Burnt area mapping in insular Southeast Asia using medium resolution satellite imagery

Burnt area mapping in humid tropical insular Southeast Asia using medium resolution (250-500m) satellite imagery is characterized by persisting cloud cover, wide range of land cover types, vast amount of wetland areas and highly varying fire regimes. The objective of this study was to deepen understanding of three major aspects affecting the implementation and limits of medium resolution burnt area mapping in insular Southeast Asia: 1) fire-induced spectral changes, 2) most suitable multitemporal compositing methods and 3) burn scars patterns and size distribution. The results revealed a high variation in fire-induced spectral changes depending on the pre-fire greenness of burnt area. It was concluded that this variation needs to be taken into account in change detection based burnt area mapping algorithms in order to maximize the potential of medium resolution satellite data. Minimum near infrared (MODIS band 2, 0.86μm) compositing method was found to be the most suitable for burnt area mapping purposes using Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) data. In general, medium resolution burnt area mapping was found to be usable in the wetlands of insular Southeast Asia, whereas in other areas the usability was seriously jeopardized by the small size of burn scars. The suitability of medium resolution data for burnt area mapping in wetlands is important since recently Southeast Asian wetlands have become a major point of interest in many fields of science due to yearly occurring wild fires that not only degrade these unique ecosystems but also create regional haze problem and release globally significant amounts of carbon into the atmosphere due to burning peat. Finally, super-resolution MODIS images were tested but the test failed to improve the detection of small scars. Therefore, super-resolution technique was not considered to be applicable to regional level burnt area mapping in insular Southeast Asia.

"Towards 'a real reunion'?" : Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951

Mika KT Pajusen väitös "Towards 'a real reunion'?" – Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951 on yleiseen kirkkohistoriaan lukeutuva tutkimus Englannin kirkon ja Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon välisistä suhteista Aleksi Lehtosen arkkipiispakaudella 1945–1951. Suhteita on tutkittu kolmesta näkökulmasta: ekumeenisesta, poliittisesta ja kirkkopoliittisesta. Tutkimuskausi alkaa pastori H.M. Waddamsin joulukuussa 1944 Suomeen tekemän vierailun jälkimainingeista ja päättyy arkkipiispa Lehtosen kuolemaan pääsiäisenä 1951. Kirkollisten suhteiden kehitystä rytmittivät lukuisat vierailut, jotka osoittivat Englannin kirkon asenteen muuttumisen sodan aikaisesta neuvostomyönteisyydestä kylmän sodan aikaiseen täysin vastakkaiseen kantaan. Englantilaiset vieraat kohtasivat Suomessa sekä kirkon että yhteiskunnan ylimmän johdon. Molemmat maat olivat valmiita tukemaan hyviä kirkollisia suhteita tilanteen niin salliessa, joskaan eivät kovin suunnitelmallisesti. Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko käytti hyviä suhteita Englannin kirkkoon saadakseen tukea ja ymmärrystä omalle kirkolleen ja yhteiskunnalleen kokemaansa Neuvostoliiton uhkaa vastaan erityisesti vaaran vuosina 1944–1948. Englannin kirkko halusi tukea suomalaista sisarkirkkoaan, mutta varoi, ettei tuottaisi tuellaan enemmän haittaa kuin hyötyä suhteessa Neuvostoliittoon. Sodan jälkeinen ekumeeninen jälleenrakentaminen lähensi kirkkoja toisiinsa. Lehtonen pyrki jatkamaan 1930-luvun kirkkojen välisiä, ehtoollisvieraanvaraisuuden saavuttaneita neuvotteluita kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Häntä motivoi sekä evankelis-katolinen teologia että pyrkimys tukea oman maan ja kirkon läntisiä yhteyksiä. Tämä haastoi Englannin kirkon ekumeenisen linjan, joka Suomen kirkon sijasta pyrki jatkamaan neuvotteluja Tanskan, Norjan ja Islannin luterilaisten kirkkojen kanssa, joilla ei vielä ollut virallista ekumeenista sopimusta Englannin kirkon kanssa. Lehtosen pyrkimyksistä huolimatta Englannin kirkko päätyi jättämään Suomen tilanteen hautumaan. Sillä se tarkoitti suhteiden koetinkivenä olleen historiallisen piispuuden leviämistä läpi Suomen kirkon ennen kuin katsoi olevansa valmis jatkamaan kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Molemmissa kirkoissa vaikutti pieni, innokkaiden, lähempiä suhteita toivoneiden kirkollisten vaikuttajien ydinjoukko. Englantilaisia Suomen-ystäviä motivoi tarve auttaa Suomea hankalassa poliittisessa tilanteessa. Suomessa arkkipiispa Lehtonen tuki korkeakirkollista liturgista liikettä, jolla oli läheinen yhteys anglikaanisuuteen, mutta joka sai vastaansa vanhoilliset pietistit. Suomen kirkon yleinen mielipide asettui etupäässä pietistiselle kannalle, jolle anglikaanisuus näyttäytyi teologisesti sekä liian katolisena että liian reformoituna. Kirkolliset suhteet tasaantuivat vuoden 1948 Lambeth-konferenssin jälkeen, joka rohkaisi anglikaanisia kirkkoja hyväksymään 1930-luvun neuvottelujen lähempiin kirkollisiin suhteisiin tähtäävät suositukset. Lehtonen näytti tyytyvän tähän. Samaan aikaan lähempää kirkollista kanssakäymistä tukenut ekumeeninen jälleenrakennus tuli tiensä päähän. Lehtonen jatkoi läheisempien suhteiden edistämistä, mutta hänen intonsa hiipui yhdessä heikkenevän terveydentilan kanssa. Osoituksena Lehtosen linjan kapeudesta Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon piispoista ei löytynyt hänen kuoltuaan ketään, joka olisi jatkanut hänen aktiivista anglikaanimyönteistä linjaansa.

