Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation : Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

This study focuses on two philosophical issues related to the interpretation of art. Firstly, it considers the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. Secondly, the study raises the issue of relativism in interpretation through a discussion of the relativistic tendencies apparent in the views of three major figures of contemporary philosophy: Joseph Margolis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richard Rorty. The major goal of the thesis is to develop a theory of interpretation supporting the role of authorial intentions in interpretation on the basis of Donald Davidson s late philosophy of language and the holistic account of interpretation that underlies different parts of his philosophy. It is my belief that an intentionalist view of interpretation built on Davidsonian elements manages to form the most convincing defense of that interpretive position against the skepticism present in the views of Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty. The theoretical issues addressed in the thesis are illuminated by discussions of case-examples, most importantly Richard Wagner s The Valkyrie, Thomas Adés America: A Prophecy, and some symphonies by Dimitri Shostakovich. In chapter one, I present a critical discussion of Margolis robust relativism. While finding Margolis criticism of the self-refutive argument plausible, I, nevertheless, argue that the relativistic logic Margolis offers should not be favored in interpretation. The first parts of chapter two outline Davidsonian intentionalism by presenting a reading of Davidson s later work in philosophy of language and mind, and by indicating its relationship to Davidson s views of literature. Then, I shall compare Davidson s ideas with some recent modest forms of intentionalism found in analytic aesthetics, and argue that Davidsonian intentionalism is in many respects more satisfactory compared to them. Chapter three engages Gadamer s hermeneutics by defending E.D. Hirsch s criticism of Gadamer. Uncovering the shortcomings in the replies of Gadamer s followers to Hirsch s criticism serves as a basis for the defense of intentionalism in interpretation carried out in the chapter. That defense is then extended with a discussion of some recent hermeneutic readings of Davidson s views. Chapter four deals with the standing of intentionalism through Rorty s pragmatist approach to literature. By indicating the position of pragmatist notions of aesthetic experience and imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism, it is shown that an intentionalist approach need not be as impoverished with regard to the value Rorty attributes to literature as he assumes. The concluding chapter outlines some ways in which one can be a pluralist with regard to art and interpretation without falling into relativism.

Kristallivalheita : Itsepetos filosofisen tulkinnan lähtökohtana eräissä draaman klassikoissa

The philosophical problem of self-deception focuses the relation between desire, advantage, evidence and harm. A self-deceptive person is irrational because he or she belives or wants to belive contrary to the available evidence. The study focuses on different forms of self-deception that come out in certain classical Western dramas. The first self-deception forms are: "S knows that ~p but still belives that p because he wants that ~p", "S wants that p and therefore belives that p.", "S belives that p against evidence t because he wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p if t but S would belive that p even if ~t because S wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because S is ignorant of it." and "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because of ignorant of t due to an internal deception." The main sources on self-deception are the views of contemporary researchers of the subject, such as Robert Audi, Marcia Baron, Bas C. van Fraassen, Mark Johnston, Mike W. Martin, Brian MaLaughlin, Alfred Mele, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, William Ruddick and Stephen L. White. In this study it is claimed that Shakespeare´s Othello presents self-deception as a tragic phenomenom from witch it follows deceptions and murders. Moliére´s Tartuffe deals with a phony hypocrite´s attempts at cheating. Ibsen´s Wild Duck defends the necessity of vital lies. Beckett´s Waiting for Godot deals with the self-deception witch is related to the waiting of the supernatural rescuer. Miller´s The Death of a Salesman tells about a man who, while pursuing the American myth of success, winds both himself and his family into the skeins of self-deception. They are studied with a Barthesian method that emphasizes the autonomy of literary work and its interpretation independently of the author´s personal history and social conditions. Self-deception has been regarded as an immoral way of thinking or way of action. However, vital lies show the necessity or necessity of the self-deception when it brings joy and optimism to the human being and supports his or her self-esteem and does not cause a suffering or damage, either to self or others. In the study, the processual character of self-deception is brought out.

Theorizing the Nature of Reflection

For the past decades reflection has been the buzzword of adult and higher education. Reflection is facilitated in many practices and there is abundant research on the issue. Despite the popularity of the concept, the reasons why bringing about reflection in educational practices is difficult remain unclear. The prevailing theories inform of the process in its ideal form. However, to a great extent, they fail to offer conceptual tools for understanding and working with the actualities of reflection. The aim of the doctoral thesis was to explore the challenges and prerequisites of reflection in order to theorize the nature of reflection. By the term reflection it is here referred to becoming aware of and questioning the assumptions that orient our thinking, feelings and actions. The doctoral thesis consists of five studies that approach these questions from different viewpoints and within different contexts. The methods involve both a philosophical and an empirical approach. This multifaceted approach embodies the aim of both gaining a more thorough grasp of the phenomenon and to develop the methodology of researching reflection. The theory building is based on conceptual analysis and rational reconstruction (see Davia 1998; Habermas 1979; Rorty1984) of Mezirow s (1981; 1991; 2000; 2009) theory of transformative learning. In order to explore the aspects which, based on the analysis, appeared insufficiently considered within Mezirow s theory, Damasio s (1994; 1999; 2003; 2010) theory on emotions and consciousness as well as Clausewitz s (1985) view on friction are used as complementary theories. Empirical analyses are used in dialogue with the theoretical, in order to challenge and refine the emerging theorization. Reflection is examined in three different contexts; regarding university teachers pedagogical growth, involuntarily childless women recovering from a life-event crisis, and soldiers preparing to act in chaotic situations of the battlefield as well as recovering from it. The choice of these contexts is based on Mezirow s notion of disorienting dilemma as a trigger for reflection. This notion indicates that reflection may more naturally emerge in association to life-event crises or other cumulative sets of instances, which bring our worldview and beliefs under question. Nevertheless, reflection is often being promoted in educational contexts in which the trigger conditions may not readily prevail. These contextual issues as well as the differences between the facilitated and non-facilitated contexts have not, however, been considered in detail within the research on reflection (or transformative learning). The doctoral thesis offers a new perspective into reflection which, as a further development on Mezirow s transformative learning theory, theorizes the nature of reflection. The developed theory explicates the prerequisites and challenges to reflection. The theory suggests that the challenges of reflection are fundamentally connected to the way the biological life-support system affects our thinking through emotions. While depicting the mechanisms that function as a counterforce to reflection, the developed theory also opens a perspective for considering possibilities for carrying out reflection, and suggests ways to locate and deal with the assumptions to be reflected on. The basic dynamic of the challenges to reflection was explicated by conceptually bridging the gap between Mezirow s and Damasio s theories, through exploring the connections between the meaning perspective and the biological functions of emotions. The concepts of comfort zone and edge-emotions were formed so as to depict the emotional orientation of our thinking, as part of the explanation of the nature of reflection.