31 resultados para First President
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.
Resumo:
In the autumn of 1997, Russian government was faced with media pressure when owners of the TV channels ORT and NTV joined forces against it. This study is based on media sources from October 1997 to December 1997. It shows clearly how the enormous power of the media was able to dictate what happened in Russia. In the mid-1990s Russians started to talk about political technology, which became a commonly used term by professionals, journalists, politicians and intelligence services. As a result of this action, two leading reformers in the government, Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, were dismissed from their highly influential posts as finance and energy ministers respectively, but retained their power as first deputy prime ministers. According to the correspondents, the real reason was to resolve a conflict within the parliament, which had demanded the dismissal of Mr. Chubais. This demand was presented after Chubais had accepted $90,000 as a reward for co-writing a book on privatization. Chubais was considered to be Russia’s “business card” towards the west – the"Authors’ case" (Delo avtorov) was only solved after President Boris Yeltsin took part in the public debate. According to the research, the media owned by powerful businessmen Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, was able to use its own security services to expose sensitive material (Russian term ‘kompromat’), if necessary, concerning any given person. The so-called Authors’ case can be considered as a part of the battle and the tip of the iceberg in arrangements designed to organize the funding of the Russian presidential election campaign in 2000. The reason why this particular incident was so widely covered on television was because several programs aimed to reveal to the public "hidden bribes" that, as they claimed, government officials had received. The political aspect, however, was quite mild, when the concrete issues of possible dismissals of Ministers were debated in the Parliament. Everything was dealt with as a “family matter” inside Kremlin. Yeltsin's "family" consisted of practically anybody from oligarch Berezovsky to Chubais, the father of Russia's privatization policy. Methods of critical history implementation analysis has been used in this research in determining the use of the source material. Literature and interviews have also provided a good base for the study. The study proves that any literature dealing with the subject has not paid enough attention to how the dismissal of Alexander Kazakov, deputy of President’s administration, was linked directly with Gazprom, the state gas monopoly. Kazakov had to leave Gazprom and lose his position as Chubais' ally when the influential ORT television company was deteriorated.
Resumo:
The main objective of the study is to evaluate the Finnish central government s foreign borrowing between the years 1862 and 1938. Most of this period was characterised by deep capital market integration that bears resemblance to the liberal world financial order at the turn of the millennium. The main aim is to analyse the credit risk associated with the state and its determination by evaluating the world financial market centres perception of Finland. By doing this, the study is also expected to provide an additional dimension to Finland s political and economic history by incorporating into the research the assessments of international capital markets regarding Finland during a period that witnessed profound political and economic changes in Finnish society. The evaluation of the credit risk mainly relies on exchange-rate risk free time series of the state s foreign bonds. They have been collected from quotations in the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Hamburg, Paris and London. In addition, it investigates Finland s exposure to short-term debt and Moody s credit ratings assigned to Finland. The study emphasises the importance of the political risk. It suggests that the hey-day of the state s reliance on foreign capital markets took place during last few decades of the 19th century when Finland enjoyed a wide autonomy in the Russian Empire and prudently managed its economy, highlighted in Finland s adherence to the international gold standard. Political confrontations in Finland and, in particular, in Russia and the turbulence of the world financial system prevented the return of this beneficial position again. Through its issuance of foreign bonds the state was able to import substantial amounts of foreign capital, which was sorely needed to foster economic development in Finland. Moreover, the study argues that the state s presence in the western capital markets not only had economic benefits, but it also increased the international awareness of Finland s distinct and separate status in the Russian Empire and later underlined its position as an independent republic.
