Pragmatismi poliittisena filosofiana. Yksilö ja yhteisö John Deweyn ajttelussa

John Dewey (1859-1952) oli yhdysvaltalainen filosofi, pedagogi ja julkinen keskustelija, jonka ajattelu on merkittävästi vaikuttanut pragmatismina tunnetun filosofisen suuntauksen kehittymiseen. Tässä Pro gradu -tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Devveyn poliittista filosofiaa ja ajattelua. Tarkoituksena on selvitellä, millaista on Devveyn poliittinen filosofia ja voiko hänen pragmatistinen poliittinen filosofiansa tarjota jotain mielenkiintoista myös tämän päivän poliittisen filosofian kentälle. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Devveyn esittämää kritiikkiä klassista liberalismia ja individualismia kohtaan, Devveyn omaa poliittisen filosofian projektia sekä sen kohtaama kritiikkiä ja arvioidaan Devveyn poliittista filosofiaa yleisesti. Tarkastelun kohteena ovat muun muassa Devveyn käsitykset yksilöstä, valtiosta, demokratiasta, vallasta ja tiedosta. Ensisijaisena lähteenä tutkielmassa on Devveyn koottujen teosten sarja vuosilta 1882-1953, ennen kaikkea 1920-30-lukujen tuotanto. Lisäksi lähteenä on useita tuoreita artikkeleita sekä kommentaareja. Keskeisin löytö tutkielmassa on, että Devveyn poliittisen filosofian oleellinen piirre on "anti-essentialismi", eli huomion siirtäminen pois jostain oletetuista yksilöiden ja ryhmien olemuksista tai sisäisestä luonnosta niiden välisiin suhteisiin ja näiden ilmauksiin. Tähän liittyen Devveyn poliittisen filosofian keskeiseksi lähtökohdaksi osoittautuu perinteisen yksilö-yhteisö jaottelun kyseenalaistaminen. Tutkielma tarjoaa laajan katsauksen Devveyn poliittiseen ajatteluun sekä pragmatistiseen poliittiseen filosofiaan.

Space in Musical Semiosis : An Abductive Theory of the Musical Composition Process

Space in musical semiosis is a study of musical meaning, spatiality and composition. Earlier studies on musical composition have not adequately treated the problems of musical signification. Here, composition is considered an epitomic process of musical signification. Hence the core problems of composition theory are core problems of musical semiotics. The study employs a framework of naturalist pragmatism, based on C. S. Peirce’s philosophy. It operates on concepts such as subject, experience, mind and inquiry, and incorporates relevant ideas of Aristotle, Peirce and John Dewey into a synthetic view of esthetic, practic, and semiotic for the benefit of grasping musical signification process as a case of semiosis in general. Based on expert accounts, music is depicted as real, communicative, representational, useful, embodied and non-arbitrary. These describe how music and the musical composition process are mental processes. Peirce’s theories are combined with current morphological theories of cognition into a view of mind, in which space is central. This requires an analysis of space, and the acceptance of a relativist understanding of spatiality. This approach to signification suggests that mental processes are spatially embodied, by virtue of hard facts of the world, literal representations of objects, as well as primary and complex metaphors each sharing identities of spatial structures. Consequently, music and the musical composition process are spatially embodied. Composing music appears as a process of constructing metaphors—as a praxis of shaping and reshaping features of sound, representable from simple quality dimensions to complex domains. In principle, any conceptual space, metaphorical or literal, may set off and steer elaboration, depending on the practical bearings on the habits of feeling, thinking and action, induced in musical communication. In this sense, it is evident that music helps us to reorganize our habits of feeling, thinking, and action. These habits, in turn, constitute our existence. The combination of Peirce and morphological approaches to cognition serves well for understanding musical and general signification. It appears both possible and worthwhile to address a variety of issues central to musicological inquiry in the framework of naturalist pragmatism. The study may also contribute to the development of Peircean semiotics.

