Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Interventions : A Pragmatic Examination of Humanitarian Intervention with Special Reference to Kosovo

Kansainvälisen oikeuden alaan kuuluvassa tutkielmassa käsitellään humanitaarisen intervention oikeutusta ja laillisuutta. Tutkimuskysymyksenä on, missä määrin humanitaarisilla näkökohdilla perusteltuja sotilaallisia toimia tai niillä uhkaamista voi pitää kansainvälisoikeudellisesti hyväksyttävänä ja millainen painoarvo ennakkotapauksena olisi annettava NATO-maiden Kosovossa toteuttamalle väliintulolle. Tutkielmassa perehdytään ihmisoikeusajattelun tiettyjen taustaoletusten kritiikkiin. Tarkastelun kohteena ovat erityisesti kannanotot, joiden mukaan ihmisoikeuksia ei voi pitää luonteeltaan universaaleina, sekä kyseiseen kritiikkiin liittyvät väitteet siitä, että ns. hegemonisessa asemassa olevat valtiot hyödyntävät ihmisoikeusargumentteja oikeuttaakseen voimankäyttönsä. Universaalisuuskritiikkiä voidaan pitää pitkälti perusteltuna, mutta nykyinen kansainvälinen yhteisö tarvitsee kuitenkin tietynlaisia yleismaailmallisia normeja voidakseen toimia tehokkaasti. Kritiikin ei voikaan katsoa pätevän humanitaarisen intervention kannalta keskeisiin ihmisoikeusnormeihin kuten kansanmurhan kieltoon, sillä kyseiset velvoitteet suojaavat kansainvälisen yhteisön toimivuutta ja uskottavuutta. Humanitaarisiin argumentteihin liittyy kuitenkin muita ongelmia: niillä on esimerkiksi aika ajoin pyritty oikeuttamaan sotilaallisia toimia, joissa ihmisoikeusnäkökohdat eivät välttämättä ole olleet etusijalla. Ihmisoikeuksille ei ole syytä antaa kansainvälisessä oikeudessa asemaa universaaleina "superargumentteina", jotka eivät olisi kyseenalaistettavissa. YK:n peruskirjan ja kansainvälisen tapaoikeuden näkökulmasta humanitaarisen intervention kaltaiseen voimankäyttöön vaaditaan turvallisuusneuvoston hyväksyntä, jota ei Kosovo-operaatioon saatu. Interventiota voi tässä suhteessa pitää yksiselitteisesti laittomana, sillä sen tueksi esitetyt oikeudelliset argumentit eivät ole vakuuttavia. Tapaukseen liittyvät ihmisoikeusnäkökohdat ovat kuitenkin siinä määrin merkittäviä, että ongelmaan ei ole perusteltua suhtautua tiukan legalistisesti. Operaation hyväksyminen moraaliargumenttien nojalla voisi kuitenkin johtaa nykyisten voimankäyttörajoitusten marginalisoitumiseen, mikä olisi yllä käsitellyn kritiikin valossa ongelmallista. Tutkielmassa nostetaan suositeltavaksi ratkaisuksi lähestymistapa, jossa Kosovon tapaus ymmärretään yksittäisenä oikeudenvastaisena mutta samalla oikeudenulkoisena poikkeustapauksena. Tällöin peruskirjan mukainen voimankäytön sääntely säilyy entisellään ilman että humanitaariset näkökohdat jäisivät tyystin huomiotta. Ratkaisu ei sulje pois mahdollisuutta suhtautua positiivisesti Kosovo-operaation mahdollisesti luomaan "poliittiseen normiin": suuren mittakaavan ihmisoikeusloukkaukset eivät jää Euroopassa seurauksitta. Ilman turvallisuusneuvoston suostumusta toteutettaviin humanitaarisiin interventioihin liittyvien käytännöllisten ja kansainvälisoikeudellisten riskien vuoksi niihin on kuitenkin aihetta suhtautua suurella varauksella.