Resumo:
The Russian mathematician, academician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich (b. 1923) is commonly mentioned in Western scholarly studies on perestroika and post-perestroika-era Russian politics as one of the most notable anti-Semites and extreme nationalists of the country. This notoriety owes to Shafarevich’s old samizdat article Russophobia, which was published in 1988. The scandal surrounding Russophobia came to a head when the president of The National Academy of Sciences in the United States asked Shafarevich, its honorary member, to resign. Nothing like this had ever happened in the academy’s history. The present dissertation discusses Shafarevich’s political activities, his texts and ideas as well as their reception. Particular attention is given to Russophobia, whose detailed examination proves very clearly that its reputation as an anti-Semitic text is groundless. The reasons for Russophobia’s hasty but fierce condemnation were many, but only one was that when the Soviet system began to tumble, it was commonly assumed that a vigorous rise in anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism in the Soviet Union/Russia would be just a matter of time. Many observers were highly sensitised to detecting its signs and symptoms. The dissertation also shows that most of those to write the first criticisms of Russophobia and to liken Shafarevich to the ideologues of Nazi Germany were the same people he had criticised in Russophobia for their deterministic view of history and irrational manner of connecting things for the purpose of fanning the flames of distrust between Russia’s Jews and Russians. In retrospect, it is fairly evident that Shafarevich actually managed to effectively “neutralise” the message of many of those obsessed with the Jews among his Russian contemporaries and contributed to the fact that anti-Jewish sentiments have been a great deal less popular in post-communist Russia than so many had feared and expected. The thesis also thoroughly discusses Shafarevich’s other texts and activities before Russophobia’s appearance and after it. In the 1970s, Shafarevich was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He worked together with academician Andrei Sakharov in a dissidents’ unofficial human rights committee and co-operated closely with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn before Solzhenitsyn’s exile. Then, during the chaotic years of perestroika, Shafarevich defended the basic rights of ordinary citizens and warned that the hype concerning democracy could become counterproductive if the most palpable result of the reforms was the disappearance of citizens’ basic security and elementary social justice. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that even if the world around Shafarevich has changed considerably, his views have remained essentially the same since the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Resumo:
Atmospheric aerosol particles have a significant impact on air quality, human health and global climate. The climatic effects of secondary aerosol are currently among the largest uncertainties limiting the scientific understanding of future and past climate changes. To better estimate the climatic importance of secondary aerosol particles, detailed information on atmospheric particle formation mechanisms and the vapours forming the aerosol is required. In this thesis we studied these issues by applying novel instrumentation in a boreal forest to obtain direct information on the very first steps of atmospheric nucleation and particle growth. Additionally, we used detailed laboratory experiments and process modelling to determine condensational growth properties, such as saturation vapour pressures, of dicarboxylic acids, which are organic acids often found in atmospheric samples. Based on our studies, we came to four main conclusions: 1) In the boreal forest region, both sulphurous compounds and organics are needed for secondary particle formation, the previous contributing mainly to particle formation and latter to growth; 2) A persistent pool of molecular clusters, both neutral and charged, is present and participates in atmospheric nucleation processes in boreal forests; 3) Neutral particle formation seems to dominate over ion-mediated mechanisms, at least in the boreal forest boundary layer; 4) The subcooled liquid phase saturation vapour pressures of C3-C9 dicarboxylic acids are of the order of 1e-5 1e-3 Pa at atmospheric temperatures, indicating that a mixed pre-existing particulate phase is required for their condensation in atmospheric conditions. The work presented in this thesis gives tools to better quantify the aerosol source provided by secondary aerosol formation. The results are particularly useful when estimating, for instance, anthropogenic versus biogenic influences and the fractions of secondary aerosol formation explained by neutral or ion-mediated nucleation mechanisms, at least in environments where the average particle formation rates are of the order of some tens of particles per cubic centimeter or lower. However, as the factors driving secondary particle formation are likely to vary depending on the environment, measurements on atmospheric nucleation and particle growth are needed from around the world to be able to better describe the secondary particle formation, and assess its climatic effects on a global scale.
