Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Learning business strategies for competitive electronic marketplaces

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for developing new agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. This tool studies negotiations based on different market mechanisms and, time and behavior dependent strategies. The results of the negotiations between agents are analyzed by data mining algorithms in order to extract rules that give agents feedback to improve their strategies. The system also includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agent reactions.

Agent-based simulation of electronic marketplaces with decision support

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for analyzing agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. The system includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agents reactions.

Virtual power producers market strategies

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Producers (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper detail some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study.

MASCEM - an electricity market simulator providing coalition support for virtual power players

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimization techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Players (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper details some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study based on real data.

Dgenco market balancing - cost repartition under light regulation markets

In this paper we present a new methodology, based in game theory, to obtain the market balancing between Distribution Generation Companies (DGENCO), in liberalized electricity markets. The new contribution of this methodology is the verification of the participation rate of each agent based in Nucléolo Balancing and in Shapley Value. To validate the results we use the Zaragoza Distribution Network with 42 Bus and 5 DGENCO.

Intersubjectivity and a practical intersubjective ethics of translation

This essay suggests that the intersubjectivity in translation should be given priority because different stages of the translation activity have different subjects, and presents a practical intersubjective ethics of translation based on an interpretation of the intersubjective relations connected with translation activities in a perspective of game theory in the hope that it can equip us with better explanations of the translator’s calculations or considerations in the professional practice.

Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.