Solving MPCC problem with the hyperbolic penalty function

The main goal of this work is to solve mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) using nonlinear programming techniques (NLP). An hyperbolic penalty function is used to solve MPCC problems by including the complementarity constraints in the penalty term. This penalty function [1] is twice continuously differentiable and combines features of both exterior and interior penalty methods. A set of AMPL problems from MacMPEC [2] are tested and a comparative study is performed.

Solving a signalized traffic intersection problem with an hyperbolic penalty function

Mathematical Program with Complementarity Constraints (MPCC) finds many applications in fields such as engineering design, economic equilibrium and mathematical programming theory itself. A queueing system model resulting from a single signalized intersection regulated by pre-timed control in traffic network is considered. The model is formulated as an MPCC problem. A MATLAB implementation based on an hyperbolic penalty function is used to solve this practical problem, computing the total average waiting time of the vehicles in all queues and the green split allocation. The problem was codified in AMPL.

Admittance spectroscopy of Cu2ZnSnS4 based thin film solar cells

In this report, we propose an AC response equivalent circuit model to describe the admittance measurements of Cu2ZnSnS4 thin film solar cell grown by sulphurization of stacked metallic precursors. This circuit describes the contact resistances, the back contact, and the heterojunction with two trap levels. The study of the back contact resistance allowed the estimation of a back contact barrier of 246 meV. The analysis of the trap series with varying temperature revealed defect activation energies of 45 meV and 113 meV. The solar cell’s electrical parameters were obtained from the J-V curve: conversion efficiency, 1.21%; fill factor, 50%; open circuit voltage, 360 mV; and short circuit current density, 6.8 mA/cm2.

Combined mutation differential evolution to solve systems of nonlinear equations

This paper presents a differential evolution heuristic to compute a solution of a system of nonlinear equations through the global optimization of an appropriate merit function. Three different mutation strategies are combined to generate mutant points. Preliminary numerical results show the effectiveness of the presented heuristic.

Combining global tabu search with local search for solving systems of equalities and inequalities

This papers aims at providing a combined strategy for solving systems of equalities and inequalities. The combined strategy uses two types of steps: a global search step and a local search step. The global step relies on a tabu search heuristic and the local step uses a deterministic search known as Hooke and Jeeves. The choice of step, at each iteration, is based on the level of reduction of the l2-norm of the error function observed in the equivalent system of equations, compared with the previous iteration.

Licensing in an international market

We study the effects of entry of a foreign firm on domestic welfare in the presence of licensing, when the entrant is technologically superior to the incumbent. We show that foreign entry increases domestic welfare for sufficiently large technological differences between the firms under both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.