Meillä ei ole ikuisia ystäviä eikä ikuisia vihollisia. Ikuisia ovat meidän omat etumme. : Suomen suhteet Kiinan kansantasavaltaan 1949 - 1989

"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.

Kirkko, Kekkonen ja kommunismi poliittisina kriisivuosina 1958-1962

This study explores the relationship of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland to communism and political power during the period of crises in Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1962. During this period the USSR repeatedly interfered in Finland´s domestic affairs and limited her foreign political freedom of action. The research subjects for this dissertation are the bishops of the Church of Finland and the newspaper Kotimaa, which can be regarded as the unofficial organ of the church at the time. A typical characteristic of the Church of Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century was patriotism. During the interwar years the church was strongly anti-communist and against the Soviet Union. This tendency was also evident during the Second World War. After the war the Finnish Church feared that the rise of the extreme left would jeopardize its position. The church, however, succeeded in maintaining its status as a state church throughout the critical years immediately following the war. This study indicates that, although the manner of expression altered, the political attitude of the church did not substantially change during the postwar period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the church was still patriotic and fear of the extreme left was also evident among the leaders of the church. The victory of the Finnish People's Democratic League in the general election of 1958 was an unwelcome surprise to the church. This generated fear in the church that, with Soviet support, the Finnish communists might return to governmental power and the nation could become a people's democracy. Accordingly, the church tried to encourage other parties to set aside their disagreements and act together against the extreme left throughout the period under study. The main characteristics of the church´s political agenda during this period of crisis were to support the Finnish foreign policy led by the president of the republic, Urho Kekkonen, and to resist Finnish communism. The attitude of Finnish bishops and the newspaper Kotimaa to the Cold War in general was generally in agreement with the majority of western Christians. They feared communism, were afraid of the USSR, but supported peaceful co-existence because they did not want an open conflict with the Soviets. Because of uncertainties in Finland's international position the Finnish Church regarded it as necessary to support the Finnish policy of friendship towards the USSR. The Finnish Church considerer it unwise to openly criticize the Soviet Union, tried resist the spread of communism in Finnish domestic policy. This period of foreign policy crises was principally seen by the church as a time when there was a need to strengthen Finland's unstable national position.