Field-of-view, detection range, and false alarm trade-offs in vision-based aircraft detection

This paper presents a survey of previously presented vision based aircraft detection flight test, and then presents new flight test results examining the impact of camera field-of view choice on the detection range and false alarm rate characteristics of a vision-based aircraft detection technique. Using data collected from approaching aircraft, we examine the impact of camera fieldof-view choice and confirm that, when aiming for similar levels of detection confidence, an improvement in detection range can be obtained by choosing a smaller effective field-of-view (in terms of degrees per pixel).

See and avoid using on-board computer vision

The integration of unmanned aircraft into civil airspace is a complex issue. One key question is whether unmanned aircraft can operate just as safely as their manned counterparts. The absence of a human pilot in unmanned aircraft automatically points to a deficiency that is the lack of an inherent see-and-avoid capability. To date, regulators have mandated that an “equivalent level of safety” be demonstrated before UAVs are permitted to routinely operate in civil airspace. This chapter proposes techniques, methods, and hardware integrations that describe a “sense-and-avoid” system designed to address the lack of a see-and-avoid capability in UAVs.

Decision support for the safe design and operation of unmanned aircraft systems

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) describe a diverse range of aircraft that are operated without a human pilot on-board. Unmanned aircraft range from small rotorcraft, which can fit in the palm of your hand, through to fixed wing aircraft comparable in size to that of a commercial passenger jet. The absence of a pilot on-board allows these aircraft to be developed with unique performance capabilities facilitating a wide range of applications in surveillance, environmental management, agriculture, defence, and search and rescue. However, regulations relating to the safe design and operation of UAS first need to be developed before the many potential benefits from these applications can be realised. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a Risk Management Process (RMP) should support all civil aviation policy and rulemaking activities (ICAO 2009). The RMP is described in International standard, ISO 31000:2009 (ISO, 2009a). This standard is intentionally generic and high-level, providing limited guidance on how it can be effectively applied to complex socio-technical decision problems such as the development of regulations for UAS. Through the application of principles and tools drawn from systems philosophy and systems engineering, this thesis explores how the RMP can be effectively applied to support the development of safety regulations for UAS. A sound systems-theoretic foundation for the RMP is presented in this thesis. Using the case-study scenario of a UAS operation over an inhabited area and through the novel application of principles drawn from general systems modelling philosophy, a consolidated framework of the definitions of the concepts of: safe, risk and hazard is made. The framework is novel in that it facilitates the representation of broader subjective factors in an assessment of the safety of a system; describes the issues associated with the specification of a system-boundary; makes explicit the hierarchical nature of the relationship between the concepts and the subsequent constraints that exist between them; and can be evaluated using a range of analytic or deliberative modelling techniques. Following the general sequence of the RMP, the thesis explores the issues associated with the quantified specification of safety criteria for UAS. A novel risk analysis tool is presented. In contrast to existing risk tools, the analysis tool presented in this thesis quantifiably characterises both the societal and individual risk of UAS operations as a function of the flight path of the aircraft. A novel structuring of the risk evaluation and risk treatment decision processes is then proposed. The structuring is achieved through the application of the Decision Support Problem Technique; a modelling approach that has been previously used to effectively model complex engineering design processes and to support decision-making in relation to airspace design. The final contribution made by this thesis is in the development of an airworthiness regulatory framework for civil UAS. A novel "airworthiness certification matrix" is proposed as a basis for the definition of UAS "Part 21" regulations. The outcome airworthiness certification matrix provides a flexible, systematic and justifiable method for promulgating airworthiness regulations for UAS. In addition, an approach for deriving "Part 1309" regulations for UAS is presented. In contrast to existing approaches, the approach presented in this thesis facilitates a traceable and objective tailoring of system-level reliability requirements across the diverse range of UAS operations. The significance of the research contained in this thesis is clearly demonstrated by its practical real world outcomes. Industry regulatory development groups and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority have endorsed the proposed airworthiness certification matrix. The risk models have also been used to support research undertaken by the Australian Department of Defence. Ultimately, it is hoped that the outcomes from this research will play a significant part in the shaping of regulations for civil UAS, here in Australia and around the world.

A review of system safety failure probability objectives for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are one of a number of emerging aviation sectors. Such new aviation concepts present a significant challenge to National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) charged with ensuring the safety of their operation within the existing airspace system. There is significant heritage in the existing body of aviation safety regulations for Conventionally Piloted Aircraft (CPA). It can be argued that the promulgation of these regulations has delivered a level of safety tolerable to society, thus justifying the “default position” of applying these same standards, regulations and regulatory structures to emerging aviation concepts such as UAS. An example of this is the proposed “1309” regulation for UAS, which is based on the 1309 regulation for CPA. However, the absence of a pilot on-board an unmanned aircraft creates a fundamentally different risk paradigm to that of CPA. An appreciation of these differences is essential to the justification of the “default position” and in turn, to ensure the development of effective safety standards and regulations for UAS. This paper explores the suitability of the proposed “1309” regulation for UAS. A detailed review of the proposed regulation is provided and a number of key assumptions are identified and discussed. A high-level model characterising the expected number of third party fatalities on the ground is then used to determine the impact of these assumptions. The results clearly show that the “one size fits all” approach to the definition of 1309 regulations for UAS, which mandates equipment design and installation requirements independent of where the UAS is to be operated, will not lead to an effective management of the risks.