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" : Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era

National identity signifies and makes state s defence- and foreign policy behaviour meaningful. National consciousness is narrated into existence by narratives upon one s own exceptionalism and Otherness of the other nations. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation, defence identity refers to the borders of Otherness and issues that have been considered as worth defending for. As national identities and all the world order models are human constructions, they may be changed by the human efforts as well; states and nations may deliberately promote communitarian or even cosmopolitan equality and tolerance without borders of Otherness. The main research question of the thesis is: How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era? The main empirical argument of the thesis is: Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the infidel EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland s foreign and defence policy orientation is instinctively Atlanticist by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically sandwiched between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a constructive European , as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a betrayal by Europe narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly common European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.

Pahaa hyvän puolesta? Venäjän Georgian- ja Naton Kosovon-interventioiden oikeutusperusteet presidenttien puheissa

Naton Kosovon-interventiolla vuonna 1999 ja Venäjän Georgian-interventiolla vuonna 2008 ei äkkiseltään katsottuna ole juurikaan yhteistä. Molemmissa tapauksissa kuitenkin suurempi valtio tai organisaatio toteutti sotilaallisen intervention suvereenin valtion fyysiselle alueelle ilman legitiimin kansainvälisen auktoriteetin, Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien turvallisuusneuvoston, siunausta. Molemmissa tapauksissa intervention kohteena oli monikulttuurinen, monien sosiaalisten, taloudellisten ja poliittisten jakolinjojen maa ja alue, jossa vähemmistöjen asema oli voimakkaan debatin aiheena. Tämän ”Pahaa hyvän puolesta?” -tutkielman tavoitteena on Yhdysvaltain ja Venäjän presidenttien puheissaan esittämien interventioiden oikeusperusteiden sekä niiden samankaltaisuuksien ja erojen määritteleminen. Tutkimuksen aineiston muodostavat presidentti Clintonin maalis-huhtikuussa 1999 ja presidentti Medvedevin elokuussa 2008 pitämät puheet, joissa he pyrkivät oikeuttamaan johtamaansa interventiota. Keskustelu Kosovon ja Georgian tapausten yhteneväisyyksistä heräsi syksyllä 2008: esimerkiksi pääministeri Vladimir Putin käytti Kosovon itsenäistymistä Georgian separatistialueiden itsenäistymisen esikuvana ja suomalaisten Venäjän-tutkijoiden piirissä interventioiden yhtäläisyyksiä pohdittiin jo pian Georgian tapahtumien alettua elokuussa 2008. Tähän keskusteluun haluan tällä tutkimuksella osallistua. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen tausta muodostuu valtiota, suvereniteettia, interventiota, sotaa, uhkaa ja identiteettiä käsittelevistä teorioista, Chaïm Perelmanin retoriikan teoriasta sekä aiemmasta Venäjän ja Yhdysvaltain ulkopolitiikkaa ja Georgiaa ja Kosovoa käsittelevästä tutkimuksesta. Aineiston analyysi osoittaa, että presidenttien esittämissä oikeusperusteissa oli sekä samankaltaisuuksia että eroavaisuuksia. Medvedevin esittelemät oikeutusperusteet voidaan jakaa neljään eri ryhmään, joita ovat kansainvälisen lainsäädännön rikkominen, humanitaariset syyt ja omien kansalaisten suojelu, rauhanturvaamisen ja historiallisen tehtävän täyttäminen sekä interventio rangaistuksena. Clintonin esittämät oikeutusperusteet jaan tässä tutkimuksessa viiteen ryhmään: interventio suuremman katastrofin estämiskeinona, humanitaarisen katastrofin, etnisen väkivallan ja julmuuden lopettamiskeinona, Yhdysvallat rauhantekijänä, vapaan, rauhallisen ja vakaan Euroopan puolesta sekä interventio moraalisena valintana ja vastauksena kansainvälisten sopimusten rikkomiselle. Puheissa esiintyy voimakkaita tunteisiin vetoavia ilmaisuja ja niissä on havaittavissa ajallinen evoluutio, ilmaisujen vähittäinen muuttuminen ajan kuluessa. Aineisto keskittyy erityisesti intervention alkuvaiheeseen, jolloin legitimiteetin vahvistaminen oli erityisen tärkeää. Molemmissa presidenttien puheissa uhka ja toiseus määritellään selkeästi. Oma toiminta esitetään korostetun positiivisessa valossa, viattomien pelastajana ja lain, oikeudenmukaisuuden ja turvallisuuden puolustajana. Puheet on suunnattu tarjoamaan jotain jokaiselle yleisölle. Poliittisina, virallisina dokumentteina niiden tehtävänä on vallankäyttö ja yleisöjen asenteisiin ja mielipiteisiin vaikuttaminen myös arvoihin vetoamalla. Puheet ovat viimeisteltyjä poliittisen teatterin näytöksiä. Näiden näytösten rooleja näyttelevät niin suuri valtio, pieni valtio, kansainvälinen yhteisö ja viattomien ihmisten kohtalokin.

