Constructing Ethical Patterns in Times of Globalization : Hans Küng's Global Ethic Project and Beyond

The purpose of this study is to evaluate contemporary philosophical models for global ethics in light of the Catholic theologian Hans Küng s Global Ethic Project (Projekt Weltethos). Küng s project starts with the motto, No survival without world ethos. No global peace without peace between religions. I will use the philosophically multidimensional potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of its possible philosophical interpretations to evaluate the general discussion of global ethics within political philosophy today. This is important in its own right, but also because through it, opportunities will emerge to articulate Küng s relatively general argument in a way that leaves less room for mutually contradictory concretizations of what global ethics ultimately should be like. The most important question in this study is the problem of religious and ideological exclusivism and its relation to the ethically consistent articulation of global ethics. I will first explore the question of the role of religion as the basis for ethics in general and what Küng may mean by his claim that only the unconditional can oblige unconditionally. I will reconstruct two different overall philosophical interpretations of the relationship between religious faith and human rationality, each having two different sub-divisions: a liberal interpretation amounts to either a Kantian-Scheiermacherian or a Jaspersian view, whereas what I call postliberal interpretation amounts to either an Aristotelian-Thomistic or an Augustinian view. Thereafter, I will further clarify how Küng views the nature of ethics beyond the question of its principal foundation in religious faith: Küng searches for a middle way between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics, a way in which the latter dimension has the final stake. I will then set out to concretize further this more or less general notion of the theoretical potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of certain precise philosophico-political models. I categorize these models according to their liberal or postliberal orientation. The liberal concretization leads me to consider a wide spectrum of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian models from Rawls to Derrida, while the alternative concretization opens up my ultimate argument in favor of a postliberal type of modus vivendi. I will suggest that the only theoretically and practically plausible way to promote global ethics, in itself a major imperative today, is the recognition of a fundamental and necessary contest between mutually exclusive ideologies in the public sphere. On this basis I will proceed to my postliberal proposal, namely, that a constructive and peaceful encountering of exclusive difference as an ethical vantage point for an intercultural and inter-religious peace dialogue is the most acute challenge for global ethics today.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.