Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Luce Irigaray's Philosophy of Feminine Being : Body, Desire and Wisdom

Luce Irigaray is a Belgian-born philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist. Irigaray s concept of woman is crucial for understanding her own work but also for examining and developing the theoretical and methodological basis of feminist theory. This thesis argues that, ultimately, Irigaray s exploration of woman s being challenges our traditional notion of philosophy as a neutral discourse and the traditional notion of ourselves as philosophizing persons or human beings. However, despite its crucial role, Irigaray s idea of woman still lacks a comprehensive explication. This is because the discourse of sexual difference is blurred by the ideas of essentialism and biologism. --- Irigaray s concept of woman has been interpreted and criticized from the perspectives of metaphysical essentialism, strategic essentialism, realist essentialism and deconstructionism. This thesis argues that a reinterpretation is necessary to account for Irigaray s claims about the the traditional woman , mimesis, the specificity of the feminine body, feminine expression and sexual difference. Moreover, any reading should account for the differences between women and avoid giving a prescriptive function to the essence of woman. --- My thesis develops a new interpretation of Irigaray s concept of woman on the basis of the phenomenology of the body. It argues that Irigaray s discourse on woman can and must be understood by an idea of existential style. Existential style is embodied, affective and spiritual and it is constituted in relation to oneself, to others and to the world. It is temporal, it evolves and changes but preserves its open unity in its transformations. Stylistic unities, such as femininity or philosophy, are constituted in and by the singulars. -- This study discusses and analyses feminine existential style as a central theme and topic of Irigaray s works and shows how her work operates as a primary and paradigmatic example of the feminine style. These tasks are performed by studying the mimetic positions available for women and by explicating the phenomenological background of Irigaray s conceptions of the philosophical method, and the lived, expressive and affective body. The critical occupation and transformation of these mimetic positions, the inquiry into the first-person pre-discursive experience, and the cultivation of feminine expressivity open up the possibility of becoming a woman writer, a woman lover and a woman philosopher. The appearance of these new feminine figures is a precondition for the realization of sexual difference. So Irigaray opens up the possibility of sexual difference by instituting and constituting a feminine subject of love and wisdom, and by problematizing the idea of a neutral and absolute subject.

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Encounters with the Virtual : The Experience of Art In Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy

My thesis concerns the notion of existence as an encounter, as developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925 1995). What this denotes is a critical stance towards a major current in Western philosophical tradition which Deleuze nominates as representational thinking. Such thinking strives to provide a stable ground for identities by appealing to transcendent structures behind the apparent reality and explaining the manifest diversity of the given by such notions as essence, idea, God, or totality of the world. In contrast to this, Deleuze states that abstractions such as these do not explain anything, but rather that they need to be explained. Yet, Deleuze does not appeal merely to the given. He sees that one must posit a genetic element that accounts for experience, and this element must not be naïvely traced from the empirical. Deleuze nominates his philosophy as transcendental empiricism and he seeks to bring together the approaches of both empiricism and transcendental philosophy. In chapter one I look into the motivations of Deleuze s transcendental empiricism and analyse it as an encounter between Deleuze s readings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This encounter regards, first of all, the question of subjectivity and results in a conception of identity as non-essential process. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this point of view, the process of individualisation must become the central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze s concept of the affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis develops a morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process. In analysing such a process of individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of great value, being an open, indeterminate charge of potentiality. As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The essentially temporal process of subjectification results in a conception of the subject as composition: an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art and aesthetic experience is valued by Deleuze because they disclose the construct-like nature of subjectivity in the sensations they produce. Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed in the network of affectivity that is the material diversity of the world. Chapter four addresses a phenomenon displaying this diversified indentity: the simulacrum an identity that is not grounded in an essence. Developed on the basis of the simulacrum, a theory of identity as assemblage emerges in chapter five. As the problematic of simulacra concerns perhaps foremost the artistic presentation, I shall look into the identity of a work of art as assemblage. To take an example of a concrete artistic practice and to remain within the problematic of the simulacrum, I shall finally address the question of reproduction particularly in the case recorded music and its identity regarding the work of art. In conclusion, I propose that by overturning its initial representational schema, phonographic music addresses its own medium and turns it into an inscription of difference, exposing the listener to an encounter with the virtual.

History, Transfer, Politics : Five studies on the legacy of Uppsala philosophy

The Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been the last genuinely Swedish philosophical movement. On the other hand, the Swedish analytic tradition is often said to have its roots in Hägerström s thought. This work examines the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy from an actor-based historical perspective. The aim is to describe how a group of younger scholars (Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Alf Ross, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal) colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to reconcile this legacy with the changing philosophical and political currents of the 1930s and 40s. Following Quentin Skinner, the texts are analysed as moves or speech acts in a particular historical context. The thesis consists of five previously published case studies and an introduction. The first study describes how the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition was created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers who (re-) presented the Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiricism. The second study examines the confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and in the pages of Sweden s leading philosophical journal Theoria. The third study focuses on how the younger generation redescribed Hägerströmian legal philosophical ideas (Scandinavian Legal Realism), while the fourth study discusses how they responded to the accusations of a connection between Hägerström s value nihilistic theory and totalitarianism. Finally, the fifth study examines how the Swedish social scientist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal tried to reconcile value nihilism with a strong political programme for social reform. The contribution of this thesis to the field consists mainly in a re-evaluation of the role of Uppsala philosophy in the history of Swedish philosophy. From this perspective the Uppsala School was less a collection of certain definite philosophical ideas than an intellectual legacy that was the subject of fierce struggles. Its theories and ideas were redescribed in various ways by individual actors with different philosophical and political intentions.

