How nonprofit boards monitor, judge and influence organisational performance

The law and popular opinion expect boards of directors will actively monitor their organisations. Further, public opinion is that boards should have a positive impact on organisational performance. However, the processes of board monitoring and judgment are poorly understood, and board influence on organisational performance needs to be better understood. This thesis responds to the repeated calls to open the ‘black box’ linking board practices and organisational performance by investigating the processual behaviours of boards. The work of four boards1 of micro and small-sized nonprofit organisations were studied for periods of at least one year, using a processual research approach, drawing on observations of board meetings, interviews with directors, and the documents of the boards. The research shows that director turnover, the difficulty recruiting and engaging directors, and the administration of reporting, had strong impacts upon board monitoring, judging and/or influence. In addition, board monitoring of organisational performance was adversely affected by directors’ limited awareness of their legal responsibilities and directors’ limited financial literacy. Directors on average found all sources of information about their organisation’s work useful. Board judgments about the financial aspects of organisational performance were regulated by the routines of financial reporting. However, there were no comparable routines facilitating judgments about non-financial performance, and such judgments tended to be limited to specific aspects of performance and were ad hoc, largely in response to new information or the repackaging of existing information in a new form. The thesis argues that Weick’s theory of sensemaking offers insight into the way boards went about the task of understanding organisational performance. Board influence on organisational performance was demonstrated in the areas of: compliance; instrumental influence through service and through discussion and decision-making; and by symbolic, legitimating and protective means. The degree of instrumental influence achieved by boards depended on director competency, access to networks of influence, and understandings of board roles, and by the agency demonstrated by directors. The thesis concludes that there is a crowding out effect whereby CEO competence and capability limits board influence. The thesis also suggests that there is a second ‘agency problem’, a problem of director volition. The research potentially has profound implications for the work of nonprofit boards. Rather than purporting to establish a general theory of board governance, the thesis embraces calls to build situation-specific mini-theories about board behaviour.

L'Impatto delle Condizioni Interne ed Esterne sul Ruolo del Cda : un'Analisi Empirica sulle Grandi Imprese Italiane [The impact of internal and external contingencies on board tasks performance : an empirical investigation of Italian companies]

Il Consiglio di Amministrazione (CdA) è il principale organo di governo delle aziende. La letteratura gli attribuisce tre ruoli: controllo, indirizzo strategico e collegamento con l’ambiente (networking). Precedenti studi empirici hanno analizzato se un Consiglio di Amministrazione è attivo o meno in tutti e tre i ruoli in un dato momento. Nel presente lavoro, invece, si propone un approccio «contingente» e si analizzano i ruoli svolti dal CdA al variare delle condizioni interne (aziende in crisi o di successo) ed esterne (aziende in settori competitivi o regolamentati).. L’indagine empirica è stata condotta su un campione di 301 imprese italiane di grandi dimensioni. I risultati supportano la tesi iniziale secondo cui le condizioni interne ed esterne incidono sul ruolo svolto dal CdA. In particolare i risultati evidenziano che il CdA non svolge sempre tutti e tre i ruoli nello stesso momento, ma esso si concentra sul ruolo o sui ruoli che assumono grande importanza nella situazione in cui si trova l’azienda. Con riferimento alle condizioni interne, nelle imprese in crisi il CdA è attivo in tutti e tre i ruoli, mentre in quelle di successo prevale un orientamento verso la funzione strategica. Nelle aziende che operano in settori competitivi il ruolo di controllo è più pressante mentre nei settori regolamentati prevale una funzione di networking.

Recruitment and training of board members for the 90's and beyond

An historical analysis of the management of the arts in Australia in the last fifty years demonstrates clearly the problems faced by arts organisations which have poorly selected and trained Boards of Directors. Traditionally Board members were selected because they represented the various facets and skills involved in business (marketing, law, accountancy, management, entrepreneurship) or they were arts practitioners or patrons, or they had some particular social standing. Arts organisations recruited Board members like a "mixed bag of lollies - one of these and one of those". No consideration was given to the vital qualities of enthusiasm, reliability, empathy, capacity for hard work, strong arts interest, effective communication skills and respect for organisational processes.

