Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Sankarihautaus vapaussodassa : valkoisten kaatuneiden hautaaminen Suomessa vuonna 1918

Civil War Hero Burials the funerals of the fallen White in Finland in 1918 This study focuses on the burial with honours of fallen White combatants during the Finnish Civil War of 1918, as well as on the reasons underpinning the practice. The main sources of the study included the archives of the White army, the Civil Guard organisation and the Church, as well as the newspapers. The genetic method of history research was used. Both the existing tradition of military burials and the ecclesiastical burial culture influenced the burials of those who fell during the Civil War. The first war hero funerals took place as early as the beginning of February 1918, and the first larger-scale collective funerals were organised in Laihia and Vaasa in the Ostrobothnia province, with the latter attended by the supreme civil and military leaders of White Finland. From early on, these funerals assumed their characteristic features, such as the lion flag a design for the Finnish national flag proposed immediately upon the declaration of the country s independence military parades, lines of honour guards, eulogies, salutes and common war hero graves. As a result of the general offensive begun in mid-March 1918, the numbers of the fallen multiplied, so special organisations were established to handle the burials of the fallen. At the same time, the war hero funerals became more frequent and diffused, and the numbers of the buried grew throughout the country. In early March, the advocates of the republican system of government published their appeal in the newspapers, requesting that collective graves for those who fell in the war prepared in every locality. They motivated their request by stating that it was the funerals in particular that had inspired many men to join the ranks voluntarily in the first place, and that the large collective soldiers graves increased the numbers of those who answered the call and left for the front. The Civil Guard organisation arranged the burials of war heroes. The clergy contributed by officiating the religious service and by clearly aligning themselves with the Whites in their eulogies. The teachings of the Lutheran Church suggest that they found the Whites to be the temporal authority instituted by God, and therefore authorised raising the sword against the Reds. Speaking at the funerals with great pomp and sentimental power, the leaders of the Civil Guard and the exponents of the learned classes instigated their audiences against the Reds. The funeral speeches idealised the war hero s death by recalling military history since the times of ancient Greece. Being of the emblematic colour of the Whites, the white coffin assumed a particular importance connected to ideas of biblical purity and innocence. By the end of May 1918, almost 3,300 Whites were buried in the soldiers graves prepared by the burial organisation in some 400 localities. Only about 200 men remained missing in action or unidentified. The largest common graves accommodated over 60 fallen combatants. Thus, the traditions of the 1918 Civil War directly influenced war hero burial practices, which continued into the Finnish Winter War of 1939.

Adaptation in a Business Network Cooperation Context (summary section only)

In today’s business one can say that competition does not take place inside the network, but between networks. Change and dynamics are central issues in network studies, and a company, due its changing environment, can identify opportunities and threats and respond to them accordingly. These opportunities are vital, but also complex and demanding for the management. Earlier research has identified a shortcoming in explanations of how the micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns are connected. The IMP-group has been trying to fill this research gap with research on interactions within business networks. In this area of research lies the focus of research on relationships between organizations. Adaptation in cooperation is a central concept within business network research. Adaptation has been dealt with in previous literature, but the focus of the studies has mainly been outside this phenomenon, and it has mostly had a supporting role. Most literature has also described the buyers' point of view in studied supply networks, whereas much less attention has been paid to the suppliers' view on them. This study focuses on this research gap. The results of the study stress that adaptation should be included to a greater extent in the strategy work of companies. The adaptations should be carefully planned and, as far as possible, made consciously. Conscious, well-planned adaptations can be seen as investments into present and future relationships, and resources should be invested into something that does not increase the company’s dependence, but divides the power in the relationship between the companies. Adaptations should be planned so that they result in a more offensive way of responding to the demands that are placed upon the companies. In this way, the actions can be viewed and analyzed in accordance with whether the actions make the company weaker or stronger.