A Sketch of the Phonology and Grammar of Rajbanshi

This dissertation is a synchronic description of the phonology and grammar of two dialects of the Rajbanshi language (Eastern Indo-Aryan) as spoken in Jhapa, Nepal. I have primarily confined the analysis to the oral expression, since the emerging literary form is still in its infancy. The grammatical analysis is therefore based, for the most part, on a corpus of oral narrative text which was recorded and transcribed from three informants from north-east Jhapa. An informant, speaking a dialect from south-west Jhapa cross checked this text corpus and provided additional elicited material. I have described the phonology, morphology and syntax of the language, and also one aspect of its discourse structure. For the most part the phonology follows the basic Indo-Aryan pattern. Derivational morphology, compounding, reduplication, echo formation and onomatopoeic constructions are considered, as well as number, noun classes (their assignment and grammatical function), pronouns, and case and postpositions. In verbal morphology I cover causative stems, the copula, primary and secondary agreement, tense, aspect, mood, auxiliary constructions and non-finite forms. The term secondary agreement here refers to genitive agreement, dative-subject agreement and patient (and sometimes patient-agent) agreement. The breaking of default agreement rules has a range of pragmatic inferences. I argue that a distinction, based on formal, semantic and statistical grounds, should be made between conjunct verbs, derivational compound verbs and quasi-aspectual compound verbs. Rajbanshi has an open set of adjectives, and it additionally makes use of a restricted set of nouns which can function as adjectives. Various particles, and the emphatic and conjunctive clitics are also considered. The syntactic structures studied include: non-declarative speech acts, phrase-internal and clause-internal constituent order, negation, subordination, coordination and valence adjustment. I explain how the future, present and past tenses in Rajbanshi oral narratives do not seem to maintain a time reference, but rather to indicate a distinction between background and foreground information. I call this tense neutralisation .

Realia, Translation Strategies, and Subtitling : A study of two comedy sketch shows on DVD

Tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia, millaisia käännösstrategioita DVD-tekstittämisessä suositaan reaalioita eli kulttuurisidonnaisia käsitteitä käännettäessä. Lähtökohtana on, että osaa strategioista voidaan käyttää reaalioiden kulttuurisen erilaisuuden korostamiseen, osaa taas tämän erilaisuuden häivyttämiseen. Nämä kaksi kategoriaa eivät kuitenkaan kata kaikkia mahdollisia strategioita, minkä vuoksi myös neutraalit strategiat otetaan tutkielmassa huomioon. Tutkielman aineisto koostuu Suomessa nimillä Ruuvit löysällä ja Pikku-Britannia tunnettujen brittiläisten sketsisarjojen DVD-julkaisuista. Molemmat tutkituista julkaisuista käsittävät yhden tuotantokauden. Formaatiltaan sketsisarjat perustuvat lukuisiin lyhyisiin kohtauksiin, joissa käsitellään useita eri aihealueita. Tämän vuoksi ne soveltuvat erinomaisesti reaalioiden tutkimukseen. Tutkittava kääntämisen laji on DVD-kääntäminen, koska sen merkityksen voidaan katsoa kasvaneen DVD:n lisääntyneen suosion myötä. Tutkielman teoriatausta muodostuu reaalioiden, käännösstrategioiden ja tekstityksen teoriasta. Näistä osa-alueista ensimmäisessä korostuu kulttuurin vaikutus kieleen ja siten myös kääntämiseen, kun taas toinen pohjautuu sekä tekstitason kotouttavista ja vieraannuttavista käännösstrategioista että sanatason lokaaleista strategioista esitettyyn teoriaan, ja kolmannessa nousevat esille sanan ja kuvan yhteistyö sekä muut tekstittämiseen vaikuttavat tekijät, kuten rajallinen käytettävissä oleva tila ja aika. Yhdessä teorian eri osa-alueet mahdollistavat tutkimuksen, jossa voidaan tarkastella kulttuuristen, kielellisten ja audiovisuaalisten piirteiden vaikutusta reaalioiden kääntämiseen. Tutkielmassa käytetään kvalitatiivista ja kvantitatiivista tutkimusmenetelmää. Kvalitatiivinen menetelmä perustuu käännösstrategioiden käyttötapojen kuvaamiseen tutkimalla tutkimusaineistosta transkriboituja reaalioiden käännöksiä yksittäisissä tapauksissa. Analyysissa otetaan huomioon ensisijaisesti reaalioiden tekstuaalinen ja audiovisuaalinen konteksti sekä niiden oletettu tunnistettavuus käännösten kohdekulttuurissa. Tätä analyysia täydennetään kaikkien havaittujen reaalioiden kääntämistä kuvaavalla kvantitatiivisella menetelmällä. Tutkielman tulokset viittaavat siihen, että erilaisten käännösstrategioiden välillä on huomattavia eroja siinä, millä tavoin ja miten usein niitä käytetään. Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat odotetusti sen, että kotouttavat ja vieraannuttavat strategiat eivät sulje toisiaan pois, vaan niitä molempia voidaan käyttää saman käännöksen sisällä. Kokonaisuutena tutkielmassa tuodaan ilmi monia aihealueen tutkimiseen liittyviä haasteita aina kulttuurin määrittelystä audiovisuaalisen aineiston analysoimiseen asti. Avainsanat: Kulttuurisidonnaiset käsitteet, käännösstrategia, tekstittäminen, kotouttaminen, vieraannuttaminen

Conducting Gestures : Institutional and Educational Construction of Conductorship in Finland, 1973-1993

Anu Konttinen: Conducting Gestures Institutional and Educational Construction of Conductorship in Finland, 1973-1993. This doctoral thesis concentrates on those Finnish conductors who have participated in Professor Jorma Panula s conducting class at the Sibelius Academy during the years 1973 1993. The starting point was conducting as a myth, and the goal has been to find its practical opposite the practical core of the profession. What has been studied is whether one can theorise and analyse this core, and how. The theoretical goal has been to find out what kind of social construction conductorship is as a historical, sociological and practical phenomenon. In practical terms, this means taking the historical and social concept of a great conductor apart to look for the practical core gestural communication. The most important theoretical tool is the concept of gesture. The idea has been to sketch a theoretical model based on gestural communication between a conductor and an orchestra, and to give one example of the many possible ways of studying the gestures of a conductor.

Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making

In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.