Contested Lands: Land Disputes in Semi-Arid Parts of Northern Tanzania : Case Studies of the Loliondo and Sale Divisions

This study Contested Lands: Land disputes in semi-arid parts of northern Tanzania. Case Studies of the Loliondo and Sale Division in the Ngorongoro District concentrates on describing the specific land disputes which took place in the 1990s in the Loliondo and Sale Divisions of the Ngorongoro District in northern Tanzania. The study shows the territorial and historical transformation of territories and property and their relation to the land disputes of the 1990s'. It was assumed that land disputes have been firstly linked to changing spatiality due to the zoning policies of the State territoriality and, secondly, they can be related to the State control of property where the ownership of land property has been redefined through statutory laws. In the analysis of the land disputes issues such as use of territoriality, boundary construction and property claims, in geographical space, are highlighted. Generally, from the 1980s onwards, increases in human population within both Divisions have put pressure on land/resources. This has led to the increased control of land/resource, to the construction of boundaries and finally to formalized land rights on village lands of the Loliondo Division. The land disputes have thus been linked to the use of legal power and to the re-creation of the boundary (informal or formal) either by the Maasai or the Sonjo on the Loliondo and Sale village lands. In Loliondo Division land disputes have been resource-based and related to multiple allocations of land or game resource concessions. Land disputes became clearly political and legal struggles with an ecological reference.Land disputes were stimulated when the common land/resource rights on village lands of the Maasai pastoralists became regulated and insecure. The analysis of past land disputes showed that space-place tensions on village lands can be presented as a platform on which spatial and property issues with complex power relations have been debated. The reduction of future land disputes will succeed only when/if local property rights to land and resources are acknowledged, especially in rural lands of the Tanzanian State.

Policy evaluations for U.S. federal timber sale accounting system development.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Puukaupan säännöt : Yksityismetsänomistajien ja metsäteollisuuden puukauppa Itä-Suomessa 1919 - 1939

The Finnish forest industry bought more than half of the timber used in factories and sawmills in the 1930s from non-industrial private forests (NIPF). This research investigates the rules conformed to this timber trade. The main research questions are: what were the rules that influenced the timber trade; and by whom they were set up? Attention is also paid to the factors which advanced the forest owners’ negotiation possibilities. A variety of sources were used: legal and company statutes, timber trade contracts, archives of the forest companies and organisations. Moreover, the written reminiscences collected by the Finnish Literature Society in the early 1970s were used to analyse the views of individual sellers and buyers. An institutional economics approach was applied as the theoretical framework of this study. In the timber trade the seller (forest owner) and the buyer (the employee of the forest company) agreed to the rules of the timber trade. They agreed about the amount and the price of the timber on sale, but also rules concerning, e.g., timber marking and harvesting. The forest companies had a strong control over the written contracts. Neither the private forest owners nor the forest organisations had much influence over these contracts. However, they managed to influence the rules which could not be found in the contracts. These written and unwritten rules regulated, for instance, the timber marking and measurement. The forest organisations such as Central Forestry Board Tapio (Keskusmetsäseura Tapio) and associations of forest owners (metsänhoitoyhdistykset) helped private forest owners in gaining more control over the timber marking. In timber marking, the forest owner selected trees to be included in the timber trade and gained more information, which he could use in the negotiations. The other rule, which was changed despite forest companies’ resistance, was the timber measurement. The Central Union of Agricultural Producers (MTK) negotiated with the Central Association of Finnish Woodworking Industries (SPKL) about changing the rules of the measurement practices. Even though SPKL did not support any changes, the new timber measurement law was accepted in the year 1938. The new law also created a supervisory authority to solve possible disagreements. Despite this the forest companies were still in charge of the measurement process in most cases. The private forest owners attained changes in the rules of the timber trade mainly during the 1930s. Earlier the relative weakness of the private forest organisations had diminished their negotiation positions. This changed in the 1930s as the private forest owners and their organisations became more active. At the same time the forest industry experienced a shortage of timber, especially pulp wood, and this provided the private forest owners with more leverage. Full-text (in Finnish) available at http://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10224/4081

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Essays on the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights

Väitöskirjassani tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden ja tekijänoikeuksien taloustiedettä kahdesta eri perspektiivistä. Niistä ensimmäinen kuuluu endogeenisen kasvuteorian alaan. Väitöskirjassani yleistän ”pool of knowledge” -tyyppisen endogeenisen kasvumallin tilanteeseen, jossa patentoitavissa olevalla innovaatiolla on minimikoko, ja jossa uudenlaisen tuotteen patentoinut yritys voi menettää monopolinsa tuotteeseen jäljittelyn johdosta. Mallin kontekstissa voidaan analysoida jäljittelyn ja innovaatioilta vaaditun ”minimikoon” vaikutuksia hyvinvointiin ja talouskasvuun. Kasvun maksimoiva imitaation määrä on mallissa aina nolla, mutta hyvinvoinnin maksimoiva imitaation määrä voi olla positiivinen. Talouskasvun ja hyvinvoinnin maksimoivalla patentoitavissa olevan innovaation ”minimikoolla” voi olla mikä tahansa teoreettista maksimia pienempi arvo. Väitöskirjani kahdessa jälkimmäisessä pääluvussa tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden kaupallista piratismia mikrotaloustieteellisen mallin avulla. Informaatiohyödykkeistä laittomasti tehtyjen kopioiden tuotantokustannukset ovat pienet, ja miltei olemattomat silloin kun niitä levitetään esimerkiksi Internetissä. Koska piraattikopioilla on monta eri tuottajaa, niiden hinnan voitaisiin mikrotaloustieteen teorian perusteella olettaa laskevan melkein nollaan, ja jos näin kävisi, kaupallinen piratismi olisi mahdotonta. Mallissani selitän kaupallisen piratismin olemassaolon olettamalla, että piratismista saatavan rangaistuksen uhka riippuu siitä, kuinka monille kuluttajille piraatti tarjoaa laittomia hyödykkeitä, ja että se siksi vaikuttaa piraattikopioiden markkinoihin mainonnan kustannuksen tavoin. Kaupallisten piraattien kiinteiden kustannusten lisääminen on mallissani aina tekijänoikeuksien haltijan etujen mukaista, mutta ”mainonnan kustannuksen” lisääminen ei välttämättä ole, vaan se saattaa myös alentaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja. Tämä tulos poikkeaa vastaavista aiemmista tuloksista sikäli, että se pätee vaikka tarkasteltuihin informaatiohyödykkeisiin ei liittyisi verkkovaikutuksia. Aiemmin ei-kaupallisen piratismin malleista on usein johdettu tulos, jonka mukaan informaatiohyödykkeen laittomat kopiot voivat kasvattaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja jos laillisten kopioiden arvo niiden käyttäjille riippuu siitä, kuinka monet muut kuluttajat käyttävät samanlaista hyödykettä ja jos piraattikopioiden saatavuus lisää riittävästi laillisten kopioiden arvoa. Väitöskirjan viimeisessä pääluvussa yleistän mallini verkkotoimialoille, ja tutkin yleistämäni mallin avulla sitä, missä tapauksissa vastaava tulos pätee myös kaupalliseen piratismiin.