Boards' contribution to strategy and innovation

Among the most disputed issues within the business arena and among academic scholars are which role boards of directors are expected to fulfill, and how they contribute to a company’s success and survival (Monks & Minow, 2008). Recent failures of large corporations worldwide has led corporate governance and strategic management scholars to call for increased board involvement in decision-making (Tricker, 2009) that has paralleled regulators’ requests for higher monitoring and punishments in the case of frauds and misbehaviors (Coffee, 2005)

The role of the board of directors in ensuring a culture of integrity

Corporate scandals are as old as the corporate form itself. Consider, for example, the controversies surrounding the role of one of the first modern corporations, the British East India Company, in the Bengal famine of 1770 and in the Chinese opium trade. Yet it is the increasing scale and scope of unethical acts carried out by individuals in the name, and interests, of corporations that continue to be concerning. Recent revelations surrounding the extent of bribery and covert surveillance used by News Corporation journalists in its British operations continue to shock the world and undermine confidence in that organiszation and journalists in general. Yet despite the systemic nature of many of these unethical activities, corporate leaders generally plead ignorance when transgressions come to light. During the enquity into the News Corporation scandal, Rupert Murdoch, the CEO and chairman, rejected the assertion that he was ultimately 'responsible for this whole fiasco' (House of Commons, 2011, Q.230). Instead, like many corporate leaders before him, Murdoch placed blame on the employees within the newspaper. His responses poses an increasingly important question: Do corporate leaders bear responsibility for the conduct of individuals within a corporation and, if so, why?

The importance of group-fit in new director selection

Purpose Director selection is an important yet under-researched topic. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to extant literature by gaining a greater understanding into how and why new board members are recruited. Design/methodology/approach This exploratory study uses in-depth interviews with Australian non-executive directors to identify what selection criteria are deemed most important when selecting new director candidates and how selection practices vary between organisations. Findings The findings indicate that appointments to the board are based on two key attributes: first, the candidates’ ability to contribute complementary skills and second, the candidates’ ability to work well with the existing board. Despite commonality in these broad criteria, board selection approaches vary considerably between organisations. As a result, some boards do not adequately assess both criteria when appointing a new director hence increasing the chance of a mis-fit between the position and the appointed director. Research limitations/implications The study highlights the importance of both individual technical capabilities and social compatibility in director selections. The authors introduce a new perspective through which future research may consider director selection: fit. Originality/value The in-depth analysis of the director selection process highlights some less obvious and more nuanced issues surrounding directors’ appointment to the board. Recurrent patterns indicate the need for both technical and social considerations. Hence the study is a first step in synthesising the current literature and illustrates the need for a multi-theoretical approach in future director selection research.

Integrating agency and resource dependence theory : firm profitability, industry regulation, and board task performance

Boards of directors are key governancemechanisms in organizations and fulfill twomain tasks:monitoringmanagers and firm performance, and providing advice and access to resources. In spite of a wealth of researchmuch remains unknown about how boards attend to the two tasks. This study investigates whether organizational (firm profitability) and environmental factors (industry regulation) affect board task performance. The data combine CEOs' responses to a questionnaire, and archival data from a sample of large Italian firms. Findings show that past firm performance is negatively associatedwith board monitoring and advice tasks; greater industry regulation enhances perceived board task performance; board monitoring and advice tasks tend to reinforce each other, despite their theoretical and practical distinction.

Getting published — and cited in entrepreneurship : reflections on ten papers

I grew up in academic heaven. At least for me it was. Not only was Sweden in the late 1980s paradise for any kind of empirical research, with rich and high-quality business statistics being made available to researchers without them having to sign away their lives; 70+ percent response rates achieved in mail surveys to almost any group (if you knew how to do them), and boards of directors opening their doors to more qualitatively orientated researchers to sit in during their meetings. In addition, I perceived an environment with a very high degree of academic freedom, letting me do whatever I found interesting and important. I’m sure for others it was sheer hell, with very unclear career paths and rules of the game. Career progression (something which rarely entered my mind) meant that you tried as best you could and then you put all your work – reports, books, book chapters, conference papers, maybe even published articles – in a box and had some external committee of professors look at it. If you were lucky they liked what they saw for whatever reasons their professorial wisdom dictated, and you got hired or promoted. If you were not so lucky you wouldn’t get the job or the promotion, without quite knowing why. So people could easily imagine an old boys club – whose members were themselves largely unproven in international, peer review publishing – picking whoever they wanted by whatever criteria they choose to apply. Neither the fact that assessors were external nor the presence of an appeals system might have completely appeased your suspicious and skeptical mind, considering the balance of power.

