Beyond Words : The European Court of Justice and Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law

This study addresses the issue of multilingualism in EU law. More specifically, it explores the implications of multilingualism for conceptualising legal certainty, a central principle of law both in domestic and EU legal systems. The main question addressed is how multilingualism and legal certainty may be reconciled in the EU legal system. The study begins with a discussion on the role of translation in drafting EU legislation and its implications for interpreting EU law at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Uncertainty regarding the meaning of multilingual EU law and the interrelationship between multilingualism and ECJ methods of interpretation are explored. This analysis leads to questioning the importance of linguistic-semantic methods of interpretation, especially the role of comparing language versions for clarifying meaning and the ordinary meaning thesis, and to placing emphasis on other, especially the teleological, purpose-oriented method of interpretation. As regards the principle of legal certainty, the starting-point is a two-dimensional concept consisting of both formal and substantive elements; of predictability and acceptability. Formal legal certainty implies that laws and adjudication, in particular, must be predictable. Substantive legal certainty is related to rational acceptability of judicial decision-making placing emphasis on its acceptability to the legal community in question. Contrary to predictability that one might intuitively relate to linguistic-semantic methods of interpretation, the study suggests a new conception of legal certainty where purpose, telos, and other dynamic methods of interpretation are of particular significance for meaning construction in multilingual EU law. Accordingly, the importance of purposive, teleological interpretation as the standard doctrine of interpretation in a multilingual legal system is highlighted. The focus on rational, substantive acceptability results in emphasising discourse among legal actors among the EU legal community and stressing the need to give reasons in favour of proposed meaning in accordance with dynamic methods of interpretation including considerations related to purposes, aims, objectives and consequences. In this context, the role of ideal discourse situations and communicative action taking the form of interaction among the EU legal community in an ongoing dialogue especially in the preliminary ruling procedure is brought into focus. In order for this dialogue to function, it requires that the ECJ gives persuasive, convincing and acceptable reasons in justifying its decisions. This necessitates transparency, sincerity, and dialogue with the relevant audience.

En förutbestämd sanning : Barnamord och delaktighet i 1700-talets Finland belysta genom kön, kropp och social kontroll

The study analyses the prevention or endorsing of the crime of infanticide in Finland 1702 1807, rather than the result. Also the impacts of the female body, biology of childbirth and experiences of pregnancy are examined, together with insights from modern medical research. Circumstances are reconstructed by a critical reading of judicial records on all levels of the judicial system. In all 269 cases of infanticide and 142 accessory crimes within the jurisdiction of the Turku court of appeal are studied, with particular focus on exceptionally well recorded cases of 83 accused women and 41 women and men accused of being party to the crime. Secondary sources are medical and jurisprudential writings, the public debate on infanticide, broadsheets and letters asking the King for pardon. Infanticide was considered murder by law. Unmarried women were predetermined as the main culprits. Nevertheless, deliberate infanticides were rare and committed mostly in accomplice. The majority of the infanticides studied were cases where inexperienced and unmarried women accidentally had given birth alone and usually to a dead child. Unaware that the pain they were experiencing was in fact a labour, the accused women instinctively sought solitude to push out the child. Some misunderstood the birth as an urgent need to defecate. The unexpected delivery ended in hiding the baby without remorse. This crime was promoted by several factors in Finnish rural culture, amongst others that also married women hid their pregnancy. The immediate household members did not necessarily know about the childbirth and failed to help the woman. This typical pattern in most cases of infanticide in 18th century Finland is also recorded in modern cases of unknown pregnancies. Fear of accountability prevented witnesses testifying to the actual course of events. The truth remained elusive. With only a few exceptions, the women were sentenced to death or imprisonment. The majority of those accused of accomplice were acquitted. However, too harsh sentences for accidents affected the reporting of the crime. Criminal politics failed to curtail infanticide as the crime was unsatisfactorily addressed by law, society and the judicial system.

