Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Metsäpirulainen : Liikemies Erik Johan Längman (1799-1863) talousjärjestelmän murroksessa

The Forest devil. Businessman Erik Johan Längman (1799 1863) in the transition of economic system In Finnish historiography, Erik Johan Längman (1799-1863) bears a bad reputation of his own level: a mean, profit-seeking businessman who did not care too much about methods in his operations. Although little known, Längman has been praised as one of the pioneers of modern industry in the Grand Duchy of Finland, which belonged to the Russian Empire. From the mid 1830s Längman owned iron mill and several sawmills around the country. The growing demand of the markets in the 1830s, especially in Great Britain, marked a strong stimulus to Finnish lumber industry. At the same time claims for stricter rule over the sawmill industry were raised by high officials. The momentum of the conflict, the Forest Act of 1851, brought an end to illegal overproduction. In this biography, particular emphasis is laid on the entrepreneurial behaviour of Längman, but also on the effect the entrepreneurs had on the Crown s policies. On the other hand, how did the limitations imposed by the Crown guide the actions of the sawmill owners? The solutions adopted by the sawmill owners and the manoeuvring of the government are in a constant dialogue in this study. The Finnish sawmill industry experienced a major change in its techniques and methods of acquiring timber during the 1830s. Längman particularly, with his acquisition organisation, was able to find and reach faraway forests with unexpected results. The official regulating system with its strict producing quotas couldn t follow the changes. When the battle against the sawmill industry really started on, in 1840, it didn t happen for the benefit of iron industry, as argued previously, but to save Crown forests from depletion. After the mid 1840s Längman and the leader of the Finnish nationalistic movement, J. V. Snellman questioned the rationality of the entire regulation system and in doing so they also posed a threat against the aristocratic power. The influential but now also badly provoked chairman of the economic division of senate, Lars Gabriel von Haartman, accused the sawmill-owners harder than ever and took the advantage of the reactionary spirit of imperial Russia to launch the state forest administration. Längman circumvented the conditions of privileges, felled Crown forests illegally and accusations were brought against him for destroying his competitors. The repeated conflicts spoke primarily about a superior business idea and organisational ability. Although Längman spent his last years mostly abroad he still had interests in Finnish timber business when the liberation of sawmill-industry was established, in 1861. Surprisingly, the antagonism around the Crown forests continued, probably even more heated.

Itsenäisen Suomen puolesta : Sotilaskomitea 1915-1918

For Independent Finland. The Military Committee 1915–1918 In the course of the First World War, several organizations were founded with the purpose of making Finland independent or, at least, restoring her autonomous status. The Military Committee was the most significant active independence organization in Finland in the First World War, in addition to the activist student movement, i.e., the Jaeger Movement. The Military Committee was an organization founded in 1915 by officers who had attended the Hamina Cadet School, with the goal of creating a national army for a liberation war against the Russian troops. It was believed that the liberation war should succeed only with the help of the German Army. With the situation in society continually tensing up in the autumn 1917, the Military Committee also had to figure on the possibility of a Civil War. The activities of the Military Committee started in the early part of 1915 when they were still small-scale, but they gained significant momentum after the Russian Revolution in March 1917. In January 1918, the Military Committee formed the general staff for the White Army, the Senate’s troops. The independence-related activities of the Hamina cadets in the years of the First World War were more extensive and multifaceted than has been believed heretofore. The work of the Military Committee was divided into preparations for a liberation war in Finland, on one hand, and in Stockholm and Berlin, on the other hand. In Finland, the Military Committee took part in intelligence gathering for Germany and in supporting the recruiting Jaegers, and later in founding the civil guard organization, in solving the law and order authorities issue, and finally in selecting the Commander-in-Chief for the Senate’s troops. The member of the Military Committee, especially Captain Hannes Ignatius of the Cavalry contributed greatly to the drafting of the independence activists’ national action plan in Stockholm in May 1917. This plan preceded the formation of the civil guard organization. The Military Committee’s role in founding the civil guards was initially minor, but in the fall of 1917, the Military Committee started to finance the activities of the civil guards, named several former officers as commanders of the civil guards and finally overtook the entire civil guard movement. In Stockholm and Berlin, the representatives of the Military Committee were in active contact with both the high command of the German Army and with the representatives of the Swedish Army. Colonel Nikolai Mexmontan, who was a representative of the Military Committee, collaborated with Swedish officers and Jaeger officers in Stockholm in coming up with comprehensive and detailed plans for starting the Liberation War. Under Mexmontan’s leadership, there were serious negotiations to enter into a confederation with Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Thesleff, on the other hand, became the commander of the Jaeger Battalion 27. The influence and importance of the Military Committee came to the forefront in independent and conflict-torn Finland. The Military Committee became a Senate committee on the 7th of January 1918, with its chairman, for all practical purposes, as the Commander-in-Chief in an eventual war. Lieutenant General Claes Charpentier was the chairman of the Military Committee from mid-December 1917 onwards, but on the 15th of January 1918 he had to resign in favour of Lieutenant General Gustaf Mannerheim. Soon after that, Mannerheim got an order from the chairman of the Senate P. E. Svinhufvud to organize and assume the leadership of the law and order authorities. The chairman of the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief of the Senate troops in January 1918, and the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief’s general staff. The Military Committee had turned from a clandestine organization into the first general staff of the independent Finnish Army.

