Is there a physicality requirement at Common Law? : a survey of the Pre-NRDC cases discussing ‘Manufacture’

One of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement. Despite being recently considered by the Federal Court, this is arguably an issue that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in Australia. In its 2006 decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the patentable subject matter standard is rooted in the physical, when it held that an invention must involve a physical effect or transformation to be patent eligible. That decision, however, has been the subject of scrutiny in the academic literature. This article seeks to add to the existing literature written in response to the Grant decision by examining in detail the key common law cases decided prior to the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, which is the undisputed authoritative statement of principle in regards to the patentable subject matter standard in Australia. This article, in conjunction with others written by the author, questions the Federal Court’s assertion in Grant that the physicality requirement it established is consistent with existing law.

Charity law, advocacy and the aid/watch decision : compatibility of charitable purposes and political objects — the view from Australia

Introduction In 1952 the Nathan report stated that: Some of the most valuable activities of voluntary societies consist, however, in the fact that they may be able to stand aside from and criticize State action or inaction, in the interests of the inarticulate man in the street. Some 60 years later it remained the case that if a voluntary society wanted to gain or retain charitable status then, contrary to the Nathan report, the one thing it could not do was set itself up with the purpose of criticizing State action or inaction. This legal position was adopted by the authorities in Australia with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) noting in Taxation Ruling TR2005/21: 102. An institution or fund is not charitable if its purpose is advocating a political party or cause, attempting to change the law or government policy, or propagating or promoting a particular point of view. So, why, if it is such a valuable activity, have governments steadfastly refused to allow charities to have as their purpose the freedom to advocate in this way and how has this situation been affected by the recent High Court of Australia decision in Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation? This article proposes to address such questions. Beginning with some background history, it explains that, initially, the current constraints did not apply. Then it looks at the nature of these constraints: how does the law define what constitutes the type of political activity that a charity must not undertake? What is the rationale for prohibition? How has the judiciary contributed to the development of the law in this area in recent years? This will lead into a consideration of the Aid/Watch case and the implications arising from the recent final decision. The article concludes by reflecting on what has changed and why the view on this contentious matter now looks different from Australia.

Section 64 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and the reluctant buyer

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunworth v Mirvac Qld Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 200 arose from unusual circumstances associated with the flood in Brisbane earlier this year. Maris Dunworth (‘the buyer’) agreed to purchase a ground floor residential apartment located beside the Brisbane River at Tennyson from Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd (‘Mirvac’). The original date for completion was 12 May 2009. In earlier proceedings, the buyer had alleged that she had been induced to purchase the apartment by false, misleading and deceptive representations. This claim was dismissed and an order for specific performance was made with a new completion date of 8 February 2011...

Country of Origin and Internet Publication : Applying the Berne Convention in the Digital Age

Historically, determining the country of origin of a published work presented few challenges, because works were generally published physically – whether in print or otherwise – in a distinct location or few locations. However, publishing opportunities presented by new technologies mean that we now live in a world of simultaneous publication – works that are first published online are published simultaneously to every country in world in which there is Internet connectivity. While this is certainly advantageous for the dissemination and impact of information and creative works, it creates potential complications under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), an international intellectual property agreement to which most countries in the world now subscribe. Under the Berne Convention’s national treatment provisions, rights accorded to foreign copyright works may not be subject to any formality, such as registration requirements (although member countries are free to impose formalities in relation to domestic copyright works). In Kernel Records Oy v. Timothy Mosley p/k/a Timbaland, et al. however, the Florida Southern District Court of the United States ruled that first publication of a work on the Internet via an Australian website constituted “simultaneous publication all over the world,” and therefore rendered the work a “United States work” under the definition in section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, subjecting the work to registration formality under section 411. This ruling is in sharp contrast with an earlier decision delivered by the Delaware District Court in Håkan Moberg v. 33T LLC, et al. which arrived at an opposite conclusion. The conflicting rulings of the U.S. courts reveal the problems posed by new forms of publishing online and demonstrate a compelling need for further harmonization between the Berne Convention, domestic laws and the practical realities of digital publishing. In this article, we argue that even if a work first published online can be considered to be simultaneously published all over the world it does not follow that any country can assert itself as the “country of origin” of the work for the purpose of imposing domestic copyright formalities. More specifically, we argue that the meaning of “United States work” under the U.S. Copyright Act should be interpreted in line with the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law to limit its application to only those works with a real and substantial connection to the United States. There are gaps in the Berne Convention’s articulation of “country of origin” which provide scope for judicial interpretation, at a national level, of the most pragmatic way forward in reconciling the goals of the Berne Convention with the practical requirements of domestic law. We believe that the uncertainties arising under the Berne Convention created by new forms of online publishing can be resolved at a national level by the sensible application of principles of statutory interpretation by the courts. While at the international level we may need a clearer consensus on what amounts to “simultaneous publication” in the digital age, state practice may mean that we do not yet need to explore textual changes to the Berne Convention.

The advancement of religion is still a valid charitable object in 2001

“The Relevance of Religion” is the title of a recent address delivered by The Honourable Chief Justice Murray Gleeson of the High Court of Australia.1 In making the point “about the continuing public importance of religion”, the Chief Justice referenced Lord Devlin’s contention that “no society has yet solved the problem of how to teach morality without religion”....

