Mental logic and its difficulties with disjunction

The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.

Multilingualism and conceptual modelling

One of the leading motivations behind the multilingual semantic web is to make resources accessible digitally in an online global multilingual context. Consequently, it is fundamental for knowledge bases to find a way to manage multilingualism and thus be equipped with those procedures for its conceptual modelling. In this context, the goal of this paper is to discuss how common-sense knowledge and cultural knowledge are modelled in a multilingual framework. More particularly, multilingualism and conceptual modelling are dealt with from the perspective of FunGramKB, a lexico-conceptual knowledge base for natural language understanding. This project argues for a clear division between the lexical and the conceptual dimensions of knowledge. Moreover, the conceptual layer is organized into three modules, which result from a strong commitment towards capturing semantic knowledge (Ontology), procedural knowledge (Cognicon) and episodic knowledge (Onomasticon). Cultural mismatches are discussed and formally represented at the three conceptual levels of FunGramKB.

Notas sobre el "primum cognitum" en Cayetano y su vínculo con la metafísica

Cayetano tuvo un papel protagónico en los debates intelectuales de su época (s. XVI), destacándose como un auténtico adalid del tomismo; inclusive muchas de sus tesis pasaron a formar parte de tal doctrina, las cuales –a veces matizadas y otras no tanto– perviven hasta nuestros días. Entre los diversos temas que afrontó se destaca su particular noción de primum cognitum. Aquí, partimos del hecho de que la tradición tomista no ha visto mayores inconvenientes en equiparar lo que entienden Cayetano y el Aquinate por el ens primo cadit; empero nosotros estamos en condiciones de afirmar que tal equiparación al menos es problemática. En este sentido, nos ocuparemos de realizar un primer acercamiento al tema del ente primer conocido cayetaniano para intentar mostrar su real significado. Asimismo, procuraremos ver, ayudados por los aportes de algunos estudiosos contemporáneos –en especial el de Lawrence Dewan–, hasta qué punto tal noción se corresponde o no con los desarrollos teóricos de Tomás de Aquino, sobre todo con el vínculo entre el primer conocido y el ente como objeto de la metafísica.