Across the Oceans : Development of Overseas Business Information Transmission, 1815-1875

Earlier studies have shown that the speed of information transmission developed radically during the 19th century. The fast development was mainly due to the change from sailing ships and horse-driven coaches to steamers and railways, as well as the telegraph. Speed of information transmission has normally been measured by calculating the duration between writing and receiving a letter, or between an important event and the time when the news was published elsewhere. As overseas mail was generally carried by ships, the history of communications and maritime history are closely related. This study also brings a postal historical aspect to the academic discussion. Additionally, there is another new aspect included. In business enterprises, information flows generally consisted of multiple transactions. Although fast one-way information was often crucial, e.g. news of a changing market situation, at least equally important was that there was a possibility to react rapidly. To examine the development of business information transmission, the duration of mail transport has been measured by a systematic and commensurable method, using consecutive information circles per year as the principal tool for measurement. The study covers a period of six decades, several of the world's most important trade routes and different mail-carrying systems operated by merchant ships, sailing packets and several nations' steamship services. The main sources have been the sailing data of mail-carrying ships and correspondence of several merchant houses in England. As the world's main trade routes had their specific historical backgrounds with different businesses, interests and needs, the systems for information transmission did not develop similarly or simultaneously. It was a process lasting several decades, initiated by the idea of organizing sailings in a regular line system. The evolution proceeded generally as follows: originally there was a more or less irregular system, then a regular system and finally a more frequent regular system of mail services. The trend was from sail to steam, but both these means of communication improved following the same scheme. Faster sailings alone did not radically improve the number of consecutive information circles per year, if the communication was not frequent enough. Neither did improved frequency advance the information circulation if the trip was very long or if the sailings were overlapping instead of complementing each other. The speed of information transmission could be improved by speeding up the voyage itself (technological improvements, minimizing the waiting time at ports of call, etc.) but especially by organizing sailings so that the recipients had the possibility to reply to arriving mails without unnecessary delay. It took two to three decades before the mail-carrying shipping companies were able to organize their sailings in an optimal way. Strategic shortcuts over isthmuses (e.g. Panama, Suez) together with the cooperation between steamships and railways enabled the most effective improvements in global communications before the introduction of the telegraph.

The Roman Republican Navy : from the sixth century to 167 BC

Työ käsittelee Rooman laivaston kehitystä, toimintaa ja osallistumista laajenemispolitiikkaan, jossa Rooma kasvoi kaupunkivaltiosta Välimeren hallitsijaksi. Rooma on aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa nähty maavaltiona vailla kiinnostusta merenkulkuun. On katsottu, että ainoa merkittävä merisota Rooman historiassa on ensimmäinen puunilaissota (264-241 eKr.) ja että siinäkin roomalaiset (jotka historioitsija Polybius kuvaa vasta-alkajiksi) menestyivät Karthagoa vastaan turvautumalla laskusiltoihin, joiden avulla he saattoivat muuttaa meritaistelun maataisteluksi. Polybiuksen kuvaukseen on aina tähän asti luotettu. On katsottu että Roomalla ei ollut laivastoa ennen ensimmäistä puunilaissotaa ja että Rooma kaikissa sodissaan panosti merisodankäyntiin mahdollisimman vähän. Tämä työ pyrkii kumoamaan nämä käsitykset. Laivasto oli osallisena ja ehdottoman välttämätön kaikissa Rooman laajenemispolitiikan käänteissä. Arkeologian tiedot osoittavat, että ennen ensimmäistä puunilaissotaa Rooma kehittyi ja siitä tuli merkittävä kaupunki nimenomaan kaupankäynnin ja ulkomaisten kontaktien seurauksena. Se ei siis ollut puhdas agraarivaltio. Roomalaisilla oli laivasto jo viimeistään 500-luvulta lähtien eKr. ja sitä käytettiin Rooman laajentaessa valtaansa Italiassa. Näin ollen ensimmäisessä puunilaissodassa läntisen Välimeren herruudesta kilpaili kaksi merivaltiota, Rooma ja Karthago. Toinen puunilaissota (218-201) tunnetaan yleensä Hannibalin tulosta Alppien yli Italiaan, mutta se oli myöskin merkittävä merisota ja karthagolaiset hävisivät sen nimenomaan merellä. Rooma osallistui kilpailuun itäisen Välimeren hallinnasta ja kukisti Makedonian ja Syyrian laivastot, jotka eivät olleet mitenkään Rooman laivaston veroisia. Kaikista Rooman vastustajista Karthagolla olisi ollut suurin mahdollisuus pysäyttää Rooman laivaston voittokulu toisessa puunilaissodassa. Laivastoa käytettiin moniin eri tarkoituksiin. Suuret meritaistelut eivät ole ainoa osoitus laivastojen mukanaolosta ja merkityksestä, vaan on myös otettava huomion sotalaivojen rakenne ja toimintaedellytykset. Sotalaivat oli rakennettu taisteluita varten ja niissä oli hyvin niukasti säilytystilaa. Niiden oli päästävä laskemaan maihin aina kun miehistö tarvitsi vettä, ruokaa ja lepoa. Laivastot saattoivat toimia vain niiden rannikoiden tuntumassa, joiden satamiin ja laskupaikkoihin niillä oli turvallinen pääsy. Roomalaiset olivat hyvin tietoisia tästä. Suuret merentakaiset sotaretket Afrikkaan, Espanjaan, Kreikkaan ja Vähän-Aasian rannikolle perustuivat kaikki siihen, että Rooman laivasto hallitsi purjehdusreittejä ja sopivia laskupaikkoja ja saattoi huolehtia joukkojen ja varusteiden kuljettamisesta kaukana taisteleville armeijoille. Samalla Rooman laivasto kävi itsenäistä sotaa merellä ja haastoi ja kukisti kaikki Välimeren merivaltiot. 130-luvulle eKr. tultaessa se oli lyönyt vihollisensa ja riisunut aseista liittolaisensa; Rooman laivasto hallitsi Välimerta yksin.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.