Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The Art of Adaptation : A study on the Europeanization of Finland's foreign and security policy

This study examines how Finnish foreign and security policy has been influenced by the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. It points to a growing interplay and misfit between the external expectations originating from the European level and the domestic expectations and traditional ways-of-doing-things. It is concluded that the deepening European integration in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy has played a significant role in a number of transformations in the Finnish policies since 1995. New, more European, meanings have been attached to the key concepts of Finnish foreign and security policy. Neutrality and traditional peacekeeping have been replaced by a minimalist reading of military non-alignment and participation in crisis management operations and EU battle groups. Traditional small state identity has been recast more and more as small member stateness . At the same time Finland has entered an era of post-consensus in national foreign and security policy. A key theoretical argument in the background of the study is that collective understandings attached to European policies, when not resonating well with domestic understandings, cause adaptation pressures on domestic-level processes and may lead to changes in the way interests and identities are constructed. This means that Europeanization is principally seen as identity reconstruction. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the study builds on the Europeanization research literature and constructivist IR theory on state identity. Foreign and security policy is defined as the practice in which state identity is reproduced, and the key foreign and security policy concepts are seen as the vehicles of identity production. It is concluded that for Finland, participation in the EU s foreign, security and defence policies represents not only a tool for responding to the changes in the international security environment but also a new means of self-identification. Concerning the Finnish attempts of projecting national interests on the European security policy agenda, it is concluded that they mainly relate to the compatibility of the potential development of EU s defence dimension with the Finnish military non-alignment. Although neutrality was cast aside in the official security policy when Finland joined the EU, the analysis shows that its impact has continued in the domestic political debate and in the mind-set of the decision-makers. The primary research material includes official Finnish foreign and security policy documentation and the related parliamentary debates from 1994 to 2007. This study serves also as a comprehensive empirical overview on Finland s reactions and contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence: Two Ethnographic Case Studies in the Finnish Defence Forces

In Finland the organising of defence is undergoing vast restructuring. Recent legislation has redefined the central tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces. At the same time, international security cooperation, economic pressures and new administrative paradigms have steered the military towards new ways of organising. National defence is not just politics and principles; to a large extent it is also enacted in day-to-day life in organisations. The lens through which these realities of defence are analysed in this study is gender. How is the security sector – and national defence as part of it – organised in the changing security environment? What is the new division of labour between different societal actors in the face of security challenges? What happens ‘at work’ within the military and the defence sector more broadly? How does gender affect the way in which defence is organised and understood, and how do the changes in the organising of security affect gender relations? The thesis searches for answers to these questions in the context of two organisational settings in the male-dominated defence sector. The case study on a Finnish peacekeeping unit in the Balkans opens a critical view on men’s social practices and the everyday life of crisis management organisations. In the second case study, reorganising of provisioning in the Finnish Defence Forces turns out to be a complicated process where different power relations and social divisions intermingle. Tallberg’s extensive ethnographic fieldwork in the two focal organisations has produced a detailed set of data that lays the basis for critical analysis and policy development in terms of defence organising, cooperation around peace and security issues, and gender equality in organisations. Observations and results are provided for understanding social networks, militarisation, authority relations, care, public-private partnerships, personnel policies, career planning, and humour.

The German Military Entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld and His Conduct of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Thirty Years War

The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.

Paradox between democracy and security- case study on Pakistan

Pro gradu-tutkielma tutkii demokratian ja turvallisuuden paradoksia Pakistanissa esitellen kuusi tekijää, jotka vaikuttavat kyseiseen paradoksiin. Näitä tekijöitä ovat historiallinen kehitys; eliittihallinto; taloudellinen kehitys; Pakistanin poliittisten tekijöiden demokratian eri määritelmät; opetuksen puuttuminen; ja valtataistelu hallituksen, armeijan, tiedustelupalvelun, oikeusjärjestelmän, poliittisten puolueiden sekä eri heimojen, uskonnollisten ja etnisten ryhmien välillä. Tutkimus tarkastelee myös sitä miten nämä tekijät vaikuttavat demokratian kehitykseen Pakistanissa. Keskeinen argumentti on, että länsimainen demokratia ei esiinny eikä toimi Pakistanissa vallitsevissa oloissa, etenkin historiallisen kehityksen ja ulkoisen turvallisuuden takia. Pro gradu-tutkielma käyttää sekundäärisiä lähteitä, kuten kirjoja, artikkeleita, maaraportteja, kommentaareja sekä omiin kokemuksiin perustuvia havaintoja Pakistanin matkalta 2010-2011. Keskeiset teoriat gradussa ovat Guillermo O’ Donnelin delegaattidemokratia sekä Duncan McCargon eliittihallintoteoria, jotka yhdessä selittävät historiallista kehitystä ja eliittihallinnon dynamiikkaa, mitkä johtavat paradoksiin. Kautta historian armeija on hallinnut Pakistania, ja siviilihallinto on ainoastaan neljä kertaa onnistunut olemaan vallassa, mutta silloinkin siviilihallinto päättyi korruptioväitteisiin tai armeijan vallankaappaukseen. Armeijahallinnoille on luonteenomaista hyvät suhteet USA:n, positiivinen taloudellinen kehitys ja vakaus, kun taas siviilihallinnot ovat epävakaita ja korruptoituneita. Tämä kehitys on paradoksin tausta, joka rakentuu turvallisuuspoliittisen tilanteen pohjalle eli hallitusten ja muiden tekijöiden yritykseen löytää vastapaino Intian uhalle. Tämä on ollut keskeinen huoli kelle tahansa poliittiselle päättäjälle itsenäisyydestä lähtien. Loputon valtataistelu eri poliittisten tekijöiden kesken sekä eliittihallinto pitävät yllä paradoksia, koska eliitit ovat kiinnostuneempia oman valtansa säilyttämisestä kuin kansan tahdon huomioonottamisesta. Koska valtaosa ihmisistä ei ole koulutettuja, he ovat paljolti kiinnostuneita omasta selviytymisestään, ja tämän takia sekä kansa että eliitit suosivat armeijahallintoa, koska se tuo vakautta ja taloudellista kehitystä. Sen vuoksi vallitsevissa oloissa demokratian tulevaisuus Pakistanissa näyttää huonolta, koska liberaalidemokratian vaatimukset eivät täyty puoliksi vapaan oikeussysteemin, puoliksi vapaan lehdistön, valtavan korruption ja monien ihmisoikeusloukkauksien takia unohtamatta armeijan ja tiedustelupalvelun sekaantumista siviilihallintoon.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.