Learning from Venice : What a unique city can teach about the aesthetic

Learning from Venice is a philosophical learning diary on what a highly original city can teach urban aesthetics. Throughout history, classical cities have been interpreted and experienced in various ways. But aesthetics has never been accentuated as much as today. Venice has been an important center of commerce, a naval power, and it has had a lot of influence in arts and culture. But in our days it is a tourist trap and a cluster of so called world heritage. The development of tourism is the main reason for the fact that many old cities have become venues for leisure and entertainment, sometimes so that everyday life itself has been pushed to the margins. There is a lot one can learn by studying the history of the aesthetic appreciation of a city. Sometimes the way a city has been enjoyed has changed following the development of traffic. In Venice water buses have replaced the slow and silent gondolas, and since the building of the railway tourists have been approaching the city from a new direction, so that her façade which was built for seafarers has almost become forgotten. There are also themes of change and mobility which are peculiarly Venetian. What is the nature of a city where there are more tourists than inhabitants? And how does one experience a city where water dominates? These questions, and many more, are discussed in Learning from Venice, and side by side with applied aesthetics, the work of philosophers like Walter Benjamin, Gianni Vattimo, and John Dewey, among many others, enter a dialogue with this extraordinary city. Themes discussed include also e.g. walking, surface and depth, Venice as kitsch, and Venice as a museum.

From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.

Esteettinen kokemus kulttuurisiltana : Soile Yli-Mäyryn taide kiinalaisen, japanilaisen ja suomalaisen yleisön kokemana

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS A BRIDGE ACROSS CULTURES Soile Yli-Mäyry s art as experienced by Chinese, Japanese and Finnish audiences This study focuses on surveying and analysing experiences of Soile Yli-Mäyry s art in eleven different countries. Questionnaires were translated into nine different languages. In addition, interviews were conducted on the experiences of Chinese, Japanese and Finnish art audiences concerning a painting called Sun Wind . The study was mainly inspired by John Dewey s ideas of art as an interactive communication where the artist, the piece and those who experience it make up an interactive process. In this process experience is a meeting point with both individual and communal characteristics. The data was collected in conjunction with exhibitions in 1997−2005. The survey was carried out in eleven countries (Finland, United States, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Japan, India, Israel, Argentina, Germany and Switzerland). The survey data was made up of 2,563 returned questionnaires. The interviews in China, Japan and Finland were about the same painting Sun Wind , which was transported from Finland to Japan (Tokyo) and China. A total of 89 people were interviewed in Shanghai Art Museum, 30 people in Port-Ginza Gallery, Tokyo and 45 people in Soile Yli-Mäyry s Gallery in Finland. Three hypotheses that were turned into research questions directed the study: 1. Are there differences/ similarities between culturally different communities in the meanings attributed to experiences, e.g. according to emotional dimensions, or do experiences focus more on reflecting on one s own life or meanings attributed to the world around us? What kinds of experiential dimensions are there in different countries? Do similar, analogous experiences that transcend cultural barriers emerge in culturally different countries such as China, Japan and Finland? 2. Does the data display different types of experiencing subjects which are typical to a subject s own country or are they experiences that can be compared to those generated by an ideal landscape , where the art touches the subconscious and collective selfhood, being thus transnational and timeless? Closer analysis focuses on audience experiences in China, Japan and Finland (interviews, textual survey data). 3. Are the experiences and interpretations of experts similar/different to those of larger audiences? The survey data has been analysed with the help of cross-tabulation. After content analysis of the interviews and textual survey data, different ways of experiencing subjects were sketched by country (China, Japan, Finland). The types were both similar and dissimilar. The most important types were social/ecological (China), therapeutic/reserved (Japan) and narrative/projecting (Finland). There were differences in how experiences were emphasised: the Chinese public approached their experiences from the viewpoint of pragmatism and utility, where they could obtain new ideas for their own work or experiencing the exhibition gave courage to approach their own lives from a new perspective. In turn, the Japanese public experienced the art from a therapeutic angle and from a very reserved perspective, which Dylan Evans (2001, 13−17) has described as typical to Japanese culture. The experiences of the Finnish audience were strongly therapeutic and narrative. The people projected their emotions onto the piece and in a concrete manner forged them into a story. The partly similar results of this study in China, Japan and Finland demonstrate that the art displayed in the exhibitions contain images of the beginning or elements connected to the beginning of life, which touch the subconscious in the way an ideal landscape would. Experiencing the meaningfulness of one s own life through art is a common thread and a bridge across cultures that unites the experiences of the audiences of this study, be they Taoists, Confucians, Buddhists or Maoists in China, Shinto followers, Zen Buddhists in Japan or Evangelist-Lutherans in Finland. Keywords: experience, reception, bridge across cultures, types of experiencing subjects, experiential process, ideal landscape, elementality

