Socialising across channels : group multichannel communication

People increasingly communicate over multiple channels, such as SMS, email and IM. Choosing the channel for interaction is typically a considered action and shapes the message itself. In order to explore how people make sense of communication mediums and more generally, social group behaviour, we developed a multichannel communication prototype. Preliminary results indicate that multichannel communication was considered very useful in the group context even considering the increased quantity of messages while it was little used for person-to-person interaction.

Leveraging mundane technologies for group mobile social communication

This paper outlines results from the long-term deployment of a system for mobile group socialization which utilizes a variety of mundane technologies to support cross-media notifications and messaging. We focus here on the results as they pertain to usage of mundane technologies, particularly the use of such technologies within the context of a cross-media system. We introduce “Rhub”, our prototype, which was designed to support coordination, communication and sharing amongst informal social groups. We also describe and discuss the usage of the “console,” a text-based syntax to enable consistent use across text messaging, instant messaging, email and the web. The prototype has been in active use for over 18 months by over 170 participants, who have used it on an everyday basis for their own socializing requirements.

Universally composable contributory group key exchange

We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.

Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols

A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles.