Training proposal in the degree of Master of Early Childhood Education for working the method of historical research in the classroom

Future teachers must be competent in creating educational settings, which provide tools to their students future they can develop a conscious mind, able to interpret their experiences, to make decisions and imagine innovative solutions to help you participate autonomously and responsible in society. This requires an educational system that allows them to integrate the subjective into a broader spatial and temporal context. La patrimonializatión of “Cultural artefacts” and oral history, the basis of which, are found in the active mind and links both the personal and the group experience, don’t only serve as a catalyst to achieving this goal, but rather, they facilitate the implementation of established practice in infant education. To gain this experience we offer the opportunity for students of their degree in Infant Education in the Public University of Navarre, training within the framework of social didactics, allowing students to learn about established practice from iconic, materials and oral sources in the Archive of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Navarra. The vidences points to their effectiveness and presented in a work in progress.

The body, the device, the sleepwalkers. On the spinozian uses of experience as a critics of the cartesian concept of freedom

In this paper I discuss one of the most significant strategies in Spinoza’s theoretical approach against those that entrave its understanding in a very powerful way. As well as Descartes, Spinoza uses the inmediate or unreflexive experience for developing his conception of free will or the distinction between body and soul, but he does so in order to prove that the experience is useful to demonstrate some purely anti-Cartesian thesis that express the core principles of Spinozism.

Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.