Readers' resposes versus reader-response theories : An empirical study

This study examines both theoretically an empirically how well the theories of Norman Holland, David Bleich, Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish can explain readers' interpretations of literary texts. The theoretical analysis concentrates on their views on language from the point of view of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. This analysis shows that many of the assumptions related to language in these theories are problematic. The empirical data show that readers often form very similar interpretations. Thus the study challenges the common assumption that literary interpretations tend to be idiosyncratic. The empirical data consists of freely worded written answers to questions on three short stories. The interpretations were made by 27 Finnish university students. Some of the questions addressed issues that were discussed in large parts of the texts, some referred to issues that were mentioned only in passing or implied. The short stories were "The Witch à la Mode" by D. H. Lawrence, "Rain in the Heart" by Peter Taylor and "The Hitchhiking Game" by Milan Kundera. According to Fish, readers create both the formal features of a text and their interpretation of it according to an interpretive strategy. People who agree form an interpretive community. However, a typical answer usually contains ideas repeated by several readers as well as observations not mentioned by anyone else. Therefore it is very difficult to determine which readers belong to the same interpretive community. Moreover, readers with opposing opinions often seem to pay attention to the same textual features and even acknowledge the possibility of an opposing interpretation; therefore they do not seem to create the formal features of the text in different ways. Iser suggests that an interpretation emerges from the interaction between the text and the reader when the reader determines the implications of the text and in this way fills the "gaps" in the text. Iser believes that the text guides the reader, but as he also believes that meaning is on a level beyond words, he cannot explain how the text directs the reader. The similarity in the interpretations and the fact that the agreement is strongest when related to issues that are discussed broadly in the text do, however, support his assumption that readers are guided by the text. In Bleich's view, all interpretations have personal motives and each person has an idiosyncratic language system. The situation where a person learns a word determines the most important meaning it has for that person. In order to uncover the personal etymologies of words, Bleich asks his readers to associate freely on the basis of a text and note down all the personal memories and feelings that the reading experience evokes. Bleich's theory of the idiosyncratic language system seems to rely on a misconceived notion of the role that ostensive definitions have in language use. The readers' responses show that spontaneous associations to personal life seem to colour the readers' interpretations, but such instances are rather rare. According to Holland, an interpretation reflects the reader's identity theme. Language use is regulated by shared rules, but everyone follows the rules in his or her own way. Words mean different things to different people. The problem with this view is that if there is any basis for language use, it seems to be the shared way of following linguistic rules. Wittgenstein suggests that our understanding of words is related to the shared ways of using words and our understanding of human behaviour. This view seems to give better grounds for understanding similarity and differences in literary interpretations than the theories of Holland, Bleich, Fish and Iser.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Questions to Artificial Nature: A Philosophical Study of Interdisciplinary Models and their Functions in Scientific Practice

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary analysis of how models and simulations function in the production of scientific knowledge. The work is informed by three scholarly traditions: studies on models and simulations in philosophy of science, so-called micro-sociological laboratory studies within science and technology studies, and cultural-historical activity theory. Methodologically, I adopt a naturalist epistemology and combine philosophical analysis with a qualitative, empirical case study of infectious-disease modelling. This study has a dual perspective throughout the analysis: it specifies the modelling practices and examines the models as objects of research. The research questions addressed in this study are: 1) How are models constructed and what functions do they have in the production of scientific knowledge? 2) What is interdisciplinarity in model construction? 3) How do models become a general research tool and why is this process problematic? The core argument is that the mediating models as investigative instruments (cf. Morgan and Morrison 1999) take questions as a starting point, and hence their construction is intentionally guided. This argument applies the interrogative model of inquiry (e.g., Sintonen 2005; Hintikka 1981), which conceives of all knowledge acquisition as process of seeking answers to questions. The first question addresses simulation models as Artificial Nature, which is manipulated in order to answer questions that initiated the model building. This account develops further the "epistemology of simulation" (cf. Winsberg 2003) by showing the interrelatedness of researchers and their objects in the process of modelling. The second question clarifies why interdisciplinary research collaboration is demanding and difficult to maintain. The nature of the impediments to disciplinary interaction are examined by introducing the idea of object-oriented interdisciplinarity, which provides an analytical framework to study the changes in the degree of interdisciplinarity, the tools and research practices developed to support the collaboration, and the mode of collaboration in relation to the historically mutable object of research. As my interest is in the models as interdisciplinary objects, the third research problem seeks to answer my question of how we might characterise these objects, what is typical for them, and what kind of changes happen in the process of modelling. Here I examine the tension between specified, question-oriented models and more general models, and suggest that the specified models form a group of their own. I call these Tailor-made models, in opposition to the process of building a simulation platform that aims at generalisability and utility for health-policy. This tension also underlines the challenge of applying research results (or methods and tools) to discuss and solve problems in decision-making processes.

