Nonprofit Boards in Australia: A Distinctive Governance Appoach

This article reports the findings into patterns of governance on nonprofit boards in Australia. The research surveys 118 boards, upon which serve a total of 1405 directors. The findings indicate that nonprofit boards can mimic some aspects of a shareholder approach to governance. But nonprofit boards, in the main, indicate priorities and activities of a stakeholder approach to governance. The features of `isomorphism' that arise largely stem from legislative requirements in corporate governance. Generally, nonprofit directors are influenced by agenda and motivations that can be differentiated from the influences upon director activity in the corporate sector. The study indicates that nonprofit boards prize knowledge and loyalty to the sector when considering board composition. The survey suggests nonprofits ``compensate'' for the demands placed upon them about fiduciary duty and due diligence responsibilities with the diverse intellectual expertise of non-executive directors. Nonprofit boards possess greater diversity than boards in the corporate sector; they include more women as directors than corporate boards and they include a greater proportion of directors from minority groups. While strategic issues feature significantly as a task of the nonprofit board, they distinguish themselves from their corporate counterparts by engaging in operational management. The findings indicate that, in the main, directors on nonprofit boards deliberate and operate in ways distinctive from their corporate counterparts. Such findings offer a contribution to the reform of Corporations Law in other countries and the likely consequence on boards outside the corporate sector.

Gender-diverse boards and properties of analyst earnings forecasts

Using a sample of 2,200 US listed firm year observations (2001-2007)this study shows a positive (negative) relation between female participation in corporate boards and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion), after controlling for earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality, stock price informativeness and potential endogeneity. Our findings are important as they suggest that board diversity adds to the transparency and accuracy of financial reports such that earnings expectations are likely to be more accurate for these firms.

Demographic faultlines in boards : impact of diversity and board size

Negative board diversity-organizational outcomes research findings have highlighted the importance of studying board demographic faultlines. Based on research gaps, this study focuses on gender diversity, age diversity, board size and faultlines formation in corporate boards. It proposes a positive linear diversity-faultlines relationship based on self-categorization and social identity theories, interaction effects of gender diversity and age diversity on faultlines based on contingency theories, and a U-shaped board size-faultlines strength relationship. The hypotheses were tested in 288 large companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange using archival data. The results provided partial support for the interaction effects relationships and support to the U-shaped board size-faultlines strength relationship. The findings indicate that boards with low levels of age diversity experience a negative linear relationship between gender diversity and faultlines such that higher representation of women leads to weaker faultlines. The results also suggest that small- and large-sized boards experience stronger faultlines strength than medium-sized board. These results inform practice and underline implications of board demographic diversity and board size.

Governance issues in accounting

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify some key issues for the analysis of corporate governance based on the papers within this special issue including the Guest Editor's perspectives. Design/methodology/approach – The five papers included in this special issue are summarized and their main contribution to the literature is highlighted. Findings – The paper collectively deal with the role and impact of corporate boards on the quality of information provided to capital markets. Practical implications – The theoretical and empirical research included in the special issue advance the understanding of corporate governance which provides impetus for practitioner and policy change. Originality/value – The normative concepts of best practice need to be validated by empirical testing in the context of firms and their institutional settings. This suite of papers provides evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance in improving accounting quality

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

How boards strategise : a strategy as practice view

While board involvement in strategy is seen as increasingly important, our understanding of how boards fulfil this role is limited. This article draws on indepth qualitative research with directors and senior managers to develop a Strategy as Practice view on how boards "do" strategy. Two different but complementary strategising practices - Procedural Strategising and Interactive Strategising - are identified and elaborated in terms of their underlying micro-activities. The internal boardroom factors that affect the relative emphasis on these strategies practices - the strategic stance of the board, board power and perceive legitimacy of each practice - are also identified and discussed. These findings are then integrated into a typology of board strategising. A key implication of this paper is that boards need to consciously choose the nature and extent of their involvement in strategy.