From Francovich to Köbler and beyond : The evolution of a State liability regime for the EC

The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of the Francovich doctrine within the European legal order. The first part deals with the gradual development of the ECJ's case law on State liability in damages for breach of EC law. Starting from the seminal Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur, the clarification of the criteria set by the Court is attempted with reference to subsequent case law, whereas issues concerning the extent and form of the compensation owned are also mentioned. The second part concerns one of the more recent developments in the field, namely State liability for breaches of Community law attributed to national judiciary. The Court's ruling in Köbler is examined in connection with two other recent judgments, namely Commission v. Italy of 2003 and Kühne & Heitz, as an attempt of the ECJ to reframe its relationships with national supreme courts and appropriate for itself the position of the Supreme Court in the European legal order. The implications on State liability claims by the ruling in Commission v. France of 1997 constitute the theme of the third part, where it is submitted that Member States can also be held liable for disregard of Community law by private individuals within their respected territories. To this extent, Schmidberger is viewed as a manifestation of this opinion, with fundamental rights acquiring a new dimension, being invoked by the States, contra the individuals as a shield to liability claims. Finally, the third part examines the relationship between the Francovich doctrine and the principle of legal certainty and concludes that the solutions employed by the ECJ have been both predictable and acceptable by the national legal orders. Keywords: State liability, damages, Francovich, Köbler, Schmidberger

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.

Patents, Ethics and Stem Cell Research : The Case of hESC Innovation in Australia, Europe and the United States

Embryonic stem cells offer potentially a ground-breaking insight into health and diseases and are said to offer hope in discovering cures for many ailments unimaginable few years ago. Human embryonic stem cells are undifferentiated, immature cells that possess an amazing ability to develop into almost any body cell such as heart muscle, bone, nerve and blood cells and possibly even organs in due course. This remarkable feature, enabling embryonic stem cells to proliferate indefinitely in vitro (in a test tube), has branded them as a so-called miracle cure . Their potential use in clinical applications provides hope to many sufferers of debilitating and fatal medical conditions. However, the emergence of stem cell research has resulted in intense debates about its promises and dangers. On the one hand, advocates hail its potential, ranging from alleviating and even curing fatal and debilitating diseases such as Parkinson s, diabetes, heart ailments and so forth. On the other hand, opponents decry its dangers, drawing attention to the inherent risks of human embryo destruction, cloning for research purposes and reproductive cloning eventually. Lately, however, the policy battles surrounding human embryonic stem cell innovation have shifted from being a controversial research to scuffles within intellectual property rights. In fact, the ability to obtain patents represents a pivotal factor in the economic success or failure of this new biotechnology. Although, stem cell patents tend to more or less satisfy the standard patentability requirements, they also raise serious ethical and moral questions about the meaning of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in European and to an extent American and Australian patent laws. At present there is a sort of a calamity over human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and to an extent in Australia and the United States. This in turn has created a sense of urgency to engage all relevant parties in the discourse on how best to approach patenting of this new form of scientific innovation. In essence, this should become a highly favoured patenting priority. To the contrary, stem cell innovation and its reliance on patent protection risk turmoil, uncertainty, confusion and even a halt on not only stem cell research but also further emerging biotechnology research and development. The patent system is premised upon the fundamental principle of balance which ought to ensure that the temporary monopoly awarded to the inventor equals that of the social benefit provided by the disclosure of the invention. Ensuring and maintaining this balance within the patent system when patenting human embryonic stem cells is of crucial contemporary relevance. Yet, the patenting of human embryonic stem cells raises some fundamental moral, social and legal questions. Overall, the present approach of patenting human embryonic stem cell related inventions is unsatisfactory and ineffective. This draws attention to a specific question which provides for a conceptual framework for this work. That question is the following: how can the investigated patent offices successfully deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells? This in turn points at the thorny issue of application of the morality clause in this field. In particular, the interpretation of the exclusions on ethical or moral grounds as found in Australian, American and European legislative and judicial precedents. The Thesis seeks to compare laws and legal practices surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australia and the United States with that of Europe. By using Europe as the primary case study for lessons and guidance, the central goal of the Thesis then becomes the determination of the type of solutions available to Europe with prospects to apply such to Australia and the United States. The Dissertation purports to define the ethical implications that arise with patenting human embryonic stem cells and intends to offer resolutions to the key ethical dilemmas surrounding patentability of human embryonic stem cells and other morally controversial biotechnology inventions. In particular, the Thesis goal is to propose a functional framework that may be used as a benchmark for an informed discussion on the solution to resolving ethical and legal tensions that come with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in Australian, American and European patent worlds. Key research questions that arise from these objectives and which continuously thread throughout the monograph are: 1. How do common law countries such as Australia and the United States approach and deal with patentability of human embryonic stem cells in their jurisdictions? These practices are then compared to the situation in Europe as represented by the United Kingdom (first two chapters), the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Patent Office decisions (Chapter 3 onwards) in order to obtain a full picture of the present patenting procedures on the European soil. 2. How are ethical and moral considerations taken into account at patent offices investigated when assessing patentability of human embryonic stem cell related inventions? In order to assess this part, the Thesis evaluates how ethical issues that arise with patent applications are dealt with by: a) Legislative history of the modern patent system from its inception in 15th Century England to present day patent laws. b) Australian, American and European patent offices presently and in the past, including other relevant legal precedents on the subject matter. c) Normative ethical theories. d) The notion of human dignity used as the lowest common denominator for the interpretation of the European morality clause. 3. Given the existence of the morality clause in form of Article 6(1) of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions which corresponds to Article 53(a) European Patent Convention, a special emphasis is put on Europe as a guiding principle for Australia and the United States. Any room for improvement of the European morality clause and Europe s current manner of evaluating ethical tensions surrounding human embryonic stem cell inventions is examined. 4. A summary of options (as represented by Australia, the United States and Europe) available as a basis for the optimal examination procedure of human embryonic stem cell inventions is depicted, whereas the best of such alternatives is deduced in order to create a benchmark framework. This framework is then utilised on and promoted as a tool to assist Europe (as represented by the European Patent Office) in examining human embryonic stem cell patent applications. This method suggests a possibility of implementing an institution solution. 5. Ultimately, a question of whether such reformed European patent system can be used as a founding stone for a potential patent reform in Australia and the United States when examining human embryonic stem cells or other morally controversial inventions is surveyed. The author wishes to emphasise that the guiding thought while carrying out this work is to convey the significance of identifying, analysing and clarifying the ethical tensions surrounding patenting human embryonic stem cells and ultimately present a solution that adequately assesses patentability of human embryonic stem cell inventions and related biotechnologies. In answering the key questions above, the Thesis strives to contribute to the broader stem cell debate about how and to which extent ethical and social positions should be integrated into the patenting procedure in pluralistic and morally divided democracies of Europe and subsequently Australia and the United States.

