Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction
| Data(s) |
31/05/2016
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| Resumo |
The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador |
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CLAC/article/view/52772 10.5209/CLAC.52772 |
| Publicador |
Ediciones Complutense |
| Relação |
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| Direitos |
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| Fonte |
Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación; Vol 66 (2016); 195-209 |
| Palavras-Chave | #disjunction; mental logic; mental models; semantic possibilities |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article Artículo revisado por pares info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
