The Philosophy and Practice of Interpretivist Research in Entrepreneurship Quality, Validation, and Trust

Knowledge production in entrepreneurship requires inclusivity as well as diversity and pluralism in research perspectives and approaches. In this article, the authors address concerns about interpretivist research regarding validity, reliability, objectivity, generalizability, and communicability of results that militate against its more widespread acceptance. Following the nonfoundationalist argument that all observation is theory-laden, context specific, and that there are no external criteria against which to assess research design and execution and the data produced, the authors propose that quality must be internalized within the underlying research philosophy rather than something to be tested upon completion. This requires a shift from the notion of validity as an outcome to validation as a process. To elucidate this, they provide a guiding framework and present a case illustration that will assist an interpretivist entrepreneurship researcher to establish and demonstrate the quality of their work.

Understanding how HR systems work: the role of HR philosophy and HR processes

Despite the proliferation of studies of HR systems, there are still substantial gaps in our understanding
of how such systems actually work. This article, by focusing on the neglected areas of HR philosophy
and HR processes in the composition of HR systems, and by using a qualitative, employee-centred
approach in the collection and analysis of data, provides new insights into the working of HR systems.
Using data from interviews with 56 knowledge workers employed in the information and
communications technology sector in Ireland and the UK, we explore employee-level reactions to two
different types of HR systems. We highlight the various ways in which HR processes interact with HR
practices and the different outcomes that may result, and we identify the key role of HR philosophy in
HR system operation.

Philosophy and Political Engagement: Reflection in the Public Sphere

Do philosophers have a responsibility to their society that is distinct from their responsibility to it as citizens? This edited volume explores both what type of contribution philosophy can make and what type of reasoning is appropriate when addressing public matters now. These questions are posed by leading international scholars working in the fields of moral and political philosophy. Each contribution also investigates the central issue of how to combine critical, rational analysis with a commitment to politically relevant public engagement. The contributions to this volume analyse issues raised in practical ethics, including abortion, embryology, and assisted suicide. They consider the role of ethical commitment in the philosophical analysis of contemporary political issues, and engage with matters of public policy such as poverty, the arts, meaningful work, as well as the evidence base for policy. They also examine the normative legitimacy of power, including the use of violence.

Philosophy, Social Hope and Democratic Criticism:Critical Theory for a Global Age

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.

Spectres of Shakespeare:Ong Keng Sen’s Search: Hamlet and the Intercultural Myth

Arguably, the myth of Shakespeare is a myth of universality. Much has been written about the dramatic, thematic and ‘humanistic’ transference of Shakespeare’s works: their permeability, transcendence of cultures and histories, geographies and temporalities. Located within this debate is a belief that this universality, among other dominating factors, is founded upon the power and poeticism of Shakespeare’s language. Subsequently, if we acknowledge Frank Kermode’s assertion that “the life of the plays is the language” and “the secret (of Shakespeare’s works) is in the detail,” what then becomes of this myth of universality, and how is Shakespeare’s language ‘transferred’ across cultures? In Asian intercultural adaptations, language becomes the primary site of confrontation as issues of semantic accuracy and poetic affiliation abound. Often, the language of the text is replaced with a cultural equivalent or reconceived with other languages of the stage – song and dance, movement and music; metaphor and imagery consequently find new voices. Yet if myth is, as Roland Barthes propounds, a second-order semiotic system that is predicated upon the already constituted sign, here being language, and myth is parasitical on language, what happens to the myth of Shakespeare in these cultural re-articulations? Wherein lies the ‘universality’? Or is ‘universality’ all that it is – an insubstantial (mythical) pageant? Using Ong Keng Sen’s Search Hamlet (2002), this paper would examine the transference of myth and / as language in intercultural Shakespeares. If, as Barthes argues, myths are to be understood as metalanguages that adumbrate social hegemonies, intercultural imaginings of Shakespeare can be said to expose the hollow myth of universality yet in a paradoxical double-bind reify and reinstate this self-same myth.

From Francis Hutcheson to James McCosh: Irish Presbyterians and Defining the Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century

This article examines the disputes amongst Irish Presbyterians about the teaching of moral philosophy by Professor John Ferrie in the college department of the Royal Belfast Academical Institution in the early nineteenth century and the substantive philosophical and theological issues that were raised. These issues have largely been ignored by Irish historians, but a discussion of them is of general relevance to historians of ideas as they illuminate a series of broader questions about the definition and development of Scottish philosophy. These are represented in the move from two philosophers who had strong connections with Irish Presbyterianism—Francis Hutcheson, the early eighteenth-century moral sense philosopher and theological moderate from County Down, and James McCosh, nineteenth-century exponent of modified Common Sense philosophy at Queen's College Belfast and a committed evangelical. In particular, this article addresses three important themes—the definition and character of ‘the Scottish philosophy’, the relationship between evangelicalism and Common Sense philosophy, and the process of development and adaptation that occurred in eighteenth-century Scottish thought during the first half of the nineteenth century.