79 resultados para Sewer design.
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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Nanotecnologia e Nanociência
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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Dissertação para Obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia e Gestão Industrial
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia e Gestão Industrial
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Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores, pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Biotecnologia
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores
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Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores, pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica
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We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-off is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-off rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics