An analytical study revisiting debate on interpretation of Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice

Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) is today generally seen as a direction to the significant sources of international law, which the world court must consider in resolving disputes; however, the list is not exhaustive nor encompasses all the formal and material sources of the international legal system. Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ was written ninety years ago in a different world, a question is under debate in many states, whether or not sources mentioned in Article 38 of the statute are compatible with needs of 21st century ? In recent decade, many new actors come on the stage which have transformed international law and now it is not only governs relations among states but also covers many International Organizations. Article 38(2) does refer to the other possible sources but does not define them. Moreover, law is a set of rules that citizens must follow to regulate peace and order in society. These laws are binding on both the individual and the state on a domestic and international level. Do states regard this particular rule as a rule of international law? The modern legal system of states is in the form of a specified and well organized set of rules, regulating affairs of different organs of a state. States also need a body of rules for their intercourse with each other. These sets of rules among states are called “International Law.” This article examines international law, its foundation and sources. It considers whether international conventions and treaties can be the only way states can considerably create international law, or there is a need for clarity about the sources of international law. Article is divided into two parts, the first one deals with sources of international law discussed in Article 38 of the statute of International Court of Justice whereas the second one discusses the material and formal sources of law, which still need reorganization as sources of law.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Charity law reforms : overview of progress since 2001

In the UK, Singapore, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, as in many other jurisdictions, charity law is rooted in the common law and anchored on the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601. The Pemsel classification of charitable purposes was uniformly accepted, and together with a shared and growing pool of judicial precedents, aided by the ‘spirit and intendment’ rule, has subsequently allowed the law to develop along much the same lines. In recent years, all the above jurisdictions have embarked on law reform processes designed to strengthen regulatory processes and to statutorily define and encode common law concepts. The reform outcomes are now to be found in a batch of national charity statutes which reflect interesting differences in the extent to which their respective governments have been prepared to balance the modernising of charitable purposes and other common law concepts alongside the customary concern to tighten the regulatory framework.

Australian copyright regimes and political economy of music

In this chapter I review the history of copyright in Australia through a singular and exemplary ruling of the Australian High Court made in 2012 and then relate that to the declining fortunes of Australian recorded music professionals. The case in point is Phonographic Performance Company [PPCA] of Australia Limited v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 8 (hereafter, HCA 8 2012). The case encapsulates the history of copyright law in Australia, with the judicial decision drawing substantive parts of its rationale from the Statute of Anne (8 Anne, c. 19, 1710), as well as copyright acts that regulated the Australian markets prior to 1968. More importantly the High Court decision serves to delineate some important political economic aspects of the recorded music professional in Australia and demonstrates Attali’s (1985) assertion that copyright is the mechanism through which composers are, by statute, literally excluded from capitalistic engagement as ‘productive labour’.

Fraud risk and the visibility of carbon

In recent years, carbon has been increasingly rendered ‘visible’ both discursively and through political processes that have imbued it with economic value. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been constructed as social and environmental costs and their reduction or avoidance as social and economic gain. The ‘marketisation’ of carbon, which has been facilitated through various compliance schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the Kyoto Protocol, the proposed Australian Emissions Reduction Scheme and through the voluntary carbon credit market, have attempted to bring carbon into the ‘foreground’ as an economic liability and/or opportunity. Accompanying the increasing economic visibility of carbon are reports of frauds and scams – the ‘gaming of carbon markets’(Chan 2010). As Lohmann (2010: 21) points out, ‘what are conventionally classed as scams or frauds are an inevitable feature of carbon offset markets, not something that could be eliminated by regulation targeting the specific businesses or state agencies involved’. This paper critiques the disparate discourses of fraud risk in carbon markets and examines cases of fraud within emerging landscapes of green criminology.

