Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector


Autoria(s): Wu, Yuliang; Bowe, Michael
Data(s)

01/10/2012

Resumo

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

Identificador

http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/information-disclosure-and-depositor-discipline-in-the-chinese-banking-sector(ec7a9f35-6d23-401d-86d0-910ca5d64173).html

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2012.05.004

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Wu , Y & Bowe , M 2012 , ' Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector ' Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money , vol 22 , no. 4 , pp. 855-878 . DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2012.05.004

Palavras-Chave #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 #Economics and Econometrics #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003 #Finance
Tipo

article