Konstruktiivisen linjakkuuden perusteita etsimässä : Systemaattinen analyysi John Biggsin esittämistä yliopisto-opetuksen lähtökohdista

The aim of this study is to explore by systematic textual analysis the crucial conceptions of constructive alignment and to reconstruct the concept of constructive alignment and examine the relation between conceptual relationships in John Biggs’s texts. In this study, I have also analyzed the presuppositions of the concept of constructive alignment and its possible implications. The research material includes Biggs’s (1996b; 2003) article entitled Enhancing Teaching through Constructive Alignment and book entitled Teaching for Quality Learning at University. The primary purpose of the systematic textual analysis is to reconstruct concepts and gain access to a new or more profound understanding of the concepts. The main purpose of the constructive alignment is to design a teaching system that supports and encourages students to adopt a deep approach learning. At the center of the constructive alignment are two concepts: constructivism in learning and alignment in teaching. A tension was detected between these concepts. Biggs assumes that students’ learning activities are primed by the teaching. Because of this it is not important what the teacher does. At the same time he emphasizes that teaching interacts with learning. The teacher’s task is to support student’s appropriate learning activities. On the basis of the analysis, I conclude these conceptions are not mutually exclusive. Interaction between teaching and learning has an effect on student’s learning activities. The most essential benefit of the model of constructive alignment is that Biggs brings together and considers teaching at the same level with learning. A weakness of Biggs’s model relates to the theoretical basis and positions of the concept of constructive alignment. There are some conflicts between conceptions of epistemology in Biggs’s texts. In addition, Biggs writes about constructivism also as conceptions of epistemology, but doesn’t consider implications of that position or what follows or doesn’t follow from that commitment. On the basis of the analysis, I suggest that constructivism refers in Biggs’s texts rather to constructivism in learning than philosophical constructivism. In light of this study, constructive alignment doesn´t lead to philosophical constructivism. That’s why constructive alignment stays out of idealism. Biggs’s way of thinking about teachers possibility to confronting students’ misconceptions and evaluate and assess students’ constructions support a realist purpose in terms of philosophical stance. Realism does not drift toward general problems of relativism, like lack of criteria for assessing or evaluate these constructions.