New Governance and the EU Courts : The Experimentalist Architecture of Judicial Decision-Making

The dissertation examines the role of the EU courts in new governance. New governance has raised unprecedented interest in the EU in recent years. This is manifested in a plethora of instruments and actors at various levels that challenge more traditional forms of command-and-control regulation. New governance and political experimentation more generally is thought to sap the ability of the EU judiciary to monitor and review these experiments. The exclusion of the courts is then seen to add to the legitimacy problem of new governance. The starting point of this dissertation is the observation that the marginalised role of the courts is based on theoretical and empirical assumptions which invite scrutiny. The theoretical framework of the dissertation is deliberative democracy and democratic experimentalism. The analysis of deliberative democracy is sustained by an attempt to apply theoretical concepts to three distinctive examples of governance in the EU. These are the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the European Chemicals Agency, and the Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive. The case studies show numerous disincentives and barriers to judicial review. Among these are questions of the role of courts in shaping governance frameworks, the reviewability of science-based measures, the standing of individuals before the courts, and the justiciability of soft law. The dissertation analyses the conditions of judicial review in each governance environment and proposes improvements. From a more theoretical standpoint it could be said that each case study presents a governance regime which builds on legislation that lays out major (guide)lines but leaves details to be filled out at a later stage. Specification of detailed standards takes place through collaborative networks comprising members from national administrations, NGOs, and the Commission. Viewed this way, deliberative problem-solving is needed to bring people together to clarify, elaborate, and revise largely abstract and general norms in order to resolve concrete and specific problems and to make law applicable and enforceable. The dissertation draws attention to the potential of peer review included there and its profound consequences for judicial accountability structures. It is argued that without this kind of ongoing and dynamic peer review of accountability in governance frameworks, judicial review of new governance is difficult and in some cases impossible. This claim has implications for how we understand the concept of soft law, the role of the courts, participation rights, and the legitimacy of governance measures more generally. The experimentalist architecture of judicial decision-making relies upon a wide variety of actors to provide conditions for legitimate and efficient review.