Análisis pragmático contrastivo inglés/español de la intensificación verbal en textos literarios

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en comparar las funciones pragmáticas de una estructura intensificadora en español peninsular formada con la partícula venga (venga a + infinitivo) con estructuras intensificadoras en inglés. Para ello, analizamos los factores sintácticos, semánticos y pragmáticos que el traductor tiene en cuenta a la hora de usar esta estructura en la traducción al español. El corpus lo componen fragmentos de obras literarias extraídas en Google Books. Los resultados demuestran que con esta construcción se consigue transferir al español no sólo efectos semánticos (iteración), sino también pragmáticos, como la evaluación del hablante (desacuerdo, sorpresa, etc.).

Legal Translation from English to Spanish in the Classroom: Problems when Translating Standard Formulas of Expression

The purpose of this paper is to identify problems when translating standard formulas of expression in English to Spanish legal translation. To achieve the goal, a total of 250 Spanish translations were analyzed of 10 sentences from legal texts in English. The degree of difficulty posed by the translation of these formulas is confirmed by the results obtained, which is related not so much to the intrinsic meaning of the words that compose them, but to their contextual meaning. An eclectic approach that combines discourse analysis with contrastive linguistics is proposed, and some specific didactic guidelines are indicated to facilitate the translation teaching of these standard formulas of expression. Lexical interpretation and contextual recreation allow the apprentice translator to make progress with the translation of these phrases and to improve his/her attitude when facing them to achieve a successful semantic and contextual interpretation, that is to say, getting the closest natural equivalent while respecting the genius of the language.

Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction

The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.