Disabled Revolutionary War Veterans and the Construction of Disability in the Early United States, c. 1776-1840

This thesis addresses the following broad research question: what did it mean to be a disabled Revolutionary War veteran in the early United States during the period from 1776 to roughly 1840? The study approaches the question from two angles: a state-centred one and an experiential one. In both cases, the theoretical framework employed comes from disability studies. Consequently, disability is regarded as a sociocultural phenomenon rather than a medical condition. The state-centred dimension of the study explores the meaning of disability and disabled veterans to the early American state through an examination of the major military pension laws of the period. An analysis of this legislation, particularly the invalid pension acts of 1793 and 1806, indicates that the early United States represents a key period in the development of the modern disability category. The experiential approach, in contrast, shifts the focus of attention away from the state towards the lived experiences of disabled veterans. It seeks to address the issue of whether or not the disabilities of disabled veterans had any significant material impact on their everyday lives. It does this through a comparison of the situation of 153 disabled veterans with that of an equivalent number of nondisabled veterans. The former group received invalid pensions while the latter did not. In comparing the material conditions of disabled and nondisabled veterans, a wide range of primary sources from military records to memoirs and letters are used. The most important sources in this regard are the pension application papers submitted by veterans in the early nineteenth century. These provide us with a unique insight into the everyday lives of veterans. Looking at the issue of experience through the window of the pension files reveals that there was not much difference in the broad contours of disabled and nondisabled veteran life. This finding has implications for the theorisation of disability that are highlighted and discussed in the thesis. The main themes covered in this study are: the wartime experiences of injured American soldiers, the military pension establishment of the early United States and the legal construction of disability, and the post-war working and family lives of disabled veterans. Keywords: disability, early America, veterans, military pensions, disabled people, Revolutionary War, United States, disability theory.

Bridging East and West : The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964-1972.

The dissertation examines the foreign policies of the United States through the prism of science and technology. In the focal point of scrutiny is the policy establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the development of the multilateral part of bridge building in American foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. After a long and arduous negotiation process, the institute was finally established by twelve national member organizations from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Soviet Union and United States; a few years later Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands also joined. It is said that the goal of the institute was to bring together researchers from East and West to solve pertinent problems caused by the modernization process experienced in industrialized world. It originates from President Lyndon B. Johnson s bridge building policies that were launched in 1964, and was set in a well-contested and crowded domain of other international organizations of environmental and social planning. Since the distinct need for yet another organization was not evident, the process of negotiations in this multinational environment enlightens the foreign policy ambitions of the United States on the road to the Cold War détente. The study places this project within its political era, and juxtaposes it with other international organizations, especially that of the OECD, ECE and NATO. Conventionally, Lyndon Johnson s bridge building policies have been seen as a means to normalize its international relations bilaterally with different East European countries, and the multilateral dimension of the policy has been ignored. This is why IIASA s establishment process in this multilateral environment brings forth new information on US foreign policy goals, the means to achieve these goals, as well as its relations to other advanced industrialized societies before the time of détente, during the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the substance of the institute applied systems analysis illuminates the differences between European and American methodological thinking in social planning. Systems analysis is closely associated with (American) science and technology policies of the 1960s, especially in its military administrative applications, thus analysis within the foreign policy environment of the United States proved particularly fruitful. In the 1960s the institutional structures of European continent with faltering, and the growing tendencies of integration were in flux. One example of this was the long, drawn-out process of British membership in the EEC, another is de Gaulle s withdrawal from NATO s military-political cooperation. On the other hand, however, economic cooperation in Europe between East and West, and especially with the Soviet Union was expanding rapidly. This American initiative to form a new institutional actor has to be seen in that structural context, showing that bridge building was needed not only to the East, but also to the West. The narrative amounts to an analysis of how the United States managed both cooperation and conflict in its hegemonic aspirations in the emerging modern world, and how it used its special relationship with the United Kingdom to achieve its goals. The research is based on the archives of the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and IIASA. The primary sources have been complemented with both contemporary and present day research literature, periodicals, and interviews.

Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.