The development of ground impact models for the analysis of the risks associated with Unmanned Aircraft Operations over inhabited areas

With the emergence of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) there is a growing need for safety standards and regulatory frameworks to manage the risks associated with their operations. The primary driver for airworthiness regulations (i.e., those governing the design, manufacture, maintenance and operation of UAS) are the risks presented to people in the regions overflown by the aircraft. Models characterising the nature of these risks are needed to inform the development of airworthiness regulations. The output from these models should include measures of the collective, individual and societal risk. A brief review of these measures is provided. Based on the review, it was determined that the model of the operation of an UAS over inhabited areas must be capable of describing the distribution of possible impact locations, given a failure at a particular point in the flight plan. Existing models either do not take the impact distribution into consideration, or propose complex and computationally expensive methods for its calculation. A computationally efficient approach for estimating the boundary (and in turn area) of the impact distribution for fixed wing unmanned aircraft is proposed. A series of geometric templates that approximate the impact distributions are derived using an empirical analysis of the results obtained from a 6-Degree of Freedom (6DoF) simulation. The impact distributions can be aggregated to provide impact footprint distributions for a range of generic phases of flight and missions. The maximum impact footprint areas obtained from the geometric template are shown to have a relative error of typically less than 1% compared to the areas calculated using the computationally more expensive 6DoF simulation. Computation times for the geometric models are on the order of one second or less, using a standard desktop computer. Future work includes characterising the distribution of impact locations within the footprint boundaries.

Visual servoing approach to collision avoidance for aircraft

This paper presents a reactive Sense and Avoid approach using spherical image-based visual servoing. Avoidance of point targets in the lateral or vertical plane is achieved without requiring an estimate of range. Simulated results for static and dynamic targets are provided using a realistic model of a small fixed wing unmanned aircraft.

Quinolinium 8-hydroxy-7-iodoquinoline-5-sulfonate 0.8-hydrate

In the structure of the hydrated quinolinium salt of ferron (8-hydroxy-7-iodoquinoline-5-sulfonic acid), C9H7N+ C9H5INO4S- . 0.8H2O, the quinolinium cation is fully disordered over two sites (occupancy factors 0.63 and 0.37) lying essentially within a common plane and with the ferron anions form pi-pi-associated stacks down the b axis (minimum ring centroid separation = 3.462(6)Ang.]. The cations and anions are linked into chains extending along c through hydroxyl O-H...O and quinolinium N-H...O hydrogen bonds to sulfonate O-atom acceptors which are also involved in water O-H...O hydrogen-bonding interactions down b giving a two-dimensional network structure.

Structure of the immature retroviral capsid at 8 Å resolution by cryo-electron microscopy

The assembly of retroviruses such as HIV-1 is driven by oligomerization of their major structural protein, Gag. Gag is a multidomain polyprotein including three conserved folded domains: MA (matrix), CA (capsid) and NC (nucleocapsid)(1). Assembly of an infectious virion proceeds in two stages(2). In the first stage, Gag oligomerization into a hexameric protein lattice leads to the formation of an incomplete, roughly spherical protein shell that buds through the plasma membrane of the infected cell to release an enveloped immature virus particle. In the second stage, cleavage of Gag by the viral protease leads to rearrangement of the particle interior, converting the non-infectious immature virus particle into a mature infectious virion. The immature Gag shell acts as the pivotal intermediate in assembly and is a potential target for anti-retroviral drugs both in inhibiting virus assembly and in disrupting virus maturation(3). However, detailed structural information on the immature Gag shell has not previously been available. For this reason it is unclear what protein conformations and interfaces mediate the interactions between domains and therefore the assembly of retrovirus particles, and what structural transitions are associated with retrovirus maturation. Here we solve the structure of the immature retroviral Gag shell from Mason-Pfizer monkey virus by combining cryo-electron microscopy and tomography. The 8-angstrom resolution structure permits the derivation of a pseudo-atomic model of CA in the immature retrovirus, which defines the protein interfaces mediating retrovirus assembly. We show that transition of an immature retrovirus into its mature infectious form involves marked rotations and translations of CA domains, that the roles of the amino-terminal and carboxy-terminal domains of CA in assembling the immature and mature hexameric lattices are exchanged, and that the CA interactions that stabilize the immature and mature viruses are almost completely distinct.