”Totuuden ja oikeuden asia” : Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts ja Viron historian uudelleensynnyttäminen vuosina 1987–1991

Neuvosto-Viron yhteiskunnassa tapahtui 1980-luvun loppupuoliskolla muutoksia, jotka johtivat virolaisten suurempaan toimintavapauteen. Osana uuden kansalaisyhteiskunnan muotoutumista Viroon syntyi historialle omistautunut joukkoliike, joka järjestäytyi loppuvuodesta 1987 historiaseuraksi nimeltään Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts. Huomattava osa myöhemmän itsenäisen Viron poliittisesta eliitistä osallistui järjestön toimintaan. Seura oli luonteeltaan sekä poliittinen toimija että Viron historiaa tutkiva kansalaisjärjestö. Tutkielmani tarkastelee kumpaakin mainittua osa-aluetta historiaseuran toiminnassa. Tutkielmani tärkein alkuperäislähde on historiaseuran vuosina 1988 1991 julkaisema kerran kuukaudessa ilmestynyt aikakausilehti Muinsuskaitse Seltsi Sõnumid, jonka sivuilla käytyä keskustelua Viron historiasta, politiikasta ja Eesti Muinsuskaitse Seltsin toiminnasta tutkielmani pääosa tarkastelee. Aiempi historiantutkimus on ainoastaan sivunnut historiaseuran roolia Viron itsenäisyyden palauttamisessa. Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts oli kansallismielinen järjestö, jonka poliittiset vaatimukset perustuivat voimakkaasti Viron kansallisesta historiasta muodostettuihin tulkintoihin. Kansallismielisten tavoitteena oli alkuvuodesta 1989 lähtien organisoida vuosien 1918 1940 tasavallan kansalaisiin tukeutunut liikehdintä, jonka oli puolestaan tarkoitus palauttaa sotienvälisen tasavallan itsenäisyys. Kansalaisliikehdintä muodosti vuoden 1990 alussa Viron kongressin, jonka syntyyn historiaseura vaikutti keskeisellä tavalla. Tutkielmani päätavoite on tarkastella historiaseuran ja sen ympärillä toimineen historialiikehdinnän tekemiä tulkintoja Viron historiasta. Vuosien 1987 1991 aikana historiaseura käynnisti Virossa ilmiön, jota kutsun historian uudelleensynnyttämiseksi. Neuvostohistorian käsitykset korvattiin kansallisromanttisella tavalla tulkita maan historiaa, joka tuki kansallismielisten poliittisia tavoitteita. Historiaseura toteutti osin tietoista historiapolitiikkaa. Ilmiötä on perusteltua kutsua uudelleensynnyttämiseksi, koska mahdollisimman laajasti noudatettiin vuosien 1918 1940 tasavallan perinteitä. Keskeisimmän osan neuvostoaikana kiellettyjen tulkintojen tuomisessa takaisin julkiseen käyttöön muodosti Viron vapaussodan (1918 1920) muiston elvyttäminen. Tärkein historiakulttuuriin liittynyt toimintamuoto oli tuhottujen muistomerkkien uudelleenrakentaminen. Historiaseuran huomio kohdistui myös presidentti Konstantin Pätsin (1874 1956) kunnianpalautukseen. Päts nostettiin kansallissankarin asemaan, vaikka hänen muistoaan varjosti vuosien 1939 1940 itsenäisyyden menetyksen aiheuttama kansallinen trauma. Viron kansallinen historia esitettiin tavalla, joka legitimoi itsenäisyyden palauttamista sekä korosti jatkuvuutta, vapaustaistelua ja itsenäisyyden välttämättömyyttä osana Viron historian kehitystä. Neuvosto-Viron ja Neuvostoliiton historian tarkastelussa korostettiin tapahtumia, joiden julkinen käsittely ei ollut aikaisempina vuosikymmeninä ollut mahdollista. Keskeiselle sijalle nostettiin monimuotoiseksi koettu punainen terrori sekä Molotovin Ribbentropin sopimus. Vuosina 1988 1991 käsitys Viron miehityksestä vahvistui. Kansallismieliset vähensivät rikolliseksi ja laittomaksi kokemansa neuvostovallan legitimiteettiä korostamalla neuvostojärjestelmän vihamieliseksi kuvattua luonnetta virolaisia kohtaan. Keskeisin päätelmäni on, että Eesti Muinsuskaitse Seltsin ja historialiikehdinnän suorittama historian uudelleensynnyttäminen mahdollisti Viron tasavallan itsenäisyyden palauttamisen vuonna 1991 siinä muodossa kuin se toteutettiin.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.