Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

When does pain and distress relief hastening death become killing?

This paper discusses the question of when pain and distress relief known to hasten death would cross the line between permissible conduct and killing. The issue is discussed in the context of organ donation after cardiac death, and considers the administration of analgesics, sedatives, and the controversial use of paralysing agents in the provision and withdrawal of ventilation.

Autonomy versus futility? Barriers to good clinical practice in end-of-life care : a Queensland case

Findings from a Queensland coronial inquest highlight the complex clinical, ethical and legal issues that arise in end-of-life care when clinicians and family members disagree about a diagnosis of clinical futility. The tension between the law and best medical practice is highlighted in this case, as doctors are compelled to seek family consent to not commence a futile intervention. Good communication between doctors and families, as well as community and professional education, is essential to resolve tensions that can arise when there is disagreement about treatment at the end of life.

The four principles: Can they be measured and do they predict ethical decision making?

Background The four principles of Beauchamp and Childress - autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice - have been extremely influential in the field of medical ethics, and are fundamental for understanding the current approach to ethical assessment in health care. This study tests whether these principles can be quantitatively measured on an individual level, and then subsequently if they are used in the decision making process when individuals are faced with ethical dilemmas. Methods The Analytic Hierarchy Process was used as a tool for the measurement of the principles. Four scenarios, which involved conflicts between the medical ethical principles, were presented to participants and they made judgments about the ethicality of the action in the scenario, and their intentions to act in the same manner if they were in the situation. Results Individual preferences for these medical ethical principles can be measured using the Analytic Hierarchy Process. This technique provides a useful tool in which to highlight individual medical ethical values. On average individuals have a significant preference for non-maleficence over the other principles, however, and perhaps counter-intuitively, this preference does not seem to relate to applied ethical judgements in specific ethical dilemmas. Conclusions People state they value these medical ethical principles but they do not actually seem to use them directly in the decision making process. The reasons for this are explained through the lack of a behavioural model to account for the relevant situational factors not captured by the principles. The limitations of the principles in predicting ethical decision making are discussed.

Is providing elective ventilation in the best interests of potential donors?

In this paper, we examine the lawfulness of a proposal to provide elective ventilation to incompetent patients who are potential organ donors. Under the current legal framework, this depends on whether the best interests test could be satisfied. It might be argued that, because the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) (and the common law) makes it clear that the best interests test is not confined to the patient's clinical interests, but extends to include the individual's own values, wishes and beliefs, the proposal will be in the patient's best interests. We reject this claim. We argue that, as things currently stand, the proposal could not lawfully be justified as a blanket proposition by reference to the best interests test. Accordingly, a modification of the law would be necessary to render the proposal lawful. We conclude with a suggestion about how that could be achieved.

The moral status of babies

In their controversial paper 'After-birth abortion', Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that there is no rational basis for allowing abortion but prohibiting infanticide ('after-birth abortion'). We ought in all consistency either to allow both or prohibit both. This paper rejects their claim, arguing that much-neglected considerations in philosophical discussions of this issue are capable of explaining why we currently permit abortion in some cases, while prohibiting infanticide.

Acting to let someone die

This paper examines the recent prominent view in medical ethics that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (LST) is an act of killing. I trace this view to the rejection of the traditional claim that withdrawing LST is an omission rather than an act. Although that traditional claim is not as problematic as this recent prominent view suggests, my main claim is that even if we accepted that withdrawing LST should be classified as an act rather than as an omission, it could still be classified as letting die rather than killing. Even though omissions are contrasted with acts, letting die need not be, for one can let die by means of acts. The remainder of the paper is devoted to establishing this claim and addresses certain objections to it.

Swine flu, doctors and pandemics : Is there a duty to treat during a pandemic?

The swine influenza (H1N1) outbreak in 2009 highlighted the ethical and legal pressures facing general practitioners and health workers in emergency departments in determining the nature and limits of their obligations to their patients and the public. Health workers require guidance on the multiple, overlapping, and at times conflicting legal and ethical duties owed to patients and prospective patients, employers and fellow health workers, and their families. Existing sources of advice on these issues in Australia, by way of statements of medical ethics and other sources of advice, are shown to be in need of further amplification if health workers are to be provided with the certainty and guidance required. Given the complexity of the issues, Australia would therefore benefit from more extensive consultation with the variety of stakeholders involved in these questions if pandemic plans are to smoothly deal with future crises in an ethically and legally sound manner.