Boards of directors' contribution to strategy : a literature review and research agenda

Research Question/Issue: Over the last four decades, research on the relationship between boards of directors and strategy has proliferated. Yet to date there is little theoretical and empirical agreement regarding the question of how boards of directors contribute to strategy. This review assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for future research. Research Findings/Results: Using a content-analysis of 150 articles published in 23 management journals up to 2007, we describe and analyze how research on boards of directors and strategy has evolved over time. We illustrate how topics, theories, settings, and sources of data interact and influence insights about board–strategy relationships during three specific periods. Theoretical Implications: Our study illustrates that research on boards of directors and strategy evolved from normative and structural approaches to behavioral and cognitive approaches. Our results encourage future studies to examine the impact of institutional and context-specific factors on the (expected) contribution of boards to strategy, and to apply alternative methods to fully capture the impact of board processes and dynamics on strategy making. Practical Implications: The increasing interest in boards of directors’ contribution to strategy echoes a movement towards more strategic involvement of boards of directors. However, best governance practices and the emphasis on board independence and control may hinder the board contribution to the strategic decision making. Our study invites investors and policy-makers to consider the requirements for an effective strategic task when they nominate board members and develop new regulations.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

The effectiveness of supervisory boards : an exploratory study of challenges in Dutch boardrooms

Triggered by highly publicized corporate scandals, changing societal expectations and the collapse of financial markets, the roles of boards of directors have changed significantly in safeguarding the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders. Yet relatively little is known about contemporary challenges non-executive directors face and whether their boards are well-equipped for their new tasks. Based on self-assessment reports by supervisory boards, a survey and interviews with supervisory board members, this paper investigates the challenges non-executive directors face in the Netherlands, particularly after a decade of corporate governance reform. Non-executive directors’ inadequate role in scrutinizing executive directors’ performance, information asymmetries and dysfunctional working relationships between executive and non-executive directors are among the greatest challenges indicated by non-executive directors on Dutch supervisory boards. The paper discusses several implications for scholars and practitioners and provides a unique insight in boardroom dynamics (word count: 138).

Boards' contribution to strategy and innovation

Among the most disputed issues within the business arena and among academic scholars are which role boards of directors are expected to fulfill, and how they contribute to a company’s success and survival (Monks & Minow, 2008). Recent failures of large corporations worldwide has led corporate governance and strategic management scholars to call for increased board involvement in decision-making (Tricker, 2009) that has paralleled regulators’ requests for higher monitoring and punishments in the case of frauds and misbehaviors (Coffee, 2005)

How two-tier boards can be more effective

Purpose: This study explores how non-executive directors address governance problems on Dutch two-tier boards. Within this board model, challenges might be particularly difficult to address due to the formal separation of management boards’ decision-management from supervisory boards’ decision-control roles. Design/methodology/approach: Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire among non-executive directors provide unique insights into three major challenges in the boardrooms of two-tier boards in the Netherlands. Findings: The study indicates that non-executive directors mainly experience challenges in three areas: the ability to ask management critical questions, information asymmetries between the management and supervisory boards and the management of the relationship between individual executive and non-executive directors. The qualitative in-depth analysis reveals the complexity of the contributing factors to problems in the boardroom and the range of process and social interventions non-executive directors use to address boardroom issues with management and the organization of the board. Practical implications: While policy makers have been largely occupied with the ‘right’ board composition, the results highlight the importance of adequately addressing operational challenges in the boardroom. The results emphasize the importance of a better understanding of board processes and the need of non-executive directors to carefully manage relationships in and around the boardroom. Originality/value: Whereas most studies have focussed on regulatory initiatives to improve the functioning of boards (e.g., the independence of the board), this study explores how non-executive directors attempt to enhance the effectiveness of boards on which they serve.

Are boards flying blind when it comes to enterprise technology governance?

Considering the sheer speed, complexity and ever changing risk in today’s technology saturated business environment, it’s hardly surprising that the call for digitally savvy directors is increasing. Emerging research suggests serious consequences for boards that continue to ignore or delegate enterprise-level technology governance.