Process virtualization theory (PVT) and institutional theory (INT) to explain SAAS adoption

Software as a service (SaaS) is a service model in which the applications are accessible from various client devices through internet. Several studies report possible factors driving the adoption of SaaS but none have considered the perception of the SaaS features and the pressures existing in the organization’s environment. We propose an integrated research model that combines the process virtualization theory (PVT) and the institutional theory (INT). PVT seeks to explain whether SaaS processes are suitable for migration into virtual environments via an information technology-based mechanism. INT seeks to explain the effects of the institutionalized environment on the structure and actions of the organization. The research makes three contributions. First, it addresses a gap in the SaaS adoption literature by studying the internal perception of the technical features of SaaS and external coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures faced by an organization. Second, it empirically tests many of the propositions of PVT and INT in the SaaS context, thereby helping to determine how the theory operates in practice. Third, the integration of PVT and INT contributes to the information system (IS) discipline, deepening the applicability and strengths of these theories.

The sociological perspective on the knowledge-based society: assumptions, facts and visions

The paper will present the central discourse of the knowledge-based society. Already in the 1960s the debate of the industrial society already raised the question whether there can be considered a paradigm shift towards a knowledge-based society. Some prominent authors already foreseen ‘knowledge’ as the main indicator in order to displace ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ as the main driving forces of the capitalistic development. Today on the political level and also in many scientific disciplines the assumption that we are already living in a knowledge-based society seems obvious. Although we still do not have a theory of the knowledge-based society and there still exist a methodological gap about the empirical indicators, the vision of a knowledge-based society determines at least the perception of the Western societies. In a first step the author will pinpoint the assumptions about the knowledge-based society on three levels: on the societal, on the organisational and on the individual level. These assumptions are relied on the following topics: a) The role of the information and communication technologies; b) The dynamic development of globalisation as an ‘evolutionary’ process; c) The increasing importance of knowledge management within organisations; d) The changing role of the state within the economic processes. Not only the differentiation between the levels but also the revision of the assumptions of a knowledge-based society will show that the ‘topics raised in the debates’ cannot be considered as the results of a profound societal paradigm shift. However what seems very impressive is the normative and virtual shift towards a concept of modernity, which strongly focuses on the role of technology as a driving force as well as on the global economic markets, which has to be accepted. Therefore – according to the official debate - the successful adaptation of these processes seems the only way to meet the knowledge-based society. Analysing the societal changes on the three levels, the label ‘knowledge-based society’ can be seen critically. Therefore the main question of Theodor W. Adorno during the 16th Congress of Sociology in 1968 did not loose its actuality. Facing the societal changes he asked whether we are still living in the industrial society or already in a post-industrial state. Thinking about the knowledge-based society according to these two options, this exercise would enrich the whole debate in terms of social inequality, political, economic exclusion processes and at least the power relationship between social groups.

Self-organization and complexity theory to support evolvable production systems

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores

An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond

Since 1989, five parliamentary elections have been the stage for the foundation and demise of political parties aspiring to govern the new democratic Polish state. The demise of the AWS before the 2001 elections after ten years of attempts to create a centre-right core party resulted in a new splintering of the right-wing, and the centre-right became again devoid of a pivotal formation. While Eurosceptic parties in average gain 8 percent of the vote, in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections Eurosceptic parties gained around 20 percent of the vote. In Poland right-wing parties show an unusual propensity for Euroscepticism. The persistence and increased importance of nationalism in Poland, which has prevented the development of a strong Christian democratic party, effectively explains the levels of Euroscepticism on the right. After the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections the national conservative party, Law and Justice, formed a governing coalition with the national Catholic League of Polish Families, creating one of the first Eurosceptic governments. Although this work does not intend to provide a theorisation of party systems development, it shows that the context of European integration fostered nationalists’ divisiveness of, and provoked the splitting of the right the unusual propensity of parties for Euroscepticism makes Poland a paradigmatic case of the kind of conflicts over European integration emerging in Central and Eastern European party systems.

Every normal logic program has a 2-valued semantics: theory, extensions, applications, implementations

Trabalho apresentado no âmbito do Doutoramento em Informática, como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Informática

Health care marketing: the theory of planned behavior applied to patients' choise between private and public providers in the portuguese health care system.