Dependence Logic: Investigations into Higher-Order Semantics Defined on Teams

This thesis is a study of a rather new logic called dependence logic and its closure under classical negation, team logic. In this thesis, dependence logic is investigated from several aspects. Some rules are presented for quantifier swapping in dependence logic and team logic. Such rules are among the basic tools one must be familiar with in order to gain the required intuition for using the logic for practical purposes. The thesis compares Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) games of first order logic and dependence logic and defines a third EF game that characterises a mixed case where first order formulas are measured in the formula rank of dependence logic. The thesis contains detailed proofs of several translations between dependence logic, team logic, second order logic and its existential fragment. Translations are useful for showing relationships between the expressive powers of logics. Also, by inspecting the form of the translated formulas, one can see how an aspect of one logic can be expressed in the other logic. The thesis makes preliminary investigations into proof theory of dependence logic. Attempts focus on finding a complete proof system for a modest yet nontrivial fragment of dependence logic. A key problem is identified and addressed in adapting a known proof system of classical propositional logic to become a proof system for the fragment, namely that the rule of contraction is needed but is unsound in its unrestricted form. A proof system is suggested for the fragment and its completeness conjectured. Finally, the thesis investigates the very foundation of dependence logic. An alternative semantics called 1-semantics is suggested for the syntax of dependence logic. There are several key differences between 1-semantics and other semantics of dependence logic. 1-semantics is derived from first order semantics by a natural type shift. Therefore 1-semantics reflects an established semantics in a coherent manner. Negation in 1-semantics is a semantic operation and satisfies the law of excluded middle. A translation is provided from unrestricted formulas of existential second order logic into 1-semantics. Also game theoretic semantics are considerd in the light of 1-semantics.

Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Investigations of planetary boundary layer processes and particle formation in the atmosphere of planet Mars

The planet Mars is the Earth's neighbour in the Solar System. Planetary research stems from a fundamental need to explore our surroundings, typical for mankind. Manned missions to Mars are already being planned, and understanding the environment to which the astronauts would be exposed is of utmost importance for a successful mission. Information of the Martian environment given by models is already now used in designing the landers and orbiters sent to the red planet. In particular, studies of the Martian atmosphere are crucial for instrument design, entry, descent and landing system design, landing site selection, and aerobraking calculations. Research of planetary atmospheres can also contribute to atmospheric studies of the Earth via model testing and development of parameterizations: even after decades of modeling the Earth's atmosphere, we are still far from perfect weather predictions. On a global level, Mars has also been experiencing climate change. The aerosol effect is one of the largest unknowns in the present terrestrial climate change studies, and the role of aerosol particles in any climate is fundamental: studies of climate variations on another planet can help us better understand our own global change. In this thesis I have used an atmospheric column model for Mars to study the behaviour of the lowest layer of the atmosphere, the planetary boundary layer (PBL), and I have developed nucleation (particle formation) models for Martian conditions. The models were also coupled to study, for example, fog formation in the PBL. The PBL is perhaps the most significant part of the atmosphere for landers and humans, since we live in it and experience its state, for example, as gusty winds, nightfrost, and fogs. However, PBL modelling in weather prediction models is still a difficult task. Mars hosts a variety of cloud types, mainly composed of water ice particles, but also CO2 ice clouds form in the very cold polar night and at high altitudes elsewhere. Nucleation is the first step in particle formation, and always includes a phase transition. Cloud crystals on Mars form from vapour to ice on ubiquitous, suspended dust particles. Clouds on Mars have a small radiative effect in the present climate, but it may have been more important in the past. This thesis represents an attempt to model the Martian atmosphere at the smallest scales with high resolution. The models used and developed during the course of the research are useful tools for developing and testing parameterizations for larger-scale models all the way up to global climate models, since the small-scale models can describe processes that in the large-scale models are reduced to subgrid (not explicitly resolved) scale.