Ignorance not racism : the ethical implications of cultural schema theory within policing

Communication between cultures that do not share similar norms, values, beliefs, experiences, attitudes and practices has long proven to be a difficult exercise (Balsmeier & Heck, 1994). These difficulties can have serious consequences when the miscommunication happens in the justice system; the innocent can be convicted and witnesses undermined. Much work has been carried out on the need for better communication in the courtroom (Eades, 1993; Lauchs, 2010; Supreme Court of Queensland, 2010; Supreme Court of Western Australia, 2008) but far less on language and interactions between police and indigenous Australians (Powell, 2000). It is ethically necessary that officers of the law be made aware of linguistic issues to ensure they conduct their investigations in a fair and effective manner. Despite years of awareness raising issues still arise. Issues of clashes between police and indigenous peoples are still prevalent (Heath, 2012; Remeikis, 2012). This paper will attempt to explain the reason for this discrepancy and, in doing so, suggest some solutions to the problem. This paper draws on cultural schema theory in an attempt to determine if cultural difference in language could be negatively affecting communication between Aboriginal people and the police of South East Queensland. Findings from this research are significant in determining if miscommunication is adding to the already unequal standing of Aboriginal people within the Criminal Justice system, and encouraging the already volatile relationship between Aboriginal people and police.

Cameron's hot air. Pollution, fraud and the politics of carbon emissions

It is widely recognised that exposure to air pollutants affect pulmonary and lung dysfunction as well as a range of neurological and vascular disorders. The rapid increase of worldwide carbon emissions continues to compromise environmental sustainability whilst contributing to premature death. Moreover, the harms caused by air pollution have a more pernicious reach, such as being the major source of climate change and ‘natural disasters’, which reportedly kills millions of people each year (World Health Organization, 2012). The opening quotations tell a story of the UK government's complacency towards the devastation of toxic and contaminating air emissions. The above headlines greeted the British public earlier this year after its government was taken to the Court of Appeal for an appalling air pollution record that continues to cause the premature deaths of 30,000 British people each year at a health cost estimated at £20 billion per annum. This combined with pending legal proceedings against the UK government for air pollution violations by the European Commission, point to a Cameron government that prioritises hot air and profit margins over human lives. The UK's legal air pollution regimes are an industry dominated process that relies on negotiation and partnership between regulators and polluters. The entire model seeks to assist business compliance rather than punish corporate offenders. There is no language of ‘crime’ in relation to UK air pollution violations but rather a discourse of ‘exceedence’ (Walters, 2010). It is a regulatory system not premised on the ‘polluter pay’ principle but instead the ‘polluter profit’ principle.

Proportionality of sanctions under the WADA Code : CAS jurisprudence and the need for a strict approach

This article suggests that the issue of proportionality in anti-doping sanctions has been inconsistently dealt with by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Given CAS’s pre-eminent role in interpreting and applying the World Anti-Doping Code under the anti-doping policies of its signatories, an inconsistent approach to the application of the proportionality principle will cause difficulties for domestic anti-doping tribunals seeking guidance as to the appropriateness of their doping sanctions.

What’s in a name : Is there a right to terminate a contract for purchase of a unit if the name changes?

The significance of the proposed name of a building to buyers of units off the plan has received recent attention in Queensland and the ACT with differing results. In Gough v South Sky Investments Pty Ltd the Queensland Court of Appeal concluded that the name of the building was not an essential term of the contract and rejected a claim by a number of buyers to terminate their contracts because of the change of name from Oracle to Peppers. In contrast, Rares J in the Federal Court decision of Madison Constructions Pty Ltd v Empire Building Group (ACT) Pty Ltd considered that the name of the building in a proposed development could potentially form the basis of misleading conduct about the association of the seller with a particular development corporation.

Court overrides costs assessment limits

This article considers the implications for Queensland practitioners of the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA 310. That decision involved the question whether the court retained a jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of costs charged by a barrister, who had entered a costs agreement with solicitors, in circumstances where where had been no application under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) for an assessment of the costs the subject of the bill and it was no longer possible for such an application to be made.

Legal Profession Act 2007 : entitlement to itemised bill – meaning of “client” – meaning of “third party payer”

In Legal Services Commissioner and Wright [2010] QSC 168 and Amos v Ian K Fry & Company, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the scope of some of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), including the definition of “third party payer” in s 301 of the Act.

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s 27(1) – duty of respondent to give information and documents

In Hare v Mount Isa City Council [2009] QDC 39 McGill DCJ examined the scope of s 27(1) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) and its interpretation by the Court of Appeal in Haug v Jupiters Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 276. The judge expressed a number of concerns about the Act and the Regulation made under it, that are worthy of consideration by the Legislature.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Wrongful birth : assessment of damages in 2013

More than 10 years have passed since the High Court of Australia confirmed the recoverability of damages for the cost of raising a child, in the well-known decision in Cattanach v Melchior. Yet a number of aspects of the assessment of such “wrongful birth” damages had not been the subject of a comprehensive court ruling. The recent decision in Waller v James was widely anticipated as potentially providing a comprehensive discussion of the principles relevant to the assessment of damages in wrongful birth cases. However, given a finding on causation adverse to the plaintiffs, the trial judge held that it was unnecessary to determine the quantum of damages. Justice Hislop did, however, make some comments in relation to the assessment of damages. This article focuses mostly on the argued damages issues relating to the costs of raising the child and the trial judge’s comments regarding the same. The Waller v James claim was issued before the enactment of the Health Care Liability Act 2001 (NSW) and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Although the case was therefore decided according to the “common law”, as explained below, his Honour’s comments may be of relevance to more recent claims governed by the civil liability legislation in New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia.

The consequences of not taking reasonable steps to obtain finance

In Hauff v Miller [2013] QCA 48 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an issue that has not previously arisen at appellate level. The case concerned the interaction of the well-known subject to finance clause and other standard contractual provisions...