The Phraseology and Structure of Latin Building Inscriptions in Roman North Africa

This study analyses the diction of Latin building inscriptions. Despite its importance, this topic has rarely been discussed before: the most substantial contribution on the subject is a short dissertation by Klaus Gast (1965) that focuses on 100 inscriptions dating mostly from the Republican period. Marietta Horster (2001) also touched upon this theme in her thesis on imperial building inscriptions. I have collected my source material in North Africa because more Latin building inscriptions dating from the Imperial period have survived there than in any other area of the Roman Empire. By means of a thorough and independent survey, I have assembled all relevant African Latin building inscriptions datable to the Roman period (between 146 BC and AD 425), 1002 texts, into a corpus. These inscriptions are all fully edited in Appendix 1; Appendix 2 contains references to earlier editions. To facilitate search operations, both are also available in electronic form. They are downloadable from the address http://www.helsinki.fi/hum/kla/htm/jatkoopinnot.htm. Chapter one is an introduction dealing with the nature of building inscriptions as source material. Chapter two offers a statistical overview of the material. The following main section of the work falls into five chapters, each of which analyses one main part of a building inscription. An average building inscription can be divided into five parts: the starting phrase opens the inscription (a dedication to gods, for example), the subject part identifies the builder, the object part describes the constructed or repaired building, the predicate part records the building activity and the supplement part offers additional information on the project (it can specify the funding, for instance). These chapters are systematic and chronological and their purpose is to register and interpret the phrases used, to analyse reasons for their use and for their popularity among the different groups of builders. Chapter eight, which follows the main section of the work, creates a typology of building inscriptions based on their structure. It also presents the most frequently attested types of building inscriptions. The conclusion describes, on a general level, how the diction of building inscriptions developed during the period of study and how this striking development resulted from socio-economic changes that took place in Romano-African society during Antiquity. This study shows that the phraseology of building inscriptions had a clear correlation both with the type of builder and with the date of carving. Private builders tended to accentuate their participation (especially its financial side) in the project; honouring the emperor received more emphasis in the building inscriptions set up by communities; the texts produced by the army were concise. The chronological development is so clear that it enables stylistic dating. At the beginning of the imperial period the phrases were clear, concrete, formal and stereotyped but by Late Antiquity they have become vague, subjective, flexible, varied and even rhetorically or poetically coloured.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Jäteveden suoimeyttämöiden toiminnasta eri vuodenaikoina ja sen tehostamisesta

English summary: On the efficiency of peat infiltration of sewage during various seasons and on its improvement