Evidence of Partisan Emphasis on EMU during 1994–1999 : Comparing Finnish Parties

This study explores the EMU stand taken by the major Finnish political parties from 1994 to 1999. The starting point is the empirical evidence showing that party responses to European integration are shaped by a mix of national and cross-national factors, with national factors having more explanatory value. The study is the first to produce evidence that classified party documents such as protocols, manifestos and authoritative policy summaries may describe the EMU policy emphasis. In fact, as the literature review demonstrates, it has been unclear so far what kind of stand the three major Finnish political parties took during 1994–1999. Consequently, this study makes a substantive contribution to understanding the factors that shaped EMU party policies, and eventually, the national EMU policy during the 1990s. The research questions addressed are the following: What are the main factors that shaped partisan standpoints on EMU during 1994–1999? To what extent did the policy debate and themes change in the political parties? How far were the policies of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party shaped by factors unique to their own national contexts? Furthermore, to what extent were they determined by cross-national influences from abroad, and especially from countries with which Finland has a special relationship, such as Sweden? The theoretical background of the study is in the area of party politics and approaches to EU policies, and party change, developed mainly by Kevin Featherstone, Peter Mair and Richard Katz. At the same time, it puts forward generic hypotheses that help to explain party standpoints on EMU. It incorporates a large quantity of classified new material based on primary research through content analysis and interviews. Quantitative and qualitative methods are used sequentially in order to overcome possible limitations. Established content-analysis techniques improve the reliability of the data. The coding frame is based on the salience theory of party competition. Interviews with eight party leaders and one independent expert civil servant provided additional insights and improve the validity of the data. Public-opinion surveys and media coverage are also used to complete the research path. Four major conclusions are drawn from the research findings. First, the quantitative and the interview data reveal the importance of the internal influences within the parties that most noticeably shaped their EMU policies during the 1990s. In contrast, international events play a minor role. The most striking feature turned out to be the strong emphasis by all of the parties on economic goals. However, it is important to note that the factors manifest differences between economic, democratic and international issues across the three major parties. Secondly, it seems that the parties have transformed into centralised and professional organisations in terms of their EMU policy-making. The weight and direction of party EMU strategy rests within the leadership and a few administrative elites. This could imply changes in their institutional environment. Eventually, parties may appear generally less differentiated and more standardised in their policy-making. Thirdly, the case of the Social Democratic Party shows that traditional organisational links continue to exist between the left and the trade unions in terms of their EMU policy-making. Hence, it could be that the parties have not yet moved beyond their conventional affiliate organisations. Fourthly, parties tend to neglect citizen opinion and demands with regard to EMU, which could imply conflict between the changes in their strategic environment. They seem to give more attention to the demands of political competition (party-party relationships) than to public attitudes (party-voter relationships), which would imply that they have had to learn to be more flexible and responsive. Finally, three suggestions for institutional reform are offered, which could contribute to the emergence of legitimised policy-making: measures to bring more party members and voter groups into the policy-making process; measures to adopt new technologies in order to open up the policy-formation process in the early phase; and measures to involve all interest groups in the policy-making process.

Teatteri liikkeessä : Työväenteatterit Suomen teatterikentällä ja työväenliikkeessä kaksiteatterijärjestelmän syntyyn asti vuonna 1922

Workers' theatres in Finland until 1922 The topic of this dissertation is the workers' theatres in Finland before the year 1922. The main question is: why did these amateur theatres within the workers' associations become part of the professional theatre field in the 1910s by getting state subsidy as local theatre institutions? How is it possible that they received this status even after the civil war in 1918 when new professional theatres were founded all over the country? The study also asks, what kind of position did workers' theatres have in the workers' associations and in the workers' movement, what did the Social Democrats and Communists think of theatre and in particular of workers' theatre, and what kind of repertoire did the workers' theatres perform? It is a particular feature of Finland that the professional theatre field was not organised and that the workers’ movement had a relatively strong political position. The study concludes that some workers' theatres were the only steady theatre institutions in their surroundings, and thus functioned as local popular theatres performing to all social groups. Although amateur-based, they started to resemble professional theatres. Even though the Social Democratic Party did not have a specific theatre policy, the leaders of the Party appreciated and supported the workers' theatres as educational institutions and worked for their artistic improvement. The workers' theatres were also largely approved of and seen as people's theatres thought to unite and educate the nation and the working class. This reveals the need for national consensus, in the 1910s against the Russian government who worked to dissolve the autonomous position of the Finnish state, and after the civil war (1918) against the threat of a communist revolution. A wave of agitating proletarian theatre was felt in Finland in the early 1920s but it was marginalised by the large anti-communist majority.

"Politiikka on kirkossa" : Keskustapuolueen kirkkopoliittisten tavoitteiden muotoutuminen vuosina 1966–1978

This study in church history deals with the formation of aims in the church politics of the Centre Party during a period of extensive politicisation in Finnish society – 1966 to 1978. The focus is on the processes of creating political input within the party organisation. The most important source material consists of the records of the highest party organs as well as material from the party office and the party’s committee for church politics. In the late 1960s, at a time of leftist radicalism in Finnish society, issues concerning the Church were seldom dealt with in the highest party organs, even though informal discussion took place within the party. This phase was followed by a conservative reaction in society during the 1970s. The rightist trend as well as the ongoing politicisation process substantially strengthened the role of church politics in the party. An aim of great importance was to prevent those supporters who belonged to the Lutheran revival movements from moving into the Finnish Christian League. Therefore it became increasingly important to prove that the Centre Party was defending the Church as well as so-called Christian values in state politics, e.g., by advocating religious instruction in schools. The Centre Party also defended the independence and legal status of the Church, at the same time positioning itself against Finland’s Social Democratic Party. Many party members were of the opinion that the church politics should have been about defending the Church and Christian values in state politics instead of defending the proportional share of the party’s seats in the ecclesiastical decision-making system. Nevertheless, the struggle for hegemony between the Centre Party and the Social Democrats was reflected in the Evangelical Lutheran Church particularly since 1973. Thus the aims of church politics were increasingly directed towards ecclesiastical elections and appointments in the 1970s. To justify its activities in church elections, the party stressed that it was not politicising the Church. To the contrary, it was asserted that the church leaders themselves had politicised the Church by favouring the Social Democrats. These alleged efforts to affiliate the Church with one political party were strictly condemned in the Centre Party. But when it came to the political parties’ activity in church elections, opinions diverged. Generally, the issues of church politics resembled those of the party’s trade union politics in the 1970s.

