design a technological artifact or system; the selection between alternative designs—which determine the affordances of each technology—is made by social actors according to their particular values, assumptions and goals. Thus, the arrangement of technical elements in any technological artifact is configured to conform to the views and interests of those involved in its development. Understanding how technologies assume particular shapes, who is involved in these decisions and how, in turn, they propitiate particular behaviors and modes of organization but not others, requires understanding the contexts in which they are developed. It is argued here that, throughout the last century, two distinct approaches to the development and dissemination of technologies have coexisted. In each of these models, based on fundamentally different ethoi, technologies are developed through different processes and by different participants—and therefore tend to assume different shapes and offer different possibilities. In the first of these approaches, the dominant model in Western societies, technologies are typically developed by firms, manufactured in large factories, and subsequently disseminated to the rest of the population for consumption. In this centralized model, the role of users is limited to selecting from the alternatives presented by professional producers. Thus, according to this approach, the technologies that are now so deeply woven into human experience, are primarily shaped by a relatively small number of producers. In recent years, however, a group of three interconnected interest groups—the makers, hackerspaces, and open source hardware communities—have increasingly challenged this dominant model by enacting an alternative approach in which technologies are both individually transformed and collectively shaped. Through a in-depth analysis of these phenomena, their practices and ethos, it is argued here that the distributed approach practiced by these communities offers a practical path towards a democratization of the technosphere by: 1) demystifying technologies, 2) providing the public with the tools and knowledge necessary to understand and shape technologies, and 3) encouraging citizen participation in the development of technologies.

Evidence of market anomalies in the Eurozone: A practical implementation

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Double Degree in Finance and Financial Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics and Maastricht University

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Improving practical reasoning and argumentation

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7).

A practical approach to execute and test a lean startup

This paper practically applies the “Lean Startup Approach” by identifying, analyzing and executing a newly developed web-based business idea. Hypotheses were designed and tested with the construction of a minimum viable product – i.e. a landing page. In-depth interviews allowed deciding either to pivot or persevere the initial launch strategy. Overall, the aim was to collect as much valuable response as possible from customers and ultimately decide for a superior strategy while devoting the smallest amount of time and money.