Director competencies for effective enterprise technology governance

In relation to enterprise technology governance (ETG), opinions differ between there being no need for board of director involvement to there being an urgent need for such involvement. This research highlights the need for boards to provide ETG oversight of technology-related strategy, investment and risk, and to be competent in doing so. We identify a large gap between board’s awareness of the importance of ETG, their taking action and the competency requirements for effective ETG. Further, while there is considerable research and literature about operational IT governance frameworks and operational IT competencies, there is no known research into the specific competencies boards of directors need to effectively govern enterprise technology. This research focuses on and develops a board-level ETG competency set using a mixed methods approach within a recognised competency development framework. Further development is tracked using a rigour scale to demonstrate a medium to high level of competency validity for the derived set. This research contributes to practice by providing the first known industry validated ETG competency set situated within new and emerging technology. It contributes to the body of knowledge in the modification and application of competency development and competency validation frameworks not previously applied to the role of board director.

Exploring board dynamics : director participation during board meetings

Despite board meetings representing the main arena where directors discharge their duties and make critical corporate decisions, we know little about what occurs in the boardroom. Consequently, there is increasing academic interest in understanding how meetings are run and how directors participate. This study contributes to this emerging literature by exploring the impact of board meeting arrangements on directors’ interactions and perceptions of meeting effectiveness. We video-taped board meetings at two Australian corporations operating in the same industry and use an in-depth analysis of interactions and board processes to reveal that a rather small difference in meeting arrangements (i.e. the timing and length of meetings) had a significant influence on interaction patterns. Specifically, given significant amounts of environmental turbulence in the sector, director inclusiveness and participation were reduced as time pressure increased due to shorter meetings, lowering director perceptions of meeting effectiveness.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Shari'ah supervision, corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks

The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari-ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005-2011. We find Shari'ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks' performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (Board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari'ah supervision boards overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari'ah supervision boards overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari'ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.

Nonprofit Boards in Australia: A Distinctive Governance Appoach

This article reports the findings into patterns of governance on nonprofit boards in Australia. The research surveys 118 boards, upon which serve a total of 1405 directors. The findings indicate that nonprofit boards can mimic some aspects of a shareholder approach to governance. But nonprofit boards, in the main, indicate priorities and activities of a stakeholder approach to governance. The features of `isomorphism' that arise largely stem from legislative requirements in corporate governance. Generally, nonprofit directors are influenced by agenda and motivations that can be differentiated from the influences upon director activity in the corporate sector. The study indicates that nonprofit boards prize knowledge and loyalty to the sector when considering board composition. The survey suggests nonprofits ``compensate'' for the demands placed upon them about fiduciary duty and due diligence responsibilities with the diverse intellectual expertise of non-executive directors. Nonprofit boards possess greater diversity than boards in the corporate sector; they include more women as directors than corporate boards and they include a greater proportion of directors from minority groups. While strategic issues feature significantly as a task of the nonprofit board, they distinguish themselves from their corporate counterparts by engaging in operational management. The findings indicate that, in the main, directors on nonprofit boards deliberate and operate in ways distinctive from their corporate counterparts. Such findings offer a contribution to the reform of Corporations Law in other countries and the likely consequence on boards outside the corporate sector.

Board network characteristics and company performance in Sweden : the case of Gnosjö companies and their board members in southern Sweden

When managers of entrepreneurial companies typically talk about strategies, they first consider what products to make and secondly where to locate the business. The entrepreneurial companies locate in rural areas because of a wish to maintain a certain lifestyle, or because they can combine a resource available there with certain knowledge or interest that they have (Getz and Nilsson, 2004). In addition, many managers of entrepreneurial companies are confident in locating in a rural area, because there often is economic and social structure supportive of local corporate governance. The most central part of corporate governance is the board of directors. In an entrepreneurial company in a rural area, such members of boards are most likely to be individuals in dominant positions influential in the local economy.