“Best interests” and withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an adult who lacks capacity in the parens patriae jurisdiction

Disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment are increasingly coming before Australian Supreme Courts. Such cases are generally heard in the parens patriae jurisdiction where the test applied is what is in the patient’s “best interests”. However, the application of the “best interests” test, and its meaning, remains unclear in this context. To shed light on this emerging body of jurisprudence, this article analyses the Australian superior court decisions that consider an adult’s best interests in the context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment. We identify a number of themes from the current body of cases and consider how these themes may guide future decision-making. After then considering the law in the United Kingdom, we suggest an approach for assessing best interests that could be adopted by Australian Supreme Courts. We argue that the suggested approach will lead to a more structured and systematic decision-making process that better promotes the best interests of the patient.

End of Life Decision Making and Palliative Care

1. An emergency department attendance represents an opportunity to set goals for care during the attendance and beyond. 2. End of life discussions and advance care planning assist early decision-making about treatment goals and end of life care. 3. Knowledge of the law assists decision-making at the end of life. 4. Not all dying patients require the skill set of a palliative care specialist but every dying patient will benefit from a palliative approach. 5. Palliative care does not preclude active treatment where the intent is understood by patient and family. 6. Failure to diagnose dying can compromise patient care. 7. The emergency department should foster close relationships with local specialist palliative care providers to improve and ensure timely access for patients and families and so that emergency staff have access to the knowledge and skills provided.

Cutting the Gordian knot of futility : a case for law reform on unilateral withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment

In this paper, we propose law reform with respect to the unilateral withholding or withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment in Australia and New Zealand. That is, where a doctor withholds or withdraws potentially life-sustaining treatment without consent from a patient or a patient’s substitute decision-maker (where the patient lacks capacity), or authorisation from a court or tribunal, or by operation of a statute or justifiable government or institutional policy. Our proposal is grounded in the core values that do (or should) underpin a regulatory framework on an issue such as this; these values are drawn from existing commitments made by Australia and New Zealand through legislation, the common law, and conventions and treaties. It is also grounded in a critical review of the law on unilateral withholding and withdrawal as well as the legal context within which this issue sits in Australasia. We argue that the current law is inconsistent with the core values and develop a proposal for a legal response to this issue that more closely aligns with the core values it is supposed to serve.

Health Law in Australia [Second Edition]

Health Law in Australia is the country’s leading text in this area and was the first book to deal with health law on a comprehensive national basis. In this important field that continues to give rise to challenges for society Health Law in Australia takes a logical, structured approach to explain the breadth of this area of law across all Australian jurisdictions. By covering all the major areas in this diverse field, Health Law in Australia enhances the understanding of the discipline as a whole. Beginning with an exploration of the general principles of health law, including chapters on “Negligence”, “Children and Consent to Medical Treatment”, and “Medical Confidentiality and Patient Privacy”, the book goes on to consider beginning-of-life and end-of-life issues before concluding with chapters on emerging areas in health law, such as biotechnology, genetic technologies and medical research. The contributing authors are national leaders who are specialists in these areas of health law and who can share with readers the results of their research. Health Law in Australia has been written for both legal and health audiences and is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students, researchers and scholars in the disciplines of law, health and medicine, as well as health and legal practitioners, government departments and bodies in the health area, and private health providers.

Health law : scope, sources and forces

• For the purposes of this chapter, “health law” encapsulates regulation of the medical and health professions, the administration of health services and the maintenance of public health to the extent that it is connected to the provision of health services. • There are diverging views as to whether health law can be regarded as a discrete “area of law”. • Health law draws on other areas of law such as tort law, criminal law and family law. It also draws upon other disciplines, most notably medical and health ethics. • Social and economic forces have influenced the development and direction of health law, and these forces may become even more influential in the future. • The increasingly globalised world has implications for Australia's health systems and raises questions and creates commitments in respect of the international community. • Technological developments, including in respect of treatment, diagnosis and information management, create ongoing challenges for health law. • Patient rights, human rights and consumerism are increasingly key drivers in the development of health law. • Health law is significant to contemporary Australian society because of the gravity of the topics that fall within its ambit, its social relevance to so many aspects of human existence and endeavour, the important role it plays in protecting the vulnerable, and the extent to which it engages with fundamental principles of justice.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms have also been established to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made.

Double effect and palliative care excuses

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.