15 resultados para Inter-element spacing
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In order to maximize their productivity, inter-disciplinary multi-occupation teams of professionals need to maximize inter-occupational cooperation in team decision making. Cooperation, however, is challenged by status anxiety over organizational careers and identity politics among team members who differ by ethnicity-race, gender, religion, nativity, citizenship status, etc. The purpose of this paper is to develop hypotheses about how informal and formal features of bureaucracy influence the level of inter-occupation cooperation achieved by socially diverse, multi-occupation work teams of professionals in bureaucratic work organizations. The 18 hypotheses, which are developed with the heuristic empirical case of National Science Foundation-sponsored university school partnerships in math and science curriculum innovation in the United States, culminate in the argument that cooperation can be realized as a synthesis of tensions between informal and formal features of bureaucracy in the form of participatory, high performance work systems.
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Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores
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Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores
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Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais
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PLos One, 4(11): ARTe7722
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Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Biology by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Instituto de Tecnologia Química e Biológica, Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência.
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Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Didáctica do Inglês,
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Como Calhoun (1996) e Mennell (1996) referem, apesar da atenção acrescida dada às construções, estratégias e políticas da identidade, permanece uma evidente dificuldade de articulação entre diferentes corpora e, nomeadamente, daqueles que derivam da utilização de um nível micro de observação e análise e de um nível de macro-focalização. (í^om base num estudo de caso, tentaremos evidenciar que (a) os processos identitários articulam as duas dimensões de análise e que (b) o nível micro- familiar constitui o referente e o mediador simbôlico-identitário adequado da articulação entre as micro e as macro-perspectivas,^ (c) a partir do qual emerge toda uma gama de idiomas simbólicos (familialistas, instrumentais e morais). O papel desempenhado pela experiência arcaica familiar tem a ver com o facto de que é nesse nível que se cruzam os gêneros e as gerações, se negoceia e gere a dimensão identitária da sexualidade, a moral e a construção diferenciada de identidades categoriais, e são organizadas as primeiras fronteiras entre «nós» e «eles»^, ao mesmo tempo que se vai diferenciando a identidade pessoal, sob a forma da construção do «indivíduo» que será progressivamente confrontado com a transposição projectiva do(s) poder(es) intra-familiar(es) para o nível macro do poder transcendental e dos poderes de Estado.
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Em pesquisas anteriores, procurámos mostrar que (i) as representações identitárias possuem uma estrutura multidimensional, cujos níveis (pessoal, bio-cultural, sócio-histórico / político, ideal, «moral», etc.) estão inter-relacionados, e formam um sistema identitário pessoal, se bem que partilhado, em proporções variáveis, com os outros emissores identitários inseridos na mesma categoria sócio-histórica; (ii) sistema identitário esse detentor de potencialidades estratégicas (Kastersztein, 1990) - ideológicas, simbólicas e fantasmáticas -, derivadas da articulação inconsciente entre os diferentes níveis mobilizados. Tentámos evidenciar ainda, no nível mais abrangente das representações identitárias dos grupos sócio-históricos, (iii) como o grau de sobreposição e convergência das atribuições identitárias, tanto ao grupo.de identificação como aos grupos de comparação interactiva, é parcial, indiciando estratégias de maior ou menor distanciação / aproximação identitária inter-nacional ou inter-étnica; (iv) e como, no seu conjunto, as representações identitárias apresentam uma lógica e uma economia retórica, tendenciosa e performativa (pro domo sua), criando para os sujeitos, no interior dos seus grupos, e para os seus grupos identitários, na comparação com os outros, uma imagem de primo inter pares, na medida em que constroiem como «real» o «real identitariamente conveniente» e não aquele que «objectivamente » é «objectivado» (em termos de poder tecnológico, econômico ou militar).
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Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Migrações, Inter-etnicidades e Transnacionalismo
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Dissertação submetida para a obtenção do grau de Doutor em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores
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We investigate the determinants of giving in a lab-in-the-field experiment with large stakes. Study participants in urban Mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the closest person to them outside their household. Dictators share more with counterparts when they have the option of giving in kind (in the form of goods), compared to giving that must be in cash. Qualitative post-experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how recipients use gifted resources. Standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving, but the effects of even large changes in these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in-kind option. Our results support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the level) of gift-recipient expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources.
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Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Linguística – especialização em Linguística Portuguesa
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The theme of this dissertation is the finite element method applied to mechanical structures. A new finite element program is developed that, besides executing different types of structural analysis, also allows the calculation of the derivatives of structural performances using the continuum method of design sensitivities analysis, with the purpose of allowing, in combination with the mathematical programming algorithms found in the commercial software MATLAB, to solve structural optimization problems. The program is called EFFECT – Efficient Finite Element Code. The object-oriented programming paradigm and specifically the C ++ programming language are used for program development. The main objective of this dissertation is to design EFFECT so that it can constitute, in this stage of development, the foundation for a program with analysis capacities similar to other open source finite element programs. In this first stage, 6 elements are implemented for linear analysis: 2-dimensional truss (Truss2D), 3-dimensional truss (Truss3D), 2-dimensional beam (Beam2D), 3-dimensional beam (Beam3D), triangular shell element (Shell3Node) and quadrilateral shell element (Shell4Node). The shell elements combine two distinct elements, one for simulating the membrane behavior and the other to simulate the plate bending behavior. The non-linear analysis capability is also developed, combining the corotational formulation with the Newton-Raphson iterative method, but at this stage is only avaiable to solve problems modeled with Beam2D elements subject to large displacements and rotations, called nonlinear geometric problems. The design sensitivity analysis capability is implemented in two elements, Truss2D and Beam2D, where are included the procedures and the analytic expressions for calculating derivatives of displacements, stress and volume performances with respect to 5 different design variables types. Finally, a set of test examples were created to validate the accuracy and consistency of the result obtained from EFFECT, by comparing them with results published in the literature or obtained with the ANSYS commercial finite element code.
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Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).