License scheme : an optimal waste management policy under asymmetric information

A system requiring a waste management license from an enforcement agency has been introduced in many countries. A license system is usually coupled with fines, a manifest, and a disposal tax. However, these policy devices have not been integrated into an optimal policy. In this paper we derive an optimal waste management policy by using those policy devices. Waste management policies are met with three difficult problems: asymmetric information, the heterogeneity of waste management firms, and non-compliance by waste management firms and waste disposers. The optimal policy in this paper overcomes all three problems.

An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets

We study which factors in terms of trading environment and trader characteristics determine individual information acquisition in experimental asset markets. Traders with larger endowments, existing inconclusive information, lower risk aversion, and less experience in financial markets tend to acquire more information. Overall, we find that traders overacquire information, so that informed traders on average obtain negative profits net of information costs. Information acquisition and the associated losses do not diminish over time. This overacquisition phenomenon is inconsistent with predictions of rational expectations equilibrium, and we argue it resembles the overdissipation results from the contest literature. We find that more acquired information in the market leads to smaller differences between fundamental asset values and prices. Thus, the overacquisition phenomenon is a novel explanation for the high forecasting accuracy of prediction markets.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

The economics of credence goods : an experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)

Asymmetric price range effects on vertical extensions

Vertical line extensions, both step-up and step-down, are common occurrence in consumer products. For example, Timex recently launched its luxury high-end Valentino line. On the other hand, many companies use downscale extensions to increase the overall sales volume. For instance, a number of luxury watch brands recently introduced watch collections with lower price points, like TAG Heur’s affordable watch the Aquaracer Calibre 5. Previous literature on vertical extensions has investigated how number of products in the line (Dacin and Smith 1994), the direction of the extension, brand concept (Kim, Lavack, and Smith 2001), and perceived risk (Lei, de Ruyter, and Wetzels 2008) affect extensions’ evaluation. Common to this literature is the use of models based on adaptation-level theory, which states that all relevant price information is integrated into a single prototype value and used in consumer judgments of price (Helson 1947; Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005). In the current research we argue that, while adaptation-level theory can be viewed as a useful simplification to understanding consumers’ evaluations, it misses out important contextual influences caused by a brand’s price range. Drawing on research on range-frequency theory (Mellers and Cooke 1994; Parducci 1965) we investigate the effects of price point distance and parent brand’s price range on evaluations of vertical extensions. Our reasoning leads to two important predictions that we test in a series of three experiments...

Health information management : What business are we in?

Developments in information technology will drive the change in records management; however, it should be the health information managers who drive the information management change. The role of health information management will be challenged to use information technology to broker a range of requests for information from a variety of users, including he alth consumers. The purposes of this paper are to conceptualise the role of health information management in the context of a technologically driven and managed health care environment, and to demonstrat e how this framework has been used to review and develop the undergraduate program in health information management at the Queensland University of Technology.