The empire of cancer: Gene patents and cancer voices

In his book, The Emperor of All Maladies, Siddhartha Mukherjee writes a history of cancer — "It is a chronicle of an ancient disease — once a clandestine, 'whispered-about' illness — that has metamorphosed into a lethal shape-shifting entity imbued with such penetrating metaphorical, medical, scientific, and political potency that cancer is often described as the defining plague of our generation." Increasingly, an important theme in the history of cancer is the role of law, particularly in the field of intellectual property law. It is striking that a number of contemporary policy debates over intellectual property and public health have concerned cancer research, diagnosis, and treatment. In the area of access to essential medicines, there has been much debate over Novartis’ patent application in respect of Glivec, a treatment for leukaemia. India’s Supreme Court held that the Swiss company’s patent application violated a safeguard provision in India’s patent law designed to stop evergreening. In the field of tobacco control, the Australian Government introduced plain packaging for tobacco products in order to address the health burdens associated with the tobacco epidemic. This regime was successfully defended in the High Court of Australia. In the area of intellectual property and biotechnology, there have been significant disputes over the Utah biotechnology company Myriad Genetics and its patents in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are related to breast cancer and ovarian cancer. The Federal Court of Australia handed down a decision on the validity of Myriad Genetics’ patent in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1 in February 2013. The Supreme Court of the United States heard a challenge to the validity of Myriad Genetics’ patents in this area in April 2013, and handed down a judgment in July 2013. Such disputes have involved tensions between intellectual property rights, and public health. This article focuses upon one of these important test cases involving intellectual property, public health, and cancer research. In June 2010, Cancer Voices Australia and Yvonne D’Arcy brought an action in the Federal Court of Australia against the validity of a BRCA1 patent — held by Myriad Genetics Inc, the Centre de Recherche du Chul, the Cancer Institute of Japan and Genetic Technologies Limited. Yvonne D’Arcy — a Brisbane woman who has had treatment for breast cancer — maintained: "I believe that what they are doing is morally and ethically corrupt and that big companies should not control any parts of the human body." She observed: "For my daughter, I've had her have [sic] mammograms, etc, because of me but I would still like her to be able to have the test to see if the mutation gene is in there from me." The applicants made the following arguments: "Genes and the information represented by human gene sequences are products of nature universally present in each individual, and the information content of a human gene sequence is fixed. Genetic variations or mutations are products of nature. The isolation of the BRCA1 gene mutation from the human body constitutes no more than a medical or scientific discovery of a naturally occurring phenomenon and does not give rise to a patentable invention." The applicants also argued that "the alleged invention is not a patentable invention in that, so far as claimed in claims 1–3, it is not a manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies". The applicants suggested that "the alleged invention is a mere discovery". Moreover, the applicants contended that "the alleged invention of each of claims 1-3 is not a patentable invention because they are claims for biological processes for the generation of human beings". The applicants, though, later dropped the argument that the patent claims related to biological processes for the generation of human beings. In February 2013, Nicholas J of the Federal Court of Australia considered the case brought by Cancer Voices Australia and Yvonne D’Arcy against Myriad Genetics. The judge presented the issues in the case, as follows: "The issue that arises in this case is of considerable importance. It relates to the patentability of genes, or gene sequences, and the practice of 'gene patenting'. Briefly stated, the issue to be decided is whether under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) a valid patent may be granted for a claim that covers naturally occurring nucleic acid — either deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) — that has been 'isolated'". In this context, the word "isolated" implies that naturally occurring nucleic acid found in the cells of the human body, whether it be DNA or RNA, has been removed from the cellular environment in which it naturally exists and separated from other cellular components also found there. The genes found in the human body are made of nucleic acid. The particular gene with which the patent in suit is concerned (BRCA1) is a human breast and ovarian cancer disposing gene. Various mutations that may be present in this gene have been linked to various forms of cancer including breast cancer and ovarian cancer.' The judge held in this particular case that Myriad Genetics’ patent claims were a "manner of manufacture" under s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and s 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The matter is currently under appeal in the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. This article interprets the dispute over Myriad Genetics in light of the scholarly work of Nobel Laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz on inequality. Such work has significant explanatory power in the context of intellectual property and biotechnology. First, Stiglitz has contended that "societal inequality was a result not just of the laws of economics, but also of how we shape the economy — through politics, including through almost every aspect of our legal system". Stiglitz is concerned that "our intellectual property regime … contributes needlessly to the gravest form of inequality." He maintains: "The right to life should not be contingent on the ability to pay." Second, Stiglitz worries that "some of the most iniquitous aspects of inequality creation within our economic system are a result of 'rent-seeking': profits, and inequality, generated by manipulating social or political conditions to get a larger share of the economic pie, rather than increasing the size of that pie". He observes that "the most iniquitous aspect of this wealth appropriation arises when the wealth that goes to the top comes at the expense of the bottom." Third, Stiglitz comments: "When the legal regime governing intellectual property rights is designed poorly, it facilitates rent-seeking" and "the result is that there is actually less innovation and more inequality." He is concerned that intellectual property regimes "create monopoly rents that impede access to health both create inequality and hamper growth more generally." Finally, Stiglitz has recommended: "Government-financed research, foundations, and the prize system … are alternatives, with major advantages, and without the inequality-increasing disadvantages of the current intellectual property rights system.’" This article provides a critical analysis of the Australian litigation and debate surrounding Myriad Genetics’ patents in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1. First, it considers the ruling of Nicholas J in the Federal Court of Australia that Myriad Genetics’ patent was a manner of manufacture as it related to an artificially created state of affairs, and not mere products of nature. Second, it examines the policy debate over gene patents in Australia, and its relevance to the litigation involving Myriad Genetics. Third, it examines comparative law, and contrasts the ruling by Nicholas J in the Federal Court of Australia with developments in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Fourth, this piece considers the reaction to the decision of Nicholas at first instance in Australia. Fifth, the article assesses the prospects of an appeal to the Full Federal Court of Australia over the Myriad Genetics’ patents. Finally, this article observes that, whatever happens in respect of litigation against Myriad Genetics, there remains controversy over Genetic Technologies Limited. The Melbourne firm has been aggressively licensing and enforcing its related patents on non-coding DNA and genomic mapping.

