Turbulent vertical fluxes and air quality measured in urban air in Helsinki

There is a growing need to understand the exchange processes of momentum, heat and mass between an urban surface and the atmosphere as they affect our quality of life. Understanding the source/sink strengths as well as the mixing mechanisms of air pollutants is particularly important due to their effects on human health and climate. This work aims to improve our understanding of these surface-atmosphere interactions based on the analysis of measurements carried out in Helsinki, Finland. The vertical exchange of momentum, heat, carbon dioxide (CO2) and aerosol particle number was measured with the eddy covariance technique at the urban measurement station SMEAR III, where the concentrations of ultrafine, accumulation mode and coarse particle numbers, nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) were also measured. These measurements were carried out over varying measurement periods between 2004 and 2008. In addition, black carbon mass concentration was measured at the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council site during three campaigns in 1996-2005. Thus, the analyzed dataset covered far, the most comprehensive long-term measurements of turbulent fluxes reported in the literature from urban areas. Moreover, simultaneously measured urban air pollution concentrations and turbulent fluxes were examined for the first time. The complex measurement surrounding enabled us to study the effect of different urban covers on the exchange processes from a single point of measurement. The sensible and latent heat fluxes closely followed the intensity of solar radiation, and the sensible heat flux always exceeded the latent heat flux due to anthropogenic heat emissions and the conversion of solar radiation to direct heat in urban structures. This urban heat island effect was most evident during winter nights. The effect of land use cover was seen as increased sensible heat fluxes in more built-up areas than in areas with high vegetation cover. Both aerosol particle and CO2 exchanges were largely affected by road traffic, and the highest diurnal fluxes reached 109 m-2 s-1 and 20 µmol m-2 s-1, respectively, in the direction of the road. Local road traffic had the greatest effect on ultrafine particle concentrations, whereas meteorological variables were more important for accumulation mode and coarse particle concentrations. The measurement surroundings of the SMEAR III station served as a source for both particles and CO2, except in summer, when the vegetation uptake of CO2 exceeded the anthropogenic sources in the vegetation sector in daytime, and we observed a downward median flux of 8 µmol m-2 s-1. This work improved our understanding of the interactions between an urban surface and the atmosphere in a city located at high latitudes in a semi-continental climate. The results can be utilised in urban planning, as the fraction of vegetation cover and vehicular activity were found to be the major environmental drivers affecting most of the exchange processes. However, in order to understand these exchange and mixing processes on a city scale, more measurements above various urban surfaces accompanied by numerical modelling are required.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.

Sairaanhoitajaksi kasvattaminen : Sairaanhoitajakoulutus ja siinä käytetyt oppikirjat Suomessa vuoteen 1967 asti

The historical development of Finnish nursing textbooks from the late 1880s to 1967: the training of nurses in the Foucauldian perspective. This study aims, first, to analyse the historical development of Finnish nursing textbooks in the training of nurses and in nursing education: what Foucauldian power processes operate in the writing and publishing processes? What picture of nursing did early nursing books portray and who were the decision makers? Second, this study also aims to analyse the processes of power in nurse training processes. The time frame extends from the early stages of nurse training in the late 1880s to 1967. This present study is a part of textbook research and of the history of professional education in Finland. This study seeks to explain how, who or what contributed the power processes involved in the writing of nursing textbooks and through textbooks. Did someone use these books as a tool to influence nursing education? The third aim of this study is to define and analyse the purpose of nurse training. Michel Foucault´s concept of power served as an explanatory framework for this study. A very central part of power is the assembling of data, the supplying of information and messages, and the creation of discourses. When applied to the training of nurses, power dictates what information is taught in the training and contained in the books. Thus, the textbook holds an influential position as a power user in these processes. Other processes in which such power is exercised include school discipline and all other normalizing processes. One of most powerful ways of adapting is the hall of residence, where nursing pupils were required to live. Trained nurses desired to separate themselves from their untrained predecessors and from those with less training by wearing different uniforms and living in separate housing units. The state supported the registration of trained nurses by legislation. With this decision the state made it illegal to work as a nurse without an authorised education, and use these regulations to limit and confirm the professional knowledge and power of nurses. Nurses, physicians and government authorities used textbooks in nursing education as tools to achieve their own purposes and principles. With these books all three groups attempted to confirm their own professional power and knowledge while at the same time limit the power and expertise of others. Public authorities sought to unify the training of nurses and the basis of knowledge in all nursing schools in Finland with similar and obligatory textbooks. This standardisation started 20 years before the government unified nursing training in 1930. The textbooks also served as data assemblers in unifying nursing practices in Finnish hospitals, because the Medical Board required all training hospitals to attach the textbooks to units with nursing pupils. For the nurses, and especially for the associations of Finnish nurses, making and publishing their own textbooks for the training of nurses was a part of their professional projects. With these textbooks, the nursing elite and the teachers tended to prepare nursing pupils’ identities for nursing’s very special mission. From the 1960s, nursing was no longer understood as a mission, but as a normal vocation. Nurses and doctors disputed this view throughout the period studied, which was the optimal relationship between theory and practice in nursing textbooks and in nurse education. The discussion of medical knowledge in nursing textbooks took place in the 1930s and 1940s. Nurses were very confused about their own professional knowledge and expertise, which explains why they could not create a new nursing textbook despite the urgency. A brand new nursing textbook was published in 1967, about 30 years after the predecessor. Keyword: nurse, nurse training, nursing education, power, textbook, Michel Foucault

Vascular dilatory function and cardiovascular risk factors in women with a history of pre-eclampsia

Women with a history of pre-eclampsia have an increased risk of cardiovascular disease in later life. The mechanisms which mediate this heightened risk are poorly understood; it was long believed that pre-eclampsia was a separate disease without any connection to other pathologies. The present study was undertaken to investigate the cardiovascular risk milieu, vascular dilatory function and cardiovascular risk factors, in women with pre-eclampsia, 5 6 years after index pregnancy. The aim was to understand better the cardiovascular risks associated with pre-eclampsia and add tools to the evaluation of cardiovascular risk in women. --- The study involved 30 women with previous severe pre-eclampsia and 21 controls. The 2-day study protocol included venous occlusion plethysmography and pulse wave analysis for assessment of vascular dilatory function and central pulse wave reflection, respectively, office and ambulatory blood pressure measurements, assessment of insulin sensitivity, using a minimal model technique, and tests regarding renal function, lipid metabolism, sympathetic activity and inflammation. Vasodilatory function was impaired in women with a history of pre-eclampsia; this was seen in both endothelium-dependent and endothelium-independent vasodilatation. Proteinuria during pre-eclampsia did not predict changes in vasodilatation, and renal function was similar in the two groups. Insulin sensitivity was related to vasodilatation and features of metabolic syndrome, but only in the patient group, despite similar insulin sensitivity in the control group. Arterial pressure was higher in the patient group than in the controls and correlated with endothelin-1 levels in the patient group, whilst the overall difference between the groups was diminished in 24 hour arterial pressure measurements. Additionally, women with previous pre-eclampsia were characterized by increased sympathetic activity. Impaired vasodilatory function at the vascular smooth muscle level seems to characterize clinically healthy women with a history of pre-eclampsia. These vascular changes and the features of metabolic syndrome may be related to the increased risk of cardiovascular disease. Furthermore, increased blood pressure in combination with enhanced sympathetic activity may be additive as regards this risk. These women should be informed about their potential cardiovascular risk profile and the possibilities to minimize it via their own actions. Medical cardiovascular risk assessment in women should include obstetric history.