Stalinismin lyhyt kurssi : Suomalaiset Moskovan Lenin-koulussa 1926-1938

This study of the Finns at the International Lenin School (ILS) reflects history of the Soviet Union during Stalin's era, history of the Communist International (Comintern) as well as history of Finnish communism. The life span of the ILS (1926-1938) matches up with creating and establishing the power structures of Stalinism. Both the ILS and Finnish Communism in the USSR became casualties of the Great Terror (1937-1938). After the WW2, however, the Soviet education was appreciated inside the Communist Party of Finland (CPF). If Finland would have become People's Democracy, the former ILS students would have composed the inner circle of the new "democratic" government. The Finnish teachers of the ILS were leaders of the CPF that was headquartered in Moscow. At the ILS studied in total 141 Finnish communists. The purpose of the ILS was to educate the communist parties' leading stratum of functionaries. They were supposed to internalize current values, methods and discipline of the Bolsheviks. This study evaluates the effects of the total school experience on the Finns that often ended in another total institution in Finland: prison. The curricula of the ILS consisted of theory of Marxism-Leninism, party history, political economics and themes of campaigns of Stalinism. The ILS year included participation in Bolshevik party life and practical work. During summer excursions (praktikas) the students could acquaint themselves with building of socialism in the Soviet Republics. At the ILS, intention to ideological moulding was not hidden. The students were supposed to adopt the Stalinist identity of the professional revolutionaries of the era. The ILS was saturated with ideology and propaganda. This study analyzes especially uses of history as vehicle of ideological standardisation and as instrument of power. Stalin contributed personally to shortcomings of history writing of the communist party. Later he supervised writing of the inclusive handbook of communism, "History of the All-Union Communist Party. Short Course". Special attention will be paid to the effects of Stalin's intervention at the ILS and inside the CPF. The life of the Finns at the ILS and outside the school is described at grass roots. The dividing line between personal and political is analyzed by charting emotional, intimate and bodily experiences of the Finns of the ILS. The fates of the ILS Finns after the studying or teaching period in Moscow are explored in detail. The protagonist among the teachers is Yrjö Sirola that was called "father of the CPF cadres". The Finnish ILS teachers and the formed students that had remained in the USSR were most severely hit by the Great Terror. The Soviet education had most importance in Finland of post WW2 period. The training at the ILS, however, did not contribute to revolution in Finland. The main heading of the study, "A Short Course of Stalinism", crystallises interpretation of the ILS as seat of learning of ideological unity of Stalinism. On the other hand, the title includes a statement of incompleteness of the Stalinist education if the schooling at the ILS had remained in one year.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.

Forest governance and climate change adaptation : Case studies of four African countries

Africa is threatened by climate change. The adaptive capacity of local communities continues to be weakened by ineffective and inefficient livelihood strategies and inappropriate development interventions. One of the greatest challenges for climate change adaptation in Africa is related to the governance of natural resources used by vulnerable poor groups as assets for adaptation. Practical and good governance activities for adaptation in Africa is urgently and much needed to support adaptation actions, interventions and planning. The adaptation role of forests has not been as prominent in the international discourse and actions as their mitigation role. This study therefore focused on the forest as one of the natural resources used for adaptation. The general objective of this research was to assess the extent to which cases of current forest governance practices in four African countries Burkina Faso, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana and Sudan are supportive to the adaptation of vulnerable societies and ecosystems to impacts of climate change. Qualitative and quantitative analyses from surveys, expert consultations and group discussions were used in analysing the case studies. The entire research was guided by three conceptual sets of thinking forest governance, climate change vulnerability and ecosystem services. Data for the research were collected from selected ongoing forestry activities and programmes. The study mainly dealt with forest management policies and practices that can improve the adaptation of forest ecosystems (Study I) and the adaptive capacity through the management of forest resources by vulnerable farmers (Studies II, III, IV and V). It was found that adaptation is not part of current forest policies, but, instead, policies contain elements of risk management practices, which are also relevant to the adaptation of forest ecosystems. These practices include, among others, the management of forest fires, forest genetic resources, non-timber resources and silvicultural practices. Better livelihood opportunities emerged as the priority for the farmers. These vulnerable farmers had different forms of forest management. They have a wide range of experience and practical knowledge relevant to ensure and achieve livelihood improvement alongside sustainable management and good governance of natural resources. The contributions of traded non-timber forest products to climate change adaptation appear limited for local communities, based on their distribution among the stakeholders in the market chain. Plantation (agro)forestry, if well implemented and managed by communities, has a high potential in reducing socio-ecological vulnerability by increasing the food production and restocking degraded forest lands. Integration of legal arrangements with continuous monitoring, evaluation and improvement may drive this activity to support short, medium and long term expectations related to adaptation processes. The study concludes that effective forest governance initiatives led by vulnerable poor groups represent one practical way to improve the adaptive capacities of socio-ecological systems against the impacts of climate change in Africa.