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree of Master in Statistics and Information Management.

Depositions of rulers in the later middle ages: on the theory of th "useless ruler" and its practical utilization

pp. 157-168

“The past is a foreign country”? Acculturation theory and the anthropology of globalization

Etnográfica, 15 (2): 313-336

Understanding the internet banking adoption by Portuguese customers - a unified theory of acceptance and use of technology and perceived risk application.

Trabalho de Projeto apresentado como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estatística e Gestão de Informação

Men’s purchase intention of shampoo: a model based on the theory of planned behavior and self-concept

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Unstabilised rammed earth: characterization of material collected from old constructions in South Portugal and comparison to normative requirements

International Journal of Architectural Heritage, 8: 185–212, 2014

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

A conspiracy theory for clefts : the syntax and interpretation of cleft constructions

O objetivo final deste estudo é contribuir para a discussão sobre qual a medida em que conceitos semânticos e discursivos estão sintaticamente codificados. Mais especificamente, investiga-se se existe alguma correlação consistente entre alguns aspetos interpretativos e sintáticos de quatro construções clivadas do Português Europeu, e como se deve dar conta teoricamente destas potenciais correlações. As clivadas consideradas são as clivadas canónicas, as pseudoclivadas, as clivadas de é que e as clivadas de SER. Sintaticamente podemos distinguir dois tipos: clivadas bioracionais (canónicas e pseudoclivadas) e clivadas mono-oracionais (clivadas de é que e de SER). Todas as estruturas têm um constituinte clivado focalizado que pode constituir tanto um foco informacional como um foco contrastivo, e uma oração clivada que introduz uma pressuposição existencial. Adicionalmente, o constituinte clivado identifica exaustivamente uma posição vazia na oração clivada. Adota-se a semântica alternativa para o foco (Rooth 1985), segundo a qual o foco entoacional contribui uniformemente um conjunto de alternativas na Forma Lógica. Regras pragmáticas operando neste conjunto dão origem a duas implicaturas que podem ser suspensas: pressuposição existencial e exaustividade. Dado que as clivadas de é que e as de SER têm a mesma interpretação que orações não-clivadas, conclui-se que a sua estrutura sintática particular não contribui para estas propriedades interpretativas. Em contrapartida, as clivadas bioracionais, que são orações copulativas especificacionais, têm uma presuposição existencial e uma interpretação exaustiva que não pode ser suspensa, tal como as orações especificacionais não-clivadas. Argumenta-se que isto se deve ao facto de o constituinte clivado identificar uma variável introduzida por uma descrição definida. Demonstra-se que a oração clivada, uma relativa em posição de complemento de um determinador definido nas clivadas canónicas e uma relativa livre nas pseudoclivadas, tem a mesma denotação que um DP definido, e portanto tem uma pressuposição existencial inerente. A interpretação exaustiva deve-se à relação identificacional entre o constituinte clivado e a descrição definida. Além disso, defende-se que em Português Europeu um traço de foco não desencadeia movimento-A’ para um FocP especializado. Os constituintes focalizados movem-se antes por razões independentes do foco. Isto é confirmado pelo facto de apenas o constituinte clivado das clivadas de é que ter propriedades de movimento A’, os outros parecem estar in situ. Propõe-se que o constituinte clivado das clivadas de é que é um tópico com um traço de foco que se move para um TopP. Esta análise dá conta da existência de restrições discursivas semelhantes para tópicos não focalizados e para o constituinte clivado das clivadas de é que. O traço quantificacional de foco arrastado pela topicalização dá origem a efeitos de intervenção, causando a não-recursividade do foco na periferia esquerda e a sua incompatibilidade com movimento de outros constituintes com traços quantificacionais. A análise prediz as restrições de encaixe observadas para as clivadas de é que. Finalmente, desenvolve-se uma análise sintática das clivadas de SER que aproxima estas estruturas das estruturas com partículas de foco. Propõe-se que a cópula é um operador sensível ao foco que é merged juntamente com o constituinte clivado. As restrições distribucionais da cópula devem-se a requisitos selecionais de núcleos.