Poetics of the Nameless Middle : Japan and the West in Philosophy and Music of the Twentieth Century

This study investigates the affinities between philosophy, aesthetics, and music of Japan and the West. The research is based on the structuralist notion (specifically, on that found in the narratology of Algirdas Julius Greimas), that the universal grammar functions as an abstract principle, underlying all kinds of discourse. The study thus aims to demonstrate how this grammar is manifested in philosophical, aesthetic, and musical texts and how the semiotic homogeneity of these texts can be explained on this basis. Totality and belongingness are the key philosophical concepts presented herein. As distinct from logocentrism manifested as substantializations of the world of ideas , god or mind, which was characteristic of previous Western paradigms, totality was defined as the coexistence of opposites. Thus Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dōgen, and Nishida often illustrated it by identifying fundamental polarities, such as being and nothing, seer and seen, truth and illusion, etc. Accordingly, totality was schematically presented as an all-encompassing middle of the semiotic square. Similar values can be found in aesthetics and arts. Instead of dialectic syntagms, differentiated unity is considered as paradigmatic and the study demonstrates how this is manifested in traditional Japanese and Heideggerian aesthetics, as well as in the aspects of music of Claude Debussy and Tōru Takemitsu.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.

Locus Bonus : The Relationship of the Roman Villa to its Environment in the Vicinity of Rome

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship of the Roman villa to its environment. The villa was an important feature of the countryside intended both for agricultural production and for leisure. Manuals of Roman agriculture give instructions on how to select a location for an estate. The ideal location was a moderate slope facing east or south in a healthy area and good neighborhood, near good water resources and fertile soils. A road or a navigable river or the sea was needed for transportation of produce. A market for selling the produce, a town or a village, should have been nearby. The research area is the surroundings of the city of Rome, a key area for the development of the villa. The materials used consist of archaeological settlement sites, literary and epigraphical evidence as well as environmental data. The sites include all settlement sites from the 7th century BC to 5th century AD to examine changes in the tradition of site selection. Geographical Information Systems were used to analyze the data. Six aspects of location were examined: geology, soils, water resources, terrain, visibility/viewability and relationship to roads and habitation centers. Geology was important for finding building materials and the large villas from the 2nd century BC onwards are close to sources of building stones. Fertile soils were sought even in the period of the densest settlement. The area is rich in water, both rainfall and groundwater, and finding a water supply was fairly easy. A certain kind of terrain was sought over very long periods: a small spur or ridge shoulder facing preferably south with an open area in front of the site. The most popular villa resorts are located on the slopes visible from almost the entire Roman region. A visible villa served the social and political aspirations of the owner, whereas being in the villa created a sense of privacy. The area has a very dense road network ensuring good connectivity from almost anywhere in the region. The best visibility/viewability, dense settlement and most burials by roads coincide, creating a good neighborhood. The locations featuring the most qualities cover nearly a quarter of the area and more than half of the settlement sites are located in them. The ideal location was based on centuries of practical experience and rationalized by the literary tradition.

Signifying Angels : Analyses and Interpretations of Rautavaara s Instrumental Compositions

The subject of doctoral thesis is the analysis and interpretation of instrumental pieces composed by Einojuhani Rautavaara (b. 1928) that have been given angelic titles: Archangel Michael Fighting the Antichrist from the suite Icons (1955)/Before the Icons (2006), Angels and Visitations (1978), the Double Bass Concerto Angel of Dusk (1980), Playgrounds for Angels (1981)and the Seventh Symphony Angel of Light (1994). The aim of the work is to find those musical elements common to these pieces that distinguish them from Rautavaara s other works and to determine if they could be thought of as a series. I prove that behind the common elements and titles stands the same extramusical idea the figure of an angel that the composer has described in his commentaries. The thesis is divided into three parts. Since all of the compositions possess titles that refer to the spiritual symbol of an angel, the first part offers a theoretical background to demonstrate the significant role played by angels in various religions and beliefs, and the means by which music has attempted to represent this symbol throughout history. This background traces also Rautavaara s aesthetic attitude as a spiritual composer whose output can be studied with reference to his extramusical interests including literature, psychology, painting, philosophy and myths. The second part focuses on the analysis of the instrumental compositions with angelic titles, without giving consideration to their commentaries and titles. The analyses concentrate in particular on those musical features that distinguish these pieces from Rautavaara s other compositions. In the third part these musical features are interpreted as symbols of the angel through comparison with vocal and instrumental pieces which contain references to the character of an angel, structures of mythical narration, special musical expressions, use of instruments and aspects of brightness. Finally I explore the composer s interpretative codes, drawing on Rilke s cycle of poems Ten Duino Elegies and Jung s theory of archetypes, and analyze the instrumental pieces with angelic titles in the light of the theory of musical ekphrasis.