Submission on NSW Attorney-General's Discussion Paper on Amendment of Limitation of Actions Act 1969 to remove time limit for civil claims for child abuse

The New South Wales Attorney-General and Justice Policy Division released a Discussion Paper about reform of the Limitation of Actions Act 1969. The key question was whether and how to amend the statute to better provide access to justice for civil claimants in child abuse cases. This submission draws on published literature and multidisciplinary research to support the Discussion Paper's Option A, namely, to abolish the time limit for civil claims for injuries in criminal child abuse cases, and for this to be made retrospective.

Child sexual abuse and access to justice for civil claims: Time to reform the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld)

In 2015, Victoria passed laws removing the time limit in which a survivor of child sexual abuse can commence a civil claim for personal injury. The law applies also to physical abuse, and to psychological injury arising from those forms of abuse. In 2016, New South Wales made almost identical legal reforms. These reforms were partly motivated by the recommendations of inquiries into institutional child abuse. Of particular relevance is that the Australian Royal Commission Into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse recommended in 2015 that all States and Territories remove their time limits for civil claims. This presentation explores the problems with standard time limits when applied to child sexual abuse cases (whether occurring within or beyond institutions), the scientific, ethical and legal justifications for lifting the time limits, and solutions for future law reform.

Law autonomy and advance directives

The principle of autonomy underpins legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The primacy of autonomy in this domain is recognised expressly in the case law, through judicial pronouncement, and implicitly in most Australian jurisdictions, through enactment into statute of the right to make an advance directive. This article seeks to justify autonomy as an appropriate principle for regulating advance directives and relies on three arguments: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy; the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics discourse; and the uncontested importance of autonomy in the law on contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. This article also responds to key criticisms that autonomy is not an appropriate organising principle to underpin legal regulation of advance directives.

Boards' contribution to strategy and innovation

Among the most disputed issues within the business arena and among academic scholars are which role boards of directors are expected to fulfill, and how they contribute to a company’s success and survival (Monks & Minow, 2008). Recent failures of large corporations worldwide has led corporate governance and strategic management scholars to call for increased board involvement in decision-making (Tricker, 2009) that has paralleled regulators’ requests for higher monitoring and punishments in the case of frauds and misbehaviors (Coffee, 2005)

Wrong way go back! Rediscovering the path for charity law reform

Problems with charity law jurisprudence persist. The difficulties arose in the 20th century and are fundamental to the way the doctrine is presently theorised. They grew out of the approach taken in Pemsel’s Case to the categorisation of the ‘spirit and intendment’ of the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses. Recent statutory reforms, such as the Charities Act 2006 (Eng&W), have compounded the underlying problems rather than resolving them. This paper aims to stimulate thinking about a new foundation for charity jurisprudence – while the approach may seem radical, the paper argues that these new foundations can be discerned underlying the current jurisprudence. The difficulties can be overcome by rediscovering the underlying jurisprudence which is disregarded in the current approach to categorisation. Giving voice, in contemporary language, to that foundational jurisprudence, this paper provides a way out of the current problems. It also provides an alternative way of conceptualising the doctrine of charitable purpose to guide reform.

A creature of statute: Copyright law and legal formalism

This article argues that copyright law is not just a creature of statute, but it is also a social and imaginative contruct. It evaluates a number of critiques of legal formalism. Part 1 examines whether the positive rules and principles of copyright law are the product of historical contingency and political expediency. Part 2 considers the social operation of copyright law in terms of its material effects and cultural significance. Part 3 investigates the future of copyright law, in light of the politics of globalisation and the impact of new information technologies.

Regulating Multi-National Corporations Through State-Based Laws : Problems with Enforcing Human Rights Under The Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute United States of America (“America”) Federal Courts have the jurisdiction to hear claims for civil wrongs, committed against non-American citizens, which were perpetrated outside America’s national borders. The operation of this law has confronted American Federal Courts with difficulties on how to manage conflicts between American executive foreign policy and judicial interpretations of international law. Courts began to pass judgment over conduct which was approved by foreign governments. Then in 2005 the American Supreme Court wound back the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. This article will review the problems with the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute and the reasons for its subsequent narrowing.

Commercialisation of regenerative human tissue : Regulation and reform in Australia and England, Wales and Northern Ireland

The commercialisation of therapeutic products containing regenerative human tissue is regulated by the common law, statute and ethical guidelines in Australia and England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This article examines the regulatory regimes in these jurisdictions and considers whether reform is required to both support scientific research and ensure conformity with modern social views on medical research and the use of human tissue. The authors consider the crucial role of informed consent in striking the balance between the interests of researchers and the interests of the public.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.