7 resultados para Shame
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
Although shame is a universal human emotion and is one of the most difficult emotions to overcome, its origins and nature as well as its effects on psychosocial functioning are not well understood or defined. While psychological and spiritual counselors are aware of the effects and consequences of shame for an individual s internal well-being and social life, shame is often still considered a taboo topic and is not given adequate attention. This study aims to explain the developmental process and effects of shame and shame-proneness for individuals and provide tools for practitioners to work more effectively with their clients who struggle with shame. This study presents the empirical foundation for a grounded theory that describes and explains the nature, origins, and consequences of shame-proneness. The study focused on Finnish participants childhood, adolescence and adulthood experiences and why they developed shame-proneness, what it meant for them as children and adolescents and what it meant for them as adults. The data collection phase of this study began in 2000. The participants were recruited through advertisements in local and country-wide newspapers and magazines. Altogether 325 people responded to the advertisements by sending an essay concerning their shame and guilt experiences. For the present study, 135 essays were selected and from those who sent an essay 19 were selected for in-depth interviews. In addition to essays and interviews, participants personal notebooks and childhood hospital and medical reports as well as their scores on the Internalized Shame Scale were analyzed. The development of shame-proneness and significant experiences and events during childhood and adolescence (e.g., health, parenting and parents behavior, humiliation, bullying, neglect, maltreatment and abuse) are discussed and the connections of shame-proneness to psychological concepts such as self-esteem, attachment, perfectionism, narcissism, submissiveness, pleasing others, heightened interpersonal subjectivity, and codependence are explained. Relationships and effects of shame-proneness on guilt, spirituality, temperament, coping strategies, defenses, personality formation and psychological health are also explicated. In addition, shame expressions and the development of shame triggers as well as internalized and externalized shame are clarified. These connections and developments are represented by the core category lack of gaining love, validation and protection as the authentic self. The conclusions drawn from the study include a categorization of shame-prone Finnish people according to their childhood and adolescent experiences and the characteristics of their shame-proneness and personality. Implications for psychological and spiritual counseling are also discussed. Key words: shame, internalized shame, external shame, shame development, shame triggers, guilt, self-esteem, attachment, narcissism, perfectionism, submissiveness, codependence, childhood neglect, childhood abuse, childhood maltreatment, emotional abuse, sexual abuse, spiritual abuse, psychological well-being
Resumo:
The goals of this study were to analyze the forms of emotional tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these tendencies. In study 1, students narratives of their own guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance than reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. In study 2, the relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis s IRI and guilt by Tangney s TOSCA and Hoffman s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality and feel guilty in different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish (N=156) and Peruvian (N=159) adolescents. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15 19-year-old high school students (N = 207), and the other of military conscripts (N = 503). Guilt was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathy were similar, but the relation to the openness conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to culture, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.
Resumo:
The main focus of the research is on the genealogy of women's same-sex fornication in Finnish criminal law from 1889/1894 to 1971. Why were women included in the concept of same-sex fornication in Finland and why, where, and when was the law put into effect? Which women were tried, how did the trial proceedings evolve, and what kind of effects did the trials have afterwards? Which concepts were used? These questions have been approached through the analysis of the Finnish Penal Code, the criminal law science and four trial proceedings in Eastern Finland during the 1950s. The research draws on the epistemology of the closet and the concept of heteronormativity adapted from queer theories. It is method critical in utilising ethnography, micro history and feminist ethical self-reflection. The research consists of six scientific refereed articles (see appendix) and of a theoretical introduction. The main results of the research are: 1) The genealogy of Finnish decency [Sittlichkeit] can not be researched without oral histories, due to the late modernisation of Finnish society and the legal system, which does not follow the pattern of English, French and German societies. 