Ownership structure, organisational flexibility and store performance in retail chains.

Drawing on agency and flexible capability perspectives, the authors develop a theoretical framework explaining the impact of ownership structure on organisational flexibility and store performance in retail chains. The researchers argue that franchised stores attract more entrepreneurial managers with more flexible capabilities and they have a stronger incentive to align their flexible capabilities with the demands of the business environment. A sample of 105 franchised and company-owned stores of an optical retail chain is used to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, the study found strong support for the hypotheses that 'Franchised stores have a higher structural flexibility than company-owned stores', but only weak support for operational and strategic flexible capabilities. Furthermore, in line with the study's theoretical framework, it has been found that in a highly turbulent business environment, franchised stores perform better than company-owned stores. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for theory development and management of ownership structures in retail chains.

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

Information Disclosure, Market Discipline and the Management of Bank Capital: Evidence from the Chinese Financial Sector

Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

The determinants of financial participation schemes within multinational companies in Ireland

Using a survey of multinational companies (MNCs), we investigate the factors that determine the use and scope of financial participation in MNCs operating in Ireland. We explore the impact of six factors - country of origin, age, employment size (Irish and worldwide employment size), ownership structure, trade union recognition and sector. Descriptive results find that financial participation schemes are quite common within MNCs in Ireland. Many of these schemes are only available to higher levels of staff. Multivariate analysis reveals that five out of the six factors (the exception was sector) had varying impacts on financial participation schemes. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Teamwork Efficiency and Company Size

We study how ownership structure and management objectives interact in determining the company size without assuming information constraints or any explicit costs of management. In symmetric agent economies, the optimal company size balances the returns to scale of the production function and the returns to collaboration efficiency. For a general class of payoff functions, we characterize the optimal company size, and we compare the optimal company size across different managerial objectives. We demonstrate the restrictiveness of common assumptions on effort aggregation (e.g., constant elasticity of effort substitution), and we show that common intuition (e.g., that corporate companies are more efficient and therefore will be larger than equal-share partnerships) might not hold in general.

Ownership Patterns and Control in Turkish Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided. The results of the study indicate that ownership of Turkish companies is highly concentrated, families being the dominant shareholders. The separation of ownership and control among Turkish companies is mainly achieved through pyramidal ownership structures and the presence of big business groups. However, the cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are relatively more aligned compared to other family–ownership–dominated insider–system countries.