Bridging East and West : The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964-1972.

The dissertation examines the foreign policies of the United States through the prism of science and technology. In the focal point of scrutiny is the policy establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the development of the multilateral part of bridge building in American foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. After a long and arduous negotiation process, the institute was finally established by twelve national member organizations from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Soviet Union and United States; a few years later Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands also joined. It is said that the goal of the institute was to bring together researchers from East and West to solve pertinent problems caused by the modernization process experienced in industrialized world. It originates from President Lyndon B. Johnson s bridge building policies that were launched in 1964, and was set in a well-contested and crowded domain of other international organizations of environmental and social planning. Since the distinct need for yet another organization was not evident, the process of negotiations in this multinational environment enlightens the foreign policy ambitions of the United States on the road to the Cold War détente. The study places this project within its political era, and juxtaposes it with other international organizations, especially that of the OECD, ECE and NATO. Conventionally, Lyndon Johnson s bridge building policies have been seen as a means to normalize its international relations bilaterally with different East European countries, and the multilateral dimension of the policy has been ignored. This is why IIASA s establishment process in this multilateral environment brings forth new information on US foreign policy goals, the means to achieve these goals, as well as its relations to other advanced industrialized societies before the time of détente, during the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the substance of the institute applied systems analysis illuminates the differences between European and American methodological thinking in social planning. Systems analysis is closely associated with (American) science and technology policies of the 1960s, especially in its military administrative applications, thus analysis within the foreign policy environment of the United States proved particularly fruitful. In the 1960s the institutional structures of European continent with faltering, and the growing tendencies of integration were in flux. One example of this was the long, drawn-out process of British membership in the EEC, another is de Gaulle s withdrawal from NATO s military-political cooperation. On the other hand, however, economic cooperation in Europe between East and West, and especially with the Soviet Union was expanding rapidly. This American initiative to form a new institutional actor has to be seen in that structural context, showing that bridge building was needed not only to the East, but also to the West. The narrative amounts to an analysis of how the United States managed both cooperation and conflict in its hegemonic aspirations in the emerging modern world, and how it used its special relationship with the United Kingdom to achieve its goals. The research is based on the archives of the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and IIASA. The primary sources have been complemented with both contemporary and present day research literature, periodicals, and interviews.

Reacting to Complex Threats – the Securitization in the Speeches of Anders Fogh Rasmussen based on NATO´s New Strategic Concept

The purpose of this master´s thesis is to analyze how NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is trying to justify the existence of the military alliance through the use of security arguments. I am puzzled by the question: why does NATO still exist – what is NATO’s raison d'être. The New Strategic Concept (2010) forms the base for his argumentation. This thesis focuses on the security argumentation of NATO which is examined by analyzing the speeches the Secretary General. The theoretical framework of this study is based on constructivist approach to international security examining the linguistic process of securitization. Issues become securitized after Anders Fogh Rasmussen names them as threats. This thesis focuses on the securitization process relating to NATO and analyses what issues Rasmussen raises to the security agenda. Research data consists of the speeches by Anders Fogh Rasmussen. They are analyzed through J.L. Austin’s speech act taxonomy and Chaïm Perelman’s argumentation theories. The thesis will concentrate on the formulation and articulation of these threats which are considered and coined as “new threats” in contemporary international relations. I am conducting this research through the use of securitization theory. This study illustrates that the threats are constructed by NATO’s member-states in unison, but the resolutions are sounded through Rasmussen’s official speeches and transcripts. . Based on the analysis it can be concluded that Rasmussen is giving reasons for the existence of NATO. This takes place by making use of speech acts and different rhetorical techniques. The results of the analysis indicate that NATO remains an essential organization for the West and the rest of the world according to the Secretary General.