Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.

The Far Eastern Question at the Washington Conference (1921-1922) with an outline of its implications for internal politics in China

This dissertation is a narrative account of the negotiations concerning the question of the Far East and the Shandong issue at the Washington Conference, leading to treaties, agreements and resolutions. In this dissertation, a certain stress is laid on the interaction between the Conference and the internal situation in China, particularly concerning the question of the implications of the Conference for Cabinet politics in Peking. Through the narrative account of the Conference, the general aim is an attempt to reassess the achievements of the Washington Conference. Too often the Washington Conference has been viewed negatively. The political aim behind the legal framework was to open the door to China as a sovereign State member of the international community whose territorial integrity was internationally recognized, despite its chaotic internal situation. It is undeniable that the Washington Conference opened a new chapter in modern Chinese history. The violations of the agreements concerning China that occurred in the 1930s should not lead to the belief that these agreements were of no value. Peace may not be lasting and evolves according to circumstances; agreements are transitory, and new situations need new arrangements. This dissertation tries to demonstrate that the agreements in themselves were not the cause of their failure, but the failure was due to the lack of determination on the part of the Signatories Powers to defend them.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.