2) The inclusion of women's same-sex fornication in the Finnish Penal Code is not incomprehensible when compared to the early modern European legislations and court practices. Women have been punished for the sins of Sodom, though not directly under the 1734 Swedish law. 3) Fornication and decency were ambivalent concepts in the 1889/1894 law, and juridical authorities offered controversial interpretations of them during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 4) A peak in women's convictions occurred in the 1950s, and most of the trial proceedings took place in rural Eastern Finland. Neither the state nor the police were active in prosecuting; instead, the trial proceedings began "by accident". 5) From 1940 to 1960 police training lacked instructions concerning the interrogation of women suspected of same-sex fornication. 6) The figure of the penitent woman was produced in the chiasmic encounter of confession and police interrogation which moulded and was moulded by the epistemological matrix of shame, honour, and decency. Women's speech acts were judicialised as confessions which enabled the disciplinary tampering with the women's bodies. 7) Gender and personality, more than sexuality, or "criminality" defined the status of the convicted women in their village communities after the trials. 8) Relations between police training, sexuality, and decency have not been well researched in Finland. 9) Decriminalisation in 1971 did not mark the end of homophobic legal discourse, even though the 1999 reform of sexual crimes took the form of gender neutral conceptualisation
Resumo:
On the material level of poverty, the work shows how the Great Depression forced rural women and children to enhance their work input and find new ways of coping. The most serious impact of the Depression was poor nutrition, as well as scarcity of food and clothes. Women's and men's ways to make a living started to resemble each other; men had also to consent to wages in form of foodstuff. The research also focuses on immaterial poverty by means of exploring experiences of otherness: shame, hatred and expressions of protest. Substantial humiliation was induced by poor relief and begging. A clear gap prevailed between the poor and the better off people in school, work and at leisure. The economic crisis deepened this gap even further. The dissertation specifies the poor people s every day experiences by taking into account the different worlds of men and women. The analysis of four different memory-based sources is the core in the micro-historical research design. The narrators of the research were survivors, unlike many others, who experienced the Great Depression. Moralization and humiliation of the poor have not ceased in contemporary society. Therefore, the historical perspective of both the material and the immaterial side of poverty could increase the understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon of today s poverty.
Resumo:
The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.
Resumo:
The main theme of the research centres on the idea that social inclusion can be analysed as inclusions and exclusions. The research is focused on the phenomenon of inclusion that is defined as widely understood social relationships and social binds emerging in a rehabilitation process. Information was gathered from 13 ex substance abusers, who had a background of heavy substance abuse for appr. 15 years and who have been sober for about 7 years. Also 34 persons who helped them to rehabilitate by the helped persons’ perspectives, were interviewed. The speciality of the research is that 5 of the ex abusers were also physically or mentally disabled. A Simmelian interaction process analysis was applied for the narrative analysis of the collected data. The aim of the analysis was to define different kinds of configurations of social relations and social binds. According to the research 3 different forms of inclusion are emerged in rehabilitation. At the early stage rehabilitation leans towards controlling the new sober life style (inclusion of life control). When people begin to rely on their temperance, they begin to make decisions about an own way of living (life political inclusion) and can also dissociate from the institutional thought patterns. People must also find a way into the circles of social relationships to develop own esteemed individual settings of codes for their action (inclusion of life orientation). The main result of the research represents the ‘mechanism of the social’ of rehabilitation. It is composed of the forms of inclusion mentioned above, their contents and the specific reflection mechanism of inclusion. It consists of the heavy structure of the disciplines of the rehabilitation system and the light structure of social worlds. Finally rehabilitation in the long run seems to lean on aesthetic of social relationships – how the person is connected to the circle of social relationships in this reflection. The conclusions are the following. The role of institutional disciplines is an important social resource for controlling life. Other institutions, i.e. the institutions of adult education offer opportunities to organize the abuser’s life. Unfortunately, the institutional rehabilitation seems to offer feeble help, especially to those who are actualising a kind of life orientation that does not comply with legitimated institutional thought patterns. If the helpers cannot define the need for aid in this situation, the helped easily becomes perversely socially excluded. In a discreet way the institutional rehabilitation is shaping subjectivities of the ex abusers by transferring responsibilities for them. This incident already increases the uncertainty of life of ex abuser, who is disposed towards feeling shame and inferiority. It is more secure to strengthen social binds with the institutional rehabilitation and its membership. Thus, getting individually responsible increases addictive behaviours.
Resumo:
In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.