Generalizations and Models in Ecology : Lawlikeness, Invariance, Stability, and Robustness

The question at issue in this dissertation is the epistemic role played by ecological generalizations and models. I investigate and analyze such properties of generalizations as lawlikeness, invariance, and stability, and I ask which of these properties are relevant in the context of scientific explanations. I will claim that there are generalizable and reliable causal explanations in ecology by generalizations, which are invariant and stable. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change called an intervention that changes the value of its variables. Whether a generalization remains invariant during its interventions is the criterion that determines whether it is explanatory. A generalization can be invariant and explanatory regardless of its lawlike status. Stability deals with a generality that has to do with holding of a generalization in possible background conditions. The more stable a generalization, the less dependent it is on background conditions to remain true. Although it is invariance rather than stability of generalizations that furnishes us with explanatory generalizations, there is an important function that stability has in this context of explanations, namely, stability furnishes us with extrapolability and reliability of scientific explanations. I also discuss non-empirical investigations of models that I call robustness and sensitivity analyses. I call sensitivity analyses investigations in which one model is studied with regard to its stability conditions by making changes and variations to the values of the model s parameters. As a general definition of robustness analyses I propose investigations of variations in modeling assumptions of different models of the same phenomenon in which the focus is on whether they produce similar or convergent results or not. Robustness and sensitivity analyses are powerful tools for studying the conditions and assumptions where models break down and they are especially powerful in pointing out reasons as to why they do this. They show which conditions or assumptions the results of models depend on. Key words: ecology, generalizations, invariance, lawlikeness, philosophy of science, robustness, explanation, models, stability

The Philosophical Age. Almanac. Issue 36. The Northern Lights

keywords: Enlightenment, Northern countries, Finland, Russia, Scotland In the 36 th edition of the almanac "Philosophical Age" published materials of international symposium «The Northern Lights - Facets of Enlightenment Culture», (held September 25-26, 2009) in The Aleksanteri Institute the University of Helsinki. Contents: Vesa Oittinen Between Radicalism and Utilitarianism — On the Profile of the Finnish Enlightenment Tatiana Artemyeva The Status of Intellectual Values in the Russian Enlightenment Oili Pulkkinen The Cosmopolitan Experience, Theoretical Histories and the Universal Science of the Scottish Enlightenment Аlla Zlatopolskaya L’autocritique des Lumières chez Rousseau et le rousseauisme russe Johannes Remy Alexander Radishchev, Ethical Consuming, and North American Quakers Kimmo Sarje Anders Chydenius and Radical Swedish Enlightenment Johan Sten Anders Johan Lexell: A Finnish Astronomer at St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and His European Contacts Mikhail Mikeshin A Russian Adam Smith in French Style: An Example of the Transfer of Ideas Larisa Agamalian The Library of an Enlightened Russian Landowner

Investigations of Noise-Related Tinnitus

Tinnitus is a frequent consequence of noise trauma. Usually, however, the main focus regarding the consequences of noise trauma is placed on hearing loss, instead of tinnitus. The objectives of the present study were to assess various aspects of noise-related tinnitus in Finland, such as to determine the main causes of conscript acute acoustic traumas (AAT) in the military, assess tinnitus prevalence after noise trauma, characterize long-term AAT-related tinnitus prevalence and characteristics, assess occupational tinnitus, and evaluate the efficacy of hearing protection regulations in preventing hearing loss and tinnitus. The study comprised several independent noise-exposed groups: conscripts performing their military duty, former conscripts who suffered an AAT over a decade earlier, bomb explosion victims, and retired army personnel. Tinnitus questionnaires were used to assess tinnitus prevalence and characteristics. For occupational tinnitus, occupational noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) reports to the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health were reviewed. Tinnitus is a common result of AAT, blast exposure and long-term noise exposure. Despite hearing protection regulations, up to hundreds of AATs occur annually among conscripts in the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The most common cause is an accidental shot, accounting for approximately half of the cases. Conscript AATs are mainly due to accidental shots, while the ear is unprotected. Only seldom is an AAT due to negligence. The most common causative weapon of conscript AATs is the assault rifle, accounting for 81% of conscript AATs. After AAT, the majority of tinnitus cases resolve during military service and become asymptomatic. However, in one-fifth of the cases, tinnitus persists, causing problems such as sleeping and concentration difficulties in many. In Finland, occupational tinnitus often remains unreported in conjunction with NIHL reports. In a survey of occupational NIHL cases, tinnitus was mentioned in only four per cent. However, a subsequent inquiry revealed that almost 90% in fact had tinnitus, indicating that most cases remained undetected and unreported. The best way to prevent noise-related tinnitus is prevention of noise trauma. In the military, hearing protection guidelines have been revised several times over the years. These regulations have been effective in reducing hearing loss of professional soldiers. There has also been a reduction in cases with tinnitus, but the decrease was not significant. However, with improved hearing protection regulations, a significant reduction in the risk of more serious, disturbing tinnitus was observed.