"Kirjailijoiden tapaus" Venäjällä vuonna 1997

In the autumn of 1997, Russian government was faced with media pressure when owners of the TV channels ORT and NTV joined forces against it. This study is based on media sources from October 1997 to December 1997. It shows clearly how the enormous power of the media was able to dictate what happened in Russia. In the mid-1990s Russians started to talk about political technology, which became a commonly used term by professionals, journalists, politicians and intelligence services. As a result of this action, two leading reformers in the government, Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, were dismissed from their highly influential posts as finance and energy ministers respectively, but retained their power as first deputy prime ministers. According to the correspondents, the real reason was to resolve a conflict within the parliament, which had demanded the dismissal of Mr. Chubais. This demand was presented after Chubais had accepted $90,000 as a reward for co-writing a book on privatization. Chubais was considered to be Russia’s “business card” towards the west – the"Authors’ case" (Delo avtorov) was only solved after President Boris Yeltsin took part in the public debate. According to the research, the media owned by powerful businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, was able to use its own security services to expose sensitive material (Russian term ‘kompromat’), if necessary, concerning any given person. The so-called Authors’ case can be considered as a part of the battle and the tip of the iceberg in arrangements designed to organize the funding of the Russian presidential election campaign in 2000. The reason why this particular incident was so widely covered on television was because several programs aimed to reveal to the public "hidden bribes" that, as they claimed, government officials had received. The political aspect, however, was quite mild, when the concrete issues of possible dismissals of Ministers were debated in the Parliament. Everything was dealt with as a “family matter” inside Kremlin. Yeltsin's "family" consisted of practically anybody from oligarch Berezovsky to Chubais, the father of Russia's privatization policy. Methods of critical history implementation analysis has been used in this research in determining the use of the source material. Literature and interviews have also provided a good base for the study. The study proves that any literature dealing with the subject has not paid enough attention to how the dismissal of Alexander Kazakov, deputy of President’s administration, was linked directly with Gazprom, the state gas monopoly. Kazakov had to leave Gazprom and lose his position as Chubais' ally when the influential ORT television company was deteriorated.

Preventive Dentistry and Dental Education in Iran

The present study investigated the preventive orientation of the dental education system in Iran as reflected in the responses of dental school educators and dental students to a questionnaire survey. Two questionnaires, one for dental school educators and one for senior dental students, were designed and piloted. Of the 15 state dental schools in Iran, 7 were selected using a multi-stage sampling approach, and all the dental school educators and senior dental students in these schools were asked to voluntarily fill in the anonymous questionnaires. Totally, 291 educators (80%) and 270 students (82%) participated in the study. In addition to background information, both questionnaires requested information on knowledge of caries prevention, attitudes towards preventive dentistry and oral health behaviour of the respondents. The students' questionnaire also covered items concerning prevention-oriented practice, study motives, and career preferences. Contrary to knowledge and attitudes of the students, those of the educators' were positively associated with some of their academic and personal background characteristics. Women were more likely to report favourable oral self-care habits than men. The other determinants of oral health behaviour were educators' familiarity with the oral public health field, and students' attitudes towards prevention. A higher score on preventive practice among the students was associated with better oral self-care habits and positive attitudes towards prevention. Characteristics of the profession and social status and security were the top-ranked that motivated students to study dentistry, and students mainly preferred to enter postgraduate courses and private practice after graduation. To increase the orientation of Iran's health care system towards prevention, and to cope with current concepts of prevention, corresponding changes should be made in the dental education system. The results of this study support the revision of the dental curriculum by placing more emphasis on prevention-related topics and by integrating prevention-related concepts into all disciplines. Additionally, practicing dentists and dental educators should be provided with opportunities to attend continuing education courses and to conduct seminars and congresses on various aspects of preventive dentistry at home as well as abroad.