John Searlen teoria tietoisuudesta

Tutkielmassa esitellään ja arvioidaan John Searlen teoriaa tietoisuudesta. Tietoisuus (consciousness) on Searlen mukaan tärkein mielenfilosofinen käsite. Searle ei määrittele käsitettä tarkasti, vaan tyytyy esittämään sitä kuvaavia esimerkkejä ja analogioita. Tietoisuuden keskeisimmiksi ominaisuuksiksi Searlen teoriassa näyttävät muodostuvan intentionaalisuus (intentionality), subjektiivisuus (subjectivity) ja kausaalinen vaikutus käyttäytymiseen (mental causation). Näihin ominaisuuksiin liittyvät myös Searlen painavimmat tietoisuudesta esittämät argumentit. Argumenttien analysointi on tutkielman tärkein tavoite. Searlen yhteysperiaatteen (Connection Principle) mukaan intentionaalisia tiloja voi olla vain olennolla, jolla voi olla tietoisia intentionaalisia tiloja, ja jokainen alitajuinen intentionaalinen tila on ainakin potentiaalisesti tietoinen. Toisin sanoen intentionaalisuuden ja tietoisuuden välillä vallitsee välttämätön yhteys seuraavasti: on loogisesti välttämätöntä, että jokainen intentionaalinen tila voi ainakin periaattessa päästä tietoisuuteen.Tutkielmassa kuitenkin osoitetaan, että yhteysperiaateeseen on syytä suhtautua epäillen. Searlen yhteysperiaatteen puolesta esittämä argumentti näyttää nimittäin sisältävän dilemman. Jos erottelu intrinsiseen ja näennäiseen intentionaalisuuteen tulkitaan Searlen tavoin, syyllistytään sen olettamiseen, mikä pitäisi todistaa; jos taas erottelu tulkitaan toisin kuin Searle, argumentti ei tue yhteysperiaatetta. Searlen mukaan mentaaliset tilat ovat aina jonkun mentaalisia tiloja. Tästä väitteestä Searle pyrkii johtamaan toisen, paljon radikaalimman väitteen: mielen ilmiöt kuuluvat omaan ontologiseen kategoriaansa, subjektiivisten mentaalisten tilojen kategoriaan. Searlen käsitystä tukee Thomas Nagelin esittämä, hyvin samansisältöinen argumentti. Yksimielisyys ei kuitenkaan ole erehtymättömyyden tae, sillä Paul Churchlandin kritiikki näyttää pahasti horjuttavan Searlen subjektiivisuusargumentin uskottavuutta. Churchland väittää Searlen syyllistyvän intensionaaliseen virhepäätelmään. Yksittäisen henkilön episteemisen pääsyn rajoittuneisuudesta ei Churchlandin mukaan voida tehdä mitään ontologisia johtopäätöksiä, koska tiedetyksi tuleminen ei ole objektin aito ominaisuus. Vastaväite näyttää olevan kohtalokas Searlen subjektiivisuusargumentille. Subjektiivisuuden ongelma näyttää olevan perustava metafyysinen vedenjakaja, joka jakaa mielenfilosofiset teoriat toisaalta materialistisiin, toisaalta dualistisiin. Searle uskoo, että mieli-ruumis -ongelma (mind-body problem) on ratkaistavissa ilman, että tarvitsee valita kumpaakaan. Ratkaisu sisältyy kahteen Searlen näennäisesti yhteensopimattomaan teesiin. Ensimmäisen teesin mukaan mentaaliset tilat ovat todellisia ilmiöitä, eikä niitä voida redusoida mihinkään muuhun tai eliminoida määrittelemällä ne uudestaan. Toisen teesin mukaan aivojen operaatiot aiheuttavat mentaaliset tilat ja mentaaliset tilat ovat aivojen piirteitä. Teeseistä jälkimmäinen osoittautuu ongelmalliseksi syistä, jotka Jaegwon Kim on esittänyt. Jos mentaaliset tilat olisivat aivojen ominaisuuksia, ei mielen ja aivojen välinen suhde voisi olla kausaalinen, koska kausaatiossa (causation) on aina kyse kahden erillisen entiteetin tai tapahtuman välisestä relaatiosta, jossa suhteen osapuolien välillä on oltava ajallista etäisyyttä. Toiseksi Searlen vertaus tietoisuuden ja aivojen suhteesta kappaleen kiinteyden ja sen mikrorakenteen suhteeseen epäonnistuu, koska tietoisuus ja kiinteys kuuluvat Searlen teoriassa eri ontologisiin kategorioihin, eikä niitä siten voi ongelmattomasti rinnastaa. Searlen analogia kiinteyteen murtuu myös siksi, että kappaleen mikrorakenne ei yksinkertaisesti aiheuta sen kiinteyttä. Tietoisuus ei siis voi olla samanaikaisesti aivojen ominaisuus ja aivojen kausaalisen toiminnan seuraus. Tutkielmassa päädytään puolustamaan kantaa, että Searlen argumentit eivät ole vakuuttavia ja että Searle ei ole onnistunut eksplikoimaan teoriaa, joka välttäisi dualismiin ja materialismiin liittyvät tunnetut ongelmat. Kysymys mikä on mielen suhde ruumiiseen, jää siten avoimeksi. Avainsanat: intentionaalisuus, mentaalinen, mieli-ruumis -ongelma, Searle, subjektiivisuus, tietoisuus