Despacho Económico de um SEE com coordenação Hidrotérmica Departamento de Engenharia Electrotécnica

O Despacho económico de um sistema eléctrico de energia com a coordenação hidrotérmica tem como objectivo alcançar a operação óptima do sistema em um determinado período de tempo, ao menor custo possível, e com alto grau de fiabilidade. O problema é muito complexo, pois depende do grau de dificuldade em se prever os caudais dos afluentes, e da capacidade das albufeiras das centrais hídricas. De um modo geral, a produção térmica é determinada de modo a proporcionar o uso mais racional possível da água, dentro do contexto de incertezas quanto às afluências futuras, de modo a, por um lado manter o sistemas o mais económico possível, e por outro, evitar o desperdício energético implícito em descarregamentos de volumes de água turbináveis. Neste trabalho é proposta uma metodologia baseada em programação linear para a solução da coordenação hidrotérmica de curto prazo, e que permite obter custos-sombra de água em centrais hídricas com armazenamento. Esta metodologia foi posteriormente implementado num programa computacional em Microsoft Excel 2010 para a solução numa primeira fase, da rede de 24 barramentos do IEEE, e numa segunda fase, para a solução da Rede Nacional de Transporte referente ao ano de 2010. Para efeitos de análise e validação de dados, os dados provenientes do programa, são depois comparados aos dados dos relatórios da REN. Por último, os dados provenientes do programa em Excel são colocados e analisados no programa PowerWorld Simulator 8.0.

Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

International duopoly with unknown costs

We consider two firms, located in different countries, selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. In each country there is a non negative tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms and also on the welfare of the governments.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.