Resumo:
The struggle over globalization has arguably been the most important debate in world politics of the 2000 s. This study maps the origins of this debate, its most important actors and its results so far. The focus is on the Global Justice Movement which launched the globalization debate to the mass media spotlight. Particular attention is given to the World Social Forum, the movement s global gathering, analyzed as a new form of global publics. The mediation of the debates initiated by these publics to the Finnish national context is analyzed at two levels: First, through forums for policy debate such as the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy and second, through the public debate in the Finnish mass media. The study proves many common assumptions about the Global Justice Movement wrong. Rather than being a marginal actor, the movement is the initiator of the whole debate. Combining expert knowledge to carnevalistic demonstrations rarely seen in Finland, the movement gains more public attention and more members in Finland than in many other European countries. The political and economic elites are not just adversaries of the movement. Rather, the Finnish elite is divided in two. Some top politicians starting from the president and the minister for foreign affairs adopt many of the movement s claims. Later, the business elite, with support from the nation s largest newspaper, begins a counterattack to challenge the movement and its allies. The return of politics staged by the movement is, first and foremost, a phenomenon in the public sphere. Two downward trends, the decline of party politics and the traditionally strong Finnish field of politically oriented civic associations remain unchanged. This allows for the conclusion that we are witnessing a move from organizational politics towards politics in the public sphere. The study develops a theoretical perspective on social movements as actors in the public sphere. It argues that movements have, in fact, played an important role in the very development of the democratic public sphere as we know it. In the light of this observation, the study assesses the potentials and the pitfalls of social movements and their related publics to global democracy. Methodologically, the most important contribution is the development of Public Justifications Analysis, a method for analyzing political claims in media debates and the ways in which these claims are justified.
Resumo:
Memory Meanders is an ethnographic analysis of a postcolonial migrant community, white former Rhodesians, who have emigrated from Zimbabwe to South Africa after Zimbabwe s independence in 1980. An estimated 100 000 whites left the country during the first years of independence. Majority of these emigrants settled in South Africa. In recent years President Mugabe s land redistribution program has inflicted forced expulsions and violence against white farmers and black farm workers, and instigated a new wave of emigration. Concerning the study of Southern Africa, my research is therefore very topical. In recent years there has been a growing concern to study postcolonialism as it unfolds in the lived realities of actual postcolonies. A rising interest has also been cast on colonial cultures and white colonials within complex power relationships. My research offers insight to these discussions by investigating the ways in which the colonial past affects and effects in the present activities and ideas of former colonials. The study also takes part in discussing fundamental questions concerning how diaspora communities socially construct their place in the world in relation to the place left behind, to their current places of dwelling and to the community in dispersal. In spite of Rhodesia s incontestable ending, it is held close by social practices; by thoughts and talks, by material displays, and by webs of meaningful relationships. Such social memory practices, I suggest, are fundamental to how the community understands itself. The vantage points from which I examine how the ex-Rhodesians reminisce about Rhodesia concern ideas and practices related to place, home and commemoration. I first focus on the processes of symbolic investment that go into understanding place and landscape in Rhodesia and ask how the once dwelled-in places, iconic landscapes and experiences within places are reminisced about in diaspora. Secondly, I examine how home both as a mundanely organized sphere of everyday lives and as an idea of belonging is culturally configured, and analyze how and if homes travel in diaspora. In the final ethnographic section I focus on commemorative practices. I first analyze how food and culturally specific festive occasions of commensality are connected to social and sensual memory, considering the unique ways in which food acts as a mnemonic trigger in a diaspora community. The second example concerns the celebration of a centenary of Rhodesia in 1990. Through this case I describe how the mnemonic power of commemoration rests on the fact that culturally meaningful experiences are bodily re-enacted. I show how habitual memory connected to performance is one example of how memory gets passed-on in non-textual ways.
Resumo:
The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.
Resumo:
The analysis uses data from an integrated luminosity of approximately 172 pb-1 of ppbar collisions at sqrt(s)=1.96 TeV, collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron. The Lambda_b and B0 relative branching fractions are measured to be: B(Lambda_b to Lambda_c+ mu nu)/B(Lambda_b to Lambda_c+ pi) = 16.6 +- 3.0 (stat) +- 1.0 (syst) +2.6 -3.4 (PDG) +- 0.3 (EBR), B(B0 to D+ mu nu)/B(B0 to D+ pi) = 9.9 +- 1.0 (stat) +- 0.6 (syst) +- 0.4 (PDG) +- 0.5 (EBR), B(B0 to D*+ mu nu)/B(B0 to D*+ pi) = 16.5 +- 2.3 (stat) +- 0.6 (syst) +- 0.5 (PDG) +- 0.8 (EBR) This article also presents measurements of the branching fractions of four new Lambda_b semileptonic decays: Lambda_b to Lambda_c(2595)+ mu nu, Lambda_b to Lambda_c(2625)+ mu nu, Lambda_b to Sigma_c(2455)0 pi mu nu, Lambda_b to Sigma_c(2455)++ pi mu nu, relative to the branching fraction of the Lambda_b to Lambda_c mu nu decay. Finally, the transverse-momentum distribution of Lambda_b baryons produced in p-pbar collisions is measured and found to be significantly different from that of B0 mesons.