Työkykyarviokokous moniammatillisen työryhmän päätöksentekotilanteena : Tutkimus vuorovaikutuksesta ja potilaan osallisuudesta

Work capacity assessment meeting as a decision-making situation of a multi-professional team a study on interaction and patient participation Multi-professional working has become an increasingly popular method of work in social and health care. The introduction of the viewpoints of several professionals is seen as a way to enhance the openness and quality of decision-making. However, so far relatively few study results are available on the implementation of this method in actual operations. This study examines one work method, a work capacity assessment meeting, along with medical certificates B and their enclosures written by the doctor to the patient after a meeting. After the theoretical and methodological chapter, providing background information, the study describes the structure of the meeting and the medical certificate as a constructive factor. This is followed by a discussion on the manner of assessing the various domains of the patient s functional capacity and the decision-making based on the assessed factors. Next, the study moves on to examine the effect of patient involvements on the conclusions and decisions that professionals make at the meeting. In conclusion, the study looks into how the voices of the professionals and the customer are transferred to the medical certificate. The material of the study consists of 11 meetings recorded on video, of which eight are work capacity assessment meetings and three are rehabilitation examination meetings. The first type of meeting is attended by a patient and a number of professionals, while the latter is attended only by the professionals. All the patients, whose cases are discussed in the work capacity assessment meetings, have a musculoskeletal disorder, while the rehabilitation meetings are related to patients who all also have some additional problem. The study material also consists of seven medical certificates B, written after a work capacity assessment meeting. For the most part, the material has been collected by the conversation analysis method. Moreover, also discourse analysis and a rhetorical approach were used. By using conversation analysis, it is possible to study closely how interaction is built up at the meeting and to examine how the actors implement their institutional assessment tasks in a co-operation that takes its form turn by turn. The four main findings of the study are as follows: firstly, the meeting is structured to a great extent on the basis of the medical certificate form to various phases of the meeting and the headings of the certificate are seen as communicative affordances at the meeting, directed primarily to the professionals that have assessed the patient s work capacity with various tests. The medical certificate is the ethno-method of the doctor acting as the chairman of the meeting that functions in two directions: it constructs the meeting and constitutes the task of the professionals as they produce contents for it. Secondly, the study describes the ways that are used to assess the different domains of the patient s work capacity, how they are described at the meeting and how a decision is taken when the assessment information has been saturated in the opinion of the team. Thirdly, the study brings up ways, with which the patient can influence the conclusions and decisions made by the professionals at the meeting. The study showed that the patient can affect the preconditions of his or her own future and wellbeing. Fourthly, the study describes how the wealth of expressions at the meeting is transferred to the certificate as an argumentative micro-cosmos, where the patient is classified to be recommended for rehabilitation or disability pension. An important finding is also how objective and subjective information and the voices of actors at the meeting are transferred to the statement in a strategic and intentional manner, with an orientation to the decision that will be taken at the insurance institution. The study results can be utilized in the training of professionals and in developing the operations of organisations performing the assessment of the work capacity of people suffering from musculoskeletal disorders.