Resumo:
A combined mass and particle identification fit is used to make the first observation of the decay Bs --> Ds K and measure the branching fraction of Bs --> Ds K relative to Bs --> Ds pi. This analysis uses 1.2 fb^-1 integrated luminosity of pbar-p collisions at sqrt(s) = 1.96 TeV collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron collider. We observe a Bs --> Ds K signal with a statistical significance of 8.1 sigma and measure Br(Bs --> Ds K)/Br(Bs --> Ds pi) = 0.097 +- 0.018(stat) +- 0.009(sys).
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The cross section for jets from b quarks produced with a W boson has been measured in ppbar collision data from 1.9/fb of integrated luminosity recorded by the CDF II detector at the Tevatron. The W+b-jets process poses a significant background in measurements of top quark production and prominent searches for the Higgs boson. We measure a b-jet cross section of 2.74 +- 0.27(stat.) +- 0.42(syst.) pb in association with a single flavor of leptonic W boson decay over a limited kinematic phase space. This measured result cannot be accommodated in several available theoretical predictions.
Resumo:
This article presents the first measurement of the ratio of branching fractions B(Λb0→Λc+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(Λb0→Λc+π-). Measurements in two control samples using the same technique B(B̅ 0→D+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(B̅ 0→D+π-) and B(B̅ 0→D*(2010)+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(B̅ 0→D*(2010)+π-) are also reported. The analysis uses data from an integrated luminosity of approximately 172 pb-1 of pp̅ collisions at √s=1.96 TeV, collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron. The relative branching fractions are measured to be B(Λb0→Λc+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(Λb0→Λc+π-)=16.6±3.0(stat)±1.0(syst)+2.6/-3.4(PDG)±0.3(EBR), B(B̅ 0→D+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(B̅ 0→D+π-)= 9.9±1.0(stat)±0.6(syst)±0.4(PDG)±0.5(EBR), and B(B̅ 0→D*(2010)+μ-ν̅ μ)/B(B̅ 0→D*(2010)+π-)=16.5±2.3(stat)± 0.6(syst)±0.5(PDG)±0.8(EBR). The uncertainties are from statistics (stat), internal systematics (syst), world averages of measurements published by the Particle Data Group or subsidiary measurements in this analysis (PDG), and unmeasured branching fractions estimated from theory (EBR), respectively. This article also presents measurements of the branching fractions of four new Λb0 semileptonic decays: Λb0→Λc(2595)+μ-ν̅ μ, Λb0→Λc(2625)+μ-ν̅ μ, Λb0→Σc(2455)0π+μ-ν̅ μ, and Λb0→Σc(2455)++π-μ-ν̅ μ, relative to the branching fraction of the Λb0→Λc+μ-ν̅ μ decay. Finally, the transverse-momentum distribution of Λb0 baryons produced in pp̅ collisions is measured and found to be significantly different from that of B̅ 0 mesons, which results in a modification in the production cross-section ratio σΛb0/σB̅ 0 with respect to the CDF I measurement.
Resumo:
A combined mass and particle identification fit is used to make the first observation of the decay B̅ s0→Ds±K∓ and measure the branching fraction of B̅ s0→Ds±K∓ relative to B̅ s0→Ds+π-. This analysis uses 1.2 fb-1 integrated luminosity of pp̅ collisions at √s=1.96 TeV collected with the CDF II detector at the Fermilab Tevatron collider. We observe a B̅ s0→Ds±K∓ signal with a statistical significance of 8.1σ and measure B(B̅ s0→Ds±K∓)/B(B̅ s0→Ds+π-)=0